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THE SOVIET UNION
AND PEACE

THE SOVIET UNION AND PEACE

*The most important of
the documents issued by
the Government of the
U.S.S.R. concerning
peace and disarmament
from 1917 to 1929*

With an introduction by
HENRI BARBUSSE



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FOREWORD

THIS collection of authentic documents has been issued for the purpose of acquainting wide circles in this country with the facts as to the Soviet Union and peace.

All the most important and valuable documents, chiefly of a diplomatic nature, will be found here; indeed, this is the most complete collection of Soviet documents dealing directly with the question of peace that has so far seen the light.

The documents have been placed under five heads for the greater convenience of readers; *a.* the November Revolution and Peace; *b.* Soviet Russia at Peace Conferences; *c.* the U.S.S.R. Disarmament Campaign; *d.* the U.S.S.R. and the Kellogg Pact; *e.* the U.S.S.R. and Pacts of Neutrality and Non-Aggression.

The introductory article gives a summary (based on the diplomatic documents included herein) of the Soviet Union's struggle for peace.

The documents published are translated from the French whenever that was the language originally employed; in all other cases the translation is from the Russian.

THE SOVIET UNION AND PEACE

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet Union and Peace

THERE can hardly be a single State whose history is so full of endeavours for the effective establishment of peace throughout the world as is the eleven years' history of the Soviet Union. Nor can the endeavours of any State have come up against such extraordinary obstacles as the Soviet Union's peace policy has encountered.

From its first decree "On Peace" (issued on the morrow of its coming into power) to its adherence to the Kellogg Pact, the Soviet Government has struggled for peace with remarkable persistence and inexhaustible energy, proposing peace to its opponents, raising its voice for immediate, universal and complete disarmament, and acting as initiators in the conclusion of mutual non-aggression and neutrality pacts.

The Government of the Soviet Union has never failed to avail itself of any opportunity arising in international politics for the furtherance of peace—and peace for all the peoples of the world, as well as for its own country. All the diplomatic activities of the Soviet Union bear testimony to this aspiration for universal peace—never lost sight of in the darkest hour of defeat or the elation of victory. The Soviet Union holds the same language with regard to peace for all countries—for those that directly attacked it, for those that have entered into normal diplomatic relations with it, and for those who still refuse, despite its eleven years of existence and ever-increasing development, to "recognise" the Soviet State.

The history of these efforts is a remarkable one, and worthy of attentive study, as well as closer acquaintance. It is not only the first stage of the Soviet Union's struggle for peace that is remarkable for those efforts, that first stage of intense endeavours to emerge from the nightmare of world-war and establish peaceful relations, both with the Governments of Central Europe and with the Entente, whatever might be the outcome of the war for revolutionary Soviet Russia. All the most important stages in the peace activities of the Soviet Union—its participation in peace conferences, in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, its adherence to the Kellogg Pact—are equally rich in new formulae, original suggestions, and exhaustive projects from the Soviet Government, every one of which has been directed towards the actual solution of the highly complicated problem of universal peace.

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The historic Peace Decree issued by the Soviet Government on the morrow of its own formation was chronologically the second of the original, basic decrees of the Soviet Government, determining its policy for many years ahead. This decree, passed unanimously at the Second All Russian Congress of Soviets, at its session of November 8th, 1917, was rather a political declaration inviting "all belligerent nations and their Governments to begin immediate negotiations for a just and democratic peace" than a decree in the literal sense of the word. Precisely defining what the Russian workers and peasants and their newly-formed Government understand by the term "democratic peace," the decree continues "the Government of Russia invites all belligerent nations to conclude immediately such a peace, expressing its readiness to take without the slightest delay any decisive steps for the final confirmation of all conditions of such a peace by representative assemblies of all countries and nationalities." The decree then informs all belligerent nations and their Governments that the Soviet Government *renounces secret diplomacy* and hopes that negotiations will be carried on quite openly. The Soviet Government at the same time declared that it was ready to carry on negotiations either through the postal and telegraphic services, by conversations between representatives of various countries, or by conferences of such representatives,

and that it was willing to send its representatives abroad to a neutral country.

On the same day the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs sent a note to the ambassadors of the " Allied " countries, informing them of the formation of the Government of the All-Russian Republic in the form of a Council of People's Commissars, under the presidency of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and drew attention to the Peace Decree as a document making formal proposals for an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace negotiations. This, the Soviet Government's first diplomatic Note, ended with an assurance of profound respect for the nation represented by the ambassador addressed, " which, like all the other nations, exhausted and drained of blood by the unexampled slaughter, cannot but long for peace."

Two days after, the Soviet Government attempted to get into touch with the " neutral " countries, sending them a circular note on the proposals made to the " Allies " and asking them to bring them before " the enemy's side, instructions having already been given for the opening of negotiations with the enemy for an armistice."

The Allies rejected these first attempts of the Soviet Government to extricate the people of Russia, and with them the people of the belligerent countries, from the bloodshed of war. The only affirmative reply was that received from the German High Command, whose aims were the opposite of those laid down in the Decree for a just, democratic peace.

On November 28th, 1917, the Council of People's Commissars again appealed to the peoples in the belligerent countries with a proposal to join in negotiations for an armistice. The Soviet Government stated that they had postponed the beginning of negotiations until December 1st, " in order once more to invite the Allied Governments to define their attitude to the question of peace negotiations." The Soviet Government asked the people in the Allied countries : " Do they agree to go on with this unreasonable and pointless massacre, to go blindly to the ruin of the whole of European culture." This document gave warning that the Russian army and the Russian people could not and would not wait any longer, and that if the Allied peoples did not send their representatives, the Russian Soviets alone would open negotia-

tions with the Germans, which would, in any case, begin on December 1st.

Both this document and many others testify to the extraordinary efforts made by the Soviet Government to get the question of peace solved in the interests of all the belligerent nations and those of the whole of humanity.

In appealing to the Western nations the Soviet Government did not forget those of the East, the more that the secret documents of the Tsarist Government bore witness to bargains at the expense of the Mohammedans, especially with regard to the Near East. During the first month after its formation the Soviet Government appealed (on December 7th, 1917) to all Mohammedan workers in Russia and the East (Persians, Turks, Arabs, Indians) for their support of its efforts for peace. This document ended as follows :

“ We declare that the secret treaties of the deposed Tsar with regard to the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the late Kerensky Government, are now null and void. The Russian Republic and its Government, the Council of People's Commissars, are opposed to the annexation of foreign territory : Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Mohammedans.

“ We declare that the treaty of the division of Persia is null and void. As soon as military activity is ended the Russian troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of free determination.

“ We declare that the treaty for the division of Turkey and the annexation of Armenia is null and void. As soon as military activity is ended the Armenians will be guaranteed the free determination of their political fate.

“ We are progressing firmly and resolutely towards an honest democratic peace.”

By a series of notes in the ensuing days and weeks to Turkey and Persia, the Soviet Government gave these countries official assurance that the secret treaties detrimental to them had been annulled, and that the order for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Persia had already been given.

The further policy of the Soviet Government towards Afghanistan, Mongolia and China, with the renunciation of the unequal treaties, showed in practice its desire for a real peace in the East as well as in the West.

While the Soviet Government was carrying on preparatory negotiations with the Germans, the destructive struggle was being continued in the West. On December 1st, 1917, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, in an address to the oppressed and exhausted workers in European countries, stated that an armistice had been signed at Brest-Litovsk and that military activities had been suspended on the Eastern front. The appeal states : " This act in itself represents an enormous victory for humanity. After forty-two months of uninterrupted slaughter, with no result in sight, the workers' and peasants' revolution in Russia has opened the way to peace." This document affirmed that there were no hopes of the imperialist Governments agreeing to a democratic peace, that the slaughter was going on on the other fronts, and that the people themselves would have to take the matter of the conclusion of peace into their own hands.

Meanwhile negotiations with the Germans were revived and the Soviet Delegation at Brest-Litovsk issued a declaration showing the Soviet Government's conception of a just, democratic peace. A week after (December 30th, 1917) the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, not abandoning the idea of drawing the Allies into the question of peace, again appealed with an exhaustive note to the people and Governments in the Allied countries, stating that " the Brest-Litovsk negotiations had been suspended for 10 days until January 8th, 1918, to give the Allied countries a last opportunity to participate in further negotiations, and thus guarantee themselves against the results of a separate peace between Russia and the enemy countries." Further, describing the difference in the two peace-programmes—of the Soviet and German Governments—the declaration again asserts that the Allies refused to define their attitude to the peace-proposals of the Soviet Government, thus lengthening the war and involving countless fresh sacrifices.

Meanwhile the independent withdrawal of Soviet Russia from the war was taken advantage of by the Allies to break off relations and embark upon an unofficial war with the R.S.F.S.R. The period of intervention and blockade set in. In its appeal to the toiling masses of France, England, America, Italy, and Japan, of August 1st, 1918, the Council of People's Commissars made a summary of the Allies' intervention, stated the fundamental

causes of Soviet Russia's withdrawal from the war, and appealed to the people themselves to counteract the crimes, in the form of continued military activities against the workers' and peasants' State, which were being prepared.

The Soviet Government exerted all its strength to bring the people of Russia and the people of Europe to peace. It used every opportunity for the achievement of that end. On August 6th, 1918, G. V. Chicherin wrote to Mr. Poole, the American Consul, who was still continuing to fulfil, without the slightest hindrance, his consular duties in Moscow, asking him to bring to the notice of the Governments and people "in foreign countries," the fact that a perfectly unjustified attack and a blatant act of violence had been committed against Soviet Russia. G. V. Chicherin asked Mr. Poole : " Since you have assured us that your country has no desire to destroy the Soviets, we would now ask you if you cannot tell us plainly what Great Britain wants from us. Does Great Britain want to destroy the most popular Government that the world has ever seen—the Councils of Workers and Peasants ? Is their aim counter-revolutionary ? We must assume that their desires amount to the reinstatement of the worst tyranny in the world—the detested Tsarist Government. Or are they thinking of the annexation of any special nationality or territory ? "

The same question was repeated by G. V. Chicherin on October 24th, 1918, in a Note to President Wilson, with the addition of a recital of the numerous facts of allied intervention, pointing out that, despite President Wilson's own declaration, his own troops had committed violence against the Soviet population in the Far East and the North, and plainly asking : " What do the Governments of America, England and France want from the Russian people ? Is it concessions, the transfer to them on certain conditions of mines, etc., or territorial concessions in any part of Siberia, the Caucasus or the Murmansk coast ? " As was anticipated, no answer was received to this Note.

On November 3rd, 1918, the Soviet Government made a fresh, formal proposal through the representatives of the neutral Entente Powers remaining in Moscow, and confirmed this proposal on November 8th by a special resolution of Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, to begin peace negotiations.

On December 24th, 1918, M. M. Litvinov, at that time mem-

ber of the Board of the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, sent an exhaustive note to President Wilson, who had just arrived in London, stating that he had full powers to enter into negotiations for the peaceful solution of all differences causing hostile activities against the Soviets, and suggesting the cessation of the illegal war against the Soviet State on the basis of concessions, together with the peaceful development of the "social principles" on which the Soviet State was founded.

On January 12th, 1919, G. V. Chicherin made another peace proposal to the United States of America. In this Note he pointed out that there was no sort of justification for the continued presence of American troops on Soviet territory. Referring to the speeches of certain American senators with regard to intervention, the Note stated: "We hope that the peaceful views of the above-mentioned senators are shared by the American Government and would ask it to be so kind as to inform us where and when peace negotiations with our representatives can be begun."

On January 14th, 1919, this proposal was repeated through Stockholm to the Entente Powers, and on January 17th, in connection with the declarations of the French Confederation of Labour and Socialist Party, with regard to non-intervention by the Entente Powers in the affairs of Soviet Russia, the Soviet Government once more repeated its peace proposals to the Entente Governments: "The Government of the Soviet Republic would like to know if deeds are soon to follow the above-mentioned declarations and what these deeds will be, and if negotiations between the Governments of the Entente Powers and the Government of the Russian Soviet Republic for the fulfilment of the spirit of these declarations will soon be opened."

At this time the Soviet Government in its search for peace responded affirmatively even to an anonymous wireless telegram from an unknown address, with regard to an invitation by the Entente Powers for representatives of the "organised groups" fighting in Russia to go to Prinkipo Island for peace negotiations, only stipulating for preliminary cessation of hostilities. In its exhaustive reply the Soviet Government, pointing to its successes on the home fronts, nevertheless declared itself ready "to begin negotiations immediately, either on Prinkipo Island or any other place to which the Entente Powers might agree, either to meet

individual powers or any Russian groups—according to the wishes of the Entente Powers. The Soviet Government requests the Entente Powers to inform it immediately where, when and in what way to send its representatives.”

One of the most remarkable documents was the draft agreement drawn up on March 12th, 1919, by the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. and William Bullitt (sent to Russia by President Wilson) ; this proposal testifies to the intense desire for peace on the part of the Soviet Government, even at the expense of extraordinary concessions and sacrifices. This agreement would have imposed a heavy burden on Soviet Russia, proposing as it did the division of Russia between various Governments (Soviet and “ White Guard ”), and in addition the acknowledgment of the financial obligations of former Governments. The Allies, however, gave no answer whatever to this extraordinarily important document, which, as a matter of fact, was extremely advantageous for them at that time.

After this the Soviet Government appealed several times to the Entente Powers, both directly and through the agency of Professor Nansen, with proposals for an armistice and the establishment of peace conditions. It also made representations to the governments of Finland, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, for the cessation of hostilities. But all these persistent attempts to achieve peace remained, as before, fruitless. Indeed, early in October, 1919, the Supreme Council of Allied and Associated Powers appealed to Germany and the Governments of the neutral countries “ with regard to means for exercising economic pressure on Bolshevik Russia.” These measures for economic pressure, proposed by the Allies, included : obstacles to commerce, detention of steamers going to Russian ports, refusal of passports for persons wishing to go to Soviet Russia, prohibition of relations with “ Bolshevik Russia ” by post, telegraph or radio, etc. The economic blockade became ever more rigorous, closing round the young Soviet country in a death grip.

On December 5th, 1919, the Seventh All Russian Congress of Soviets made a detailed summary, in its political resolution on the report of the Government, of all the attempts of the Soviet Government directed at the realisation of peace, approved of these attempts, confirmed the steady aspirations of the people in

Soviet Russia towards peace, and once more proposed immediate peace negotiations to the Entente Governments.

The year 1919, like the previous year, ended in non-success with regard to peace with the Allies, despite all the efforts of Soviet Russia to persuade the Allies and its own nearest neighbours to conclude a firm peace. But there was no failure in the energy of the Soviet Government, despite this non-success ; on the contrary its peace proposals became yet more insistent.

At last the irrefutable victories over the " White " armies, internal stabilisation, and the sympathy enjoyed by the Soviet Government, especially as regards its peace policy, among the masses in the Entente countries, forced the Entente Powers, through the Supreme Council of the Allied Powers at Paris, to declare, pressed by political and economic necessity, for the resumption of trade relations with the Soviet Government. The Entente blockade was broken.

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The removal of the blockade and the cessation of intervention could not, of course, bring to an end, or in any way weaken, the Soviet Union's struggle for peace. The danger of armed conflicts between peoples had not disappeared. The danger of an attack on the Soviet Union had, indeed, acquired new forms. In the interests of general peace for the whole of humanity, and especially for the peaceful development of the Soviet Union and the undisturbed construction of socialism, the Soviet Government is resolutely and systematically continuing the struggle for peace.

On July 19th, 1921, the Soviet Government, learning through the columns of the foreign press that a conference of Pacific Powers, and Powers with special interests on the Pacific coast, was shortly to be held at Washington, protested against its exclusion from this conference. In this protest the Soviet Government defined once and for all, in the interests of peace, its attitude to such international conferences, which are aimed at the solution of questions touching the interests of Soviet Russia, in which solutions Soviet Russia desires to participate, but which are called without its authority and to which it is not invited. In this protest the Soviet Government solemnly declared that it would not recognise any decisions of the Washington Conference, inasmuch as it was held

without its participation. "A policy directed towards leaving Soviet Russia out of collective decisions by various Powers on questions concerning it," concludes the protest, "is not merely unfavourable to the settlement of conflicts undergone by the world at the present time, it is capable of rendering them still more acute and intensifying them by new complications."

The Soviet Government's declaration of protest of July 19th, 1921, against the convention of an international conference on Pacific questions without its participation, was left by the Powers without response. In view, therefore, of the nearness of the conference, G. V. Chicherin, on November 2nd, 1921, repeated his protest to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States, declaring that "the toiling masses of Russia have received this new demonstration of the policy of violence and injustice with the greatest indignation." In the case of the non-invitation of Soviet Russia and any possible secret agreements at its expense, "the decisions of the Washington Conference must inevitably become the source of fresh conflicts, new interference and upheavals, and introduce into international relations not harmony, but discord, and be the cause of fresh disasters for the whole world."

The insistent protests of the Soviet Government and the comprehension by the Entente Governments that none of the political and economic problems confronting post-war Europe could be solved without Soviet Russia, at last forced these Governments to draw Soviet Russia also into the discussion of the fundamental questions arising from the war, the Soviet revolution and the Versailles treaty.

For the first time after the formation of the Soviet Government, in the fifth year of its existence, it received through the Italian Government a formal invitation in the name of the Entente Powers to the financial and economic conference at Genoa.

"Recognising, together with the Governments represented in the Supreme Council," wrote G. V. Chicherin, in his reply of January 8th, 1922, "the enormous importance of the problem of economic and financial restoration confronting all Governments at the present moment," the Soviet Government willingly accepted this invitation.

In the declaration made by G. V. Chicherin on April 10th, 1922,

at the first plenary session of the Genoa Conference, the principal peace activities of the Soviet Government during the four and a half years of its existence were enumerated. These were new and living words, such as European imperialists were not accustomed to hear. This was a definite speech on peace and disarmament. Although the conference had been called for the discussion of questions of the economic and financial restoration of Europe, the Soviet declaration began by stating that "the Soviet Delegation considers it necessary to declare, first and foremost, that it has come here in the interests of peace and the general restoration of Europe, ruined by a long war and by post-war politics." Here for the first time the voice of Soviet Russia made itself heard and found an echo in the hearts of the peoples of all countries—in an appeal for the limitation of armaments. "All efforts," asserted the Soviet declaration, "directed at the restoration of world-economy will be in vain so long as the threat of new wars hangs like the sword of Damocles over Europe or over the world. . . . The Soviet delegation intends to propose general reduction of armaments and to support all proposals aimed at lightening the burden of militarism." As is well known, in reply to the Soviet delegation's declaration, the whole world heard the "No!" of Barthou, the French representative. "M. Chicherin has declared, in the name of the Soviet Delegation," said M. Barthou, "his intention of bringing the question of disarmament under debate at the Genoa Conference. This question cannot be discussed. It has been removed from the agenda of the commission. That is why I say simply, but very resolutely, that that moment when the Russian Delegation proposes the first commission to investigate this question it will meet not merely with abstention, not merely with protest, from the French delegation, but with a definite, categorical and determined refusal. . . . There are questions with regard to which I now categorically reply 'No!'"

As is well known, ever since the Genoa conference in the spring of 1922, the attitude of the French, as of many other Governments, has not changed in the least with regard to peace and disarmament. Nor has the attitude of the Soviet Union changed in regard to these most cardinal questions for the human race—distracted by wars and the intolerable burden of militarism. At subsequent international conferences from that day up to the last

session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the Soviet Government has had to defend again and again the idea of universal peace and general disarmament, meeting every time the same reply : " No ! *Non Possumus !* "

The Genoa Conference was the arena of dramatic duels between Soviet Russia, the victim of all the suffering and horror of blockade and intervention, and the Allied Powers. For the first time the Soviet Government openly formulated its peace aspirations before the whole world, and its voice rang out free, not drowned by the guns of intervention nor smothered by the barbed-wire enclosures of blockade. The Soviet Government appealed to the peoples of the whole world with regard to the incredibly hard conditions laid down by the Allies, and at the same time made far-reaching concessions to square accounts with the armed violators of peace and to obtain at last for Soviet Russia the opportunity for peaceful development and construction. Such documents as the " Memorandum of the Soviet Delegation " at the Genoa Conference on April 20th, 1922, and the " Considerations of the Soviet Delegation of May 11th, 1922, in reply to the memorandum of eight delegations of May 2nd, 1922," will always remain in the history of international relations as examples of the extraordinary energy and sincerity of the championship of peace by the young Soviet republic, and its readiness to perform great sacrifices for that aim. The Soviet Delegation justifiably reminded the participants in the Genoa conference that in the controversy over financial questions it should not be forgotten that there were other and more important questions in the solution of which the whole world was interested and " which might first of all lead to the economic restoration of Europe and Russia and to the consolidation of peace. . . . Russia had appeared at the Conference with the desire for reconciliation and still hoped that its efforts in this direction would be crowned by success." As is well known, thanks to the efforts of the world oil-magnates, who opposed any agreement whatever, the Genoa Conference collapsed. It was then decided to call a special conference at the Hague for the investigation of the " Russian question." At this conference also, held in the middle of July, 1922, for the special purpose of investigating the " Russian question," that is the question of debts and credits, the Soviet Delegation declared the readiness of Soviet

Russia to make great concessions and considerable sacrifices, simply for the sake of coming to an agreement with the Western Powers and getting certain peace guarantees. Like the Genoa Conference, however, this conference also was doomed to come to nothing owing to the die-hards among the representatives and their opposition to the Soviet Government, categorically refusing to grant credits or guarantees for private credits, and only desirous to get the Government emerging from revolution down on its knees, and to force it to capitulate unconditionally to the organised violence of the Entente Powers, unable to defeat it either in open warfare or by the hunger blockade. The conference ended on July 19th, 1922, without giving any results for either of the parties represented at it.

The Soviet Delegation was only admitted to the Lausanne Conference in the spring of 1923, called in connection with the defeat of Greece in its struggle against revolutionary Turkey, after insistent demands both from the Soviet Government and that of Turkey. The Allies, however, agreed to the presence of the Soviet delegates only during the discussion on the question of the Straits. Then it was that a remarkable duel took place between the champions of peace and the organisers of war—between Chicherin and Curzon. Not only did this conference also end fruitlessly for the cause of peace, but in consequence of the indulgence of its participators, especially the Swiss Government, towards the “White” foes of the Soviets, Vorovsky, Soviet Ambassador to Rome, who had come to Genoa after the suspension and resumption of the conference, was killed, and members of his staff severely wounded.

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Together with the general struggle for peace the Soviet Government advanced the idea of disarmament with no less insistence, perseverance and resoluteness and put forward absolutely definite proposals for its realisation. During the last seven years the Soviet Government has unremittingly profited by the slightest opportunity for demanding the consideration of the question of disarmament from the various governments. Indeed, the whole peace policy of the Soviets, from the first Peace Decree of November 8th, 1917, has contained in itself the elements of the

idea of disarmament. The principle was, however, quite definitely formulated by the Soviet Government on July 19th, 1921, in its Note of protest against non-invitation to the Washington Conference, declaring that it was ready "to greet with gladness any reduction of the armaments, or limitation of the military expenditure, under which the toilers in all countries are groaning."

On its way to the Genoa Conference the Soviet Delegation showed its initiative by calling a Conference of Baltic Countries in Riga, which, at the proposal of the Soviet representatives, signed a protocol declaring that it would "fully support the principle of the limitation of armaments in all States."

It goes without saying that the Soviet Republic remained solitary in its sincere and effective struggle for the reduction of armaments. The speech of G. V. Chicherin at the Genoa Conference, in which he declared that "the Soviet Delegation intended to introduce in the course of further work of the Conference a proposal for the general reduction of armaments, and to support all proposals aimed at lightening the burden of militarism, while reducing armies in States and supplementing the laws of war by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as poison gas, aerial warfare and others, especially the use of destructive means against the peaceful population," met with the answer already quoted from M. Barthou, the French delegate, and the Soviet Delegation was deprived of the opportunity of bringing its disarmament project before the Genoa Conference.

This opposition from the Entente Governments to the question of disarmament forced the Soviet Government to make an attempt to call a disarmament conference in the capital of Soviet Russia—Moscow. Russia's closest neighbours—Poland, Finland, Latvia, and Esthonia were invited to this Conference. In his Note to the Governments of these countries of June 12th, 1922, M. M. Litvinov reminded them that the inaugurators of the Genoa Conference "had seen fit not to include in its agenda even the question of partial reduction of armaments, not to speak of complete disarmament." True, however, to its peace policy, the Soviet Government, on whose initiative the protocol in Riga was signed and whose delegation came forward independently at Genoa, proposed in this note to the Governments of the Russian

border-states, "to delegate their representatives to a conference for the joint consideration together with the representatives of Soviet Russia of the question of the proportional reduction of armed forces in the countries represented." At this Conference the Soviet Government, despite the fact that the so-called Great Powers retained their extraordinary armed forces, proposed a perfectly definite and practicable plan for the proportional reduction of armaments. After long and fruitless arguments, however, the representatives of the border-countries refused at the last moment to sign the agreement worked out. Thus yet another of Soviet Russia's attempts in the cause of peace came to nothing owing to the stubborn resistance of the enemies of peace, and the debates at this Moscow Conference and its results once more demonstrated before the world the greatness of the desire of the Soviets for peace and the difficulties of the path towards the end they ever keep steadily in view—complete disarmament and universal peace.

On March 15th, 1923, the Soviet Government declared its readiness to take part in a conference of experts to be held in Rome on the limitation of naval armaments. Although this Conference was being called by the League of Nations, which the Soviet Government regarded, and still regards, as an organisation for the masking of military preparations, it declared that "it considers it incumbent upon itself to seize upon the slightest opportunity that presents itself for any possible furtherance of the question of the reduction of armaments." At this Conference the Soviet expert contributed a proposal for the reduction of the Soviet navy, if the other powers would do the same. But this conference, as was to have been expected, came to nothing.

After the murder of Vorovsky, the Soviet ambassador to Rome, the Soviet Government, in consideration of the criminal complicity of the Swiss Government, which did not even take the trouble to express its regret at the incident, boycotted that country. It is, therefore, quite natural that Soviet Russia was unable to take part in the conferences called by the League of Nations in Geneva. At the same time, the League of Nations, apparently with the aim of preventing Soviet Russia from taking part in the discussion of peace and disarmament, continued to call such conferences in Switzerland, sending invitations to the

Soviet Government, which they knew in advance would have to be refused. The Soviet Government was, therefore, only able to accept the invitation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission after the Swiss Government had agreed to a formula acceptable to Soviet Russia for the liquidation of the conflict.

The first three sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission passed without the participation of the Soviet Government. It was only in October, 1927, that the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the Secretariat of the League of Nations that the Soviet Union had formerly, through no fault of its own, been unable to participate in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and that, since the termination of the conflict with the Swiss Government, the obstacle to this had vanished. After obvious vacillations in League of Nations circles, its general secretary, in a note of October 31st, 1927, renewed the invitation to the Soviet Government to take part in the work of the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

On the eve of his departure for Geneva to this session, M. M. Litvinov, the head of the Soviet Delegation, in a conversation with representatives of the Soviet and foreign press, defined the attitude of the Soviet Government towards the problem of disarmament and its setting before the League of Nations, which was completely impotent to do anything in that direction. The Soviet Union, despite the opposition of the capitalist world during the ten years of its existence, put forth all its energies for the realisation of some sort of progress in the sphere of general disarmament, or at least some effective, if only partial, reduction of the armaments which make such a heavy burden for the backs of the toiling masses. The Soviet Government advanced the principle of complete disarmament from the point of view of peaceful policy. If, however, "the capitalist countries consider the realisation of a plan for complete disarmament all at once, or at the shortest possible term, impracticable, the Soviet Delegation would agree to the gradual execution of this plan, during a term to be established by the conference."

At the fourth session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission the Soviet Delegation aroused extensive and profound debate, quite in accordance with the significance and seriousness of the problem. A Draft Convention for immediate, complete

and universal disarmament, worked out by the Soviet Government as early as February 15th, 1928, and sent by M. M. Litvinov, together with an explanatory note to the general secretary of the League of Nations, is a most important document for the demonstration of the peace policy of the Soviet Union. When M. M. Litvinov came forward, prior to this, at the fourth session, in December, 1927, with a declaration of general disarmament, the session refused to discuss it, and postponed its declaration until the fifth session, fixed for March 15th, 1928.

At this session the Soviet Government's Draft Convention was to have been the principal subject of debate. The whole world was witness to the hitherto unprecedented struggle which was carried on at Geneva. The foes of disarmament, gathered together at a session of a Preparatory Disarmament Commission, rejecting the Soviet proposals for general, complete and immediate disarmament, reckoned without their host. The Soviet Delegation brought before the Commission, on the spot, a fresh draft on partial disarmament. The fight was resumed and the behaviour of the Soviet Delegation won the sympathy of all true and sincere partisans of peace. It was not the Soviet Government's fault if peace was not practically advanced one iota and if the work of the preparatory disarmament was postponed *ad kalendas Graecas*. Meanwhile, the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission took place, and rejected the proposals for disarmament of the Soviet Unions, including those for partial disarmament. The imperialist world is in no hurry to disarm, preferring to conclude secret agreements, such as the Anglo-French, to revive the Entente, so favourable to world war, and to set up military alliances against the country of the Soviets. The policy of imperialism naturally tends ever more to the increase of armaments and to war, and not towards the reduction of armaments and peace.

The position of the Soviet Union is excellently expressed in a resolution of the supreme organ of the U.S.S.R., its Central Executive Committee, on the report of the president of the Soviet Delegation at the fifth session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission : " The Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R., declaring once more before the whole world the unshaken desire of the people of the Soviet Union for peaceful co-existence with all other nations, and the resolve of the Soviet

Government to exert all its strength for the complete and final suppression of war as a method of the solution of differences between states proposes to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. to retain in the future also the programme of complete disarmament, never neglecting the slightest opportunity of achieving even partial or temporary positive results in this sphere."

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The Soviet Union, despite opposition, is always looking for ways of strengthening peace and eliminating the danger of war between nations. The Soviet Government practices an extensive system of friendly and non-aggression treaties and agreements that are entirely in the interest of the nations adhering to them. The Rappalo Treaty, concluded between the Soviet Union and Germany before the Genoa Conference, exemplifies the peace policy which the Soviet Union carries out in practice.

The 1921 treaties concluded by the Soviet Union with Persia and with Turkey, testify to the exclusively peaceful aspirations of the Soviet Union, tearing up and annulling all secret treaties made by Tsarist Russia with other imperialist states, while the agreement of May 31st, 1924, between the Soviet Union and China, on the basis of perfect equality on either side, corroborated the Soviet Union's renunciation of all special privileges and rights achieved by the Tsarist Government in China by means of war and violence.

Finally the Soviet Union proceeded to another type of treaty, permeated with the principles of non-aggression and neutrality. The first example of this type of treaty was the so-called "guarantee pact," concluded in December 1925, between the Soviet Union and Turkey. Both sides undertook to refrain from attacking each other, not to assist a third attacking party, and not to adhere to any combinations whatsoever, whether of a political, military or economic nature, directed against either of the contracting parties. The most significant feature of this guarantee pact of non-aggression and neutrality is the complete absence from it of the least hint at the usual military offensive and defensive type of treaties between the bourgeois countries, while this

guarantee type of treaty is not directed against any country whatsoever.

Similar non-aggression and neutrality pacts were concluded on the initiative of the Soviet Union in April 1926 with Germany ; in October 1926, with Lithuania ; in August 1926, with Afghanistan ; in September 1927, with Persia ; and in March 1927 (provisionally), with Latvia. The Soviet Government proposed to various other states the conclusion of such non-aggression pacts, but it was not of peace that these states were thinking . . . and the proposals still remain unanswered.

The fact that the Soviet Union has been unable to get more countries to enter into such treaties is one more testimony to the value set upon peace by the antagonists of the Soviet Union, and demonstrates before the whole world the colossal efforts exerted by the Soviet Government to attain the maximum results in the matter of the salvation of humanity from the definite dangers of war and its monstrous consequences.

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Every international act of the Soviet Union is an expression of its peace aspirations and its unwavering efforts to win over and reinforce the position of peace. Its adherence to the " Kellogg Pact " testified to the same tendency. The inaugurators and first planners of the text of this pact intended to keep the Soviet Union from adhering to it, in order to make the pact still more inimical to the country of the Soviets. But this diplomatic game did not come off. The Soviet Government is too big a factor in international life to be ignored in such questions. It had to be invited by the United States Government to subscribe to the pact.

The Soviet Government would have failed in its duty to the interests of peace and have made no new step towards its fulfilment, if it had not taken the opportunity once more to emphasise the fact that it " could not fail to endeavour to take advantage of the American project for the purpose of proceeding further along the path of the struggle for the preservation of peace." In subscribing to the Pact the Soviet Government at the same time subjected it to the severest criticism, pointing out that it entirely lacked any obligation to disarm, which is the only real element for the guarantee of peace, that the very formulation of the pro-

hibition of war is extremely vague, that the reservations made by other powers doom the Pact in advance to impotency with regard to the matter of peace.

"Nevertheless," declared the Soviet Government, "inasmuch as the Paris Pact externally throws a certain obligation on the powers in the eyes of public opinion and gives the Soviet Government fresh opportunities to set before the participators in the Pact the most important of all questions for the matter of peace—the question of disarmament, the solution of which is the only guarantee for the prevention of war—the Soviet Union declares its consent to subscribe to the Paris Pact."

However unfavourable the attitude of the Soviet Government to the Kellogg Pact, it nevertheless, in its unalterable aspirations towards peace, decided to draw the corresponding conclusion from this pact, and invited Poland and its other neighbours to put it into force immediately. After prolonged diplomatic correspondence and ambiguous replies, Poland was forced to consent to the Soviet proposal, and the pact was signed in Moscow by Poland, Latvia, Esthonia, and Rumania. This diplomatic step of the Soviet Government is fresh confirmation of the sincerity of the Soviet aspirations for peace.

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Every year of the existence of the Soviet Republics has been marked by an unceasing and resolute struggle for peace, for the liberation of tortured humanity from the horrors of military catastrophes. In the whole eleven years' history of the Soviets no step has been taken that was not directed towards the effective realisation of peace. Despite the innumerable international obstacles put in the way of the Soviet Union by its imperialist foes and opponents, it has never relinquished its aspirations towards peace, never lost an opportunity of demonstrating them, and never refused to take the initiative in advancing the affairs of peace.

HENRI BARBUSSE.

PART I
THE NOVEMBER REVOLUTION AND PEACE

PART I

The November Revolution and Peace.

1. DECREE OF PEACE, ADOPTED UNANIMOUSLY AT A MEETING OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF SOVIETS OF WORKERS', SOLDIERS' AND PEASANTS' DEPUTIES ON NOVEMBER 8TH, 1917.

2. NOTE FROM R.S.F.S.R. PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO ALLIED AMBASSADORS. NOVEMBER 22ND, 1917.

3. APPEAL BY COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS FOR THE R.S.F.S.R. TO THE PEOPLE OF THE BELLIGERENT COUNTRIES WITH A PROPOSAL TO JOIN IN THE NEGOTIATIONS FOR AN ARMISTICE. PETROGRAD, NOVEMBER 28TH, 1917.

4. APPEAL OF COUNCIL OF PEOPLE'S COMMISSARS OF THE R.S.F.S.R. TO ALL MOHAMMEDAN WORKERS IN RUSSIA AND THE EAST. DECEMBER 7TH, 1917.

5. APPEAL FROM THE PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE R.S.F.S.R. TO THE TOILING, OPPRESSED AND EXHAUSTED PEOPLES OF EUROPE. DECEMBER 19TH, 1917.

6. DECLARATION MADE BY THE R.S.F.S.R. DELEGATION AT THE FIRST PLENARY SESSION OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE IN BREST-LITOVSK. DECEMBER 22ND, 1917.

7. NOTE FROM R.S.F.S.R. COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO THE PEOPLES AND GOVERNMENTS OF ALLIED COUNTRIES. DECEMBER 29TH, 1917.

8. DECLARATION MADE BY THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT A SESSION OF THE POLITICAL COMMISSION OF THE BREST-LITOVSK PEACE CONFERENCE. FEBRUARY 10TH, 1918.

9. NOTE FROM RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERATIVE REPUBLIC OF SOVIETS, PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE TOILING MASSES OF ENGLAND, AMERICA, FRANCE, ITALY AND JAPAN. AUGUST 1ST, 1918.

10. NOTE FROM CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO D. C. POOLE, AMERICAN CONSUL IN MOSCOW. AUGUST 6TH, 1918.

11. NOTE FROM CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. OCTOBER 24TH, 1918.

12. PROPOSAL OF ARMISTICE TO THE ALLIES. RESOLUTION OF THE SIXTH ALL-RUSSIAN EXTRAORDINARY CONGRESS OF SOVIETS, PASSED AT THE SESSION OF NOVEMBER 8TH, 1918.

13. PEACE PROPOSAL BY GOVERNMENT OF R.S.F.S.R. TO ALLIED POWERS AND UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. NOTE FROM M. LITVINOV, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO WOODROW WILSON, PRESIDENT OF UNITED STATES. STOCKHOLM, DECEMBER 24TH, 1918.

14. PEACE PROPOSAL OF GOVERNMENT OF R.S.F.S.R. TO GOVERNMENT OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. TELEGRAM FROM G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO SECRETARY FOR STATE OF UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. JANUARY 12TH, 1919.

15. PEACE PROPOSAL OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE R.S.F.S.R. TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. JANUARY 17TH, 1919.

16. REPLY OF R.S.F.S.R. PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO PROPOSED CONFERENCE AT PRINKIPO. FEBRUARY 4TH, 1919.

17. DRAFT TREATY DRAWN UP BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT AND WILLIAM BULLITT, IN RUSSIA ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT WILSON. MARCH 12TH, 1919.

18. PROTEST AGAINST BLOCKADE AND SUPPORT OF RUSSIAN COUNTER REVOLUTION. APPEAL FROM G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE R.S.F.S.R., TO THE TOILERS IN THE ENTENTE COUNTRIES. APRIL 18TH, 1919.

19. APPEAL BY G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE R.S.F.S.R., TO THE TOILERS IN THE ENTENTE COUNTRIES WITH REGARD TO THE IMPERIALIST POLICY OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS. JANUARY 28TH, 1920.

1. *Decree of Peace, adopted unanimously at a Meeting of the All-Russian Convention of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies on November 8th, 1917.*¹

THE WORKERS' and PEASANTS' GOVERNMENT, created by the revolution of October 24th and 25th (November 6th and 7th), and based on the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, proposes to all warring peoples and their Governments to begin immediately negotiations for a just and democratic peace.

An overwhelming majority of the exhausted, wearied, and war-tortured workers and the labouring classes of all the warring countries are longing for a just and democratic peace—a peace

¹ This decree was issued immediately after the seizure of power by the Petrograd workers headed by the Bolshevik Party.

which in the most definite and insistent manner was demanded by Russian workers and peasants after the overthrow of the Tsar's monarchy. Such a peace the Government considers to be an immediate peace without annexations (*i.e.*, without seizure of foreign territory, without the forcible annexation of foreign nationalities) and without indemnities.

The Government of Russia proposes to all warring peoples immediately to conclude such a peace. It expresses its readiness to take at once without the slightest delay, all the decisive steps until the final confirmation of all terms of such a peace by the plenipotentiary conventions of the representatives of all countries and all nations.

By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the Government understands, in accordance with the legal consciousness of democracy in general, and of labouring classes in particular, any addition to a large or powerful state of a small or weak nationality, without the definitely, clearly, and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, regardless of when this forcible addition took place, regardless also of how developed or how backward is the nation forcibly attached or forcibly retained within the frontiers of a given state, and finally regardless of the fact whether this nation is located in Europe or in distant lands beyond the seas.

If any nation whatsoever is retained within the frontiers of a certain state by force, if it is not given the right of free voting in accordance with its desire, regardless of the fact whether such desire was expressed in the press, in people's assemblies, in decisions of political parties, or rebellions and insurrections against national oppression, such plebiscite to take place under the condition of the complete removal of the armies of the annexing or the more powerful nation ; if the weaker nation is not given the opportunity to decide the question of the forms of its national existence, then its adjoining is an annexation, that is, seizure—violence.

The Government considers it to be the greatest crime against humanity to continue the war for the sake of dividing among the powerful and rich nations the weaker nationalities which were seized by them, and the Government solemnly states its readiness to sign immediately the terms of peace which will end this war, on

the basis of the above-stated conditions, equally just for all nationalities without exception. At the same time the Government announces that it does not consider the above-stated conditions of peace as in the nature of an ultimatum, that is, it is ready to consider any other terms of peace, insisting, however, that such be proposed as soon as possible by any one of the warring countries and on condition of the most definite clarity and absolute exclusion of any ambiguousness, or any secrecy when proposing the terms of peace.

The Government abolishes secret diplomacy and on its part expresses the firm intention to carry on all negotiations absolutely openly before all the people, and immediately begins to publish in full the secret treaties concluded or confirmed by the Government of landowners and capitalists from February up to November 7th, 1917. The Government abrogates absolutely and immediately all the provisions of these secret treaties in as much as they were intended in the majority of cases for the purpose of securing profits and privileges for Russian landowners and capitalists and retaining or increasing the annexations by the Great-Russians.

While addressing the proposal to the Governments and peoples of all countries to start immediately open negotiations for the conclusion of peace, the Government expresses its readiness to carry on these negotiations by written communications, by telegraph, as well as by parleys of the representatives of various countries, or at a conference of such representatives. To facilitate such negotiations the Government appoints a plenipotentiary representative in neutral countries.

The Government proposes to all the Governments and peoples of all the warring countries to conclude an armistice immediately; at the same time, it considers desirable that this armistice should be concluded for a period of not less than three months—that is, a period during which it would be fully possible to terminate the negotiations for peace with the participation of the representatives of all peoples and nationalities drawn into the war or compelled to participate in it, as well as to call the plenipotentiary conventions of people's representatives of all countries for the final ratification of the terms of peace.

While addressing this proposal of peace to the Governments

and peoples of all the warring countries, the Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia appeals also in particular to the class-conscious workers of the three most forward nations of the world and the largest states participating in the present war—England, France, and Germany. The workers of these countries have been of the greatest service to the cause of progress and socialism. We have the great example of the Chartist movement in England, several revolutions which were of universal historic importance accomplished by the French proletariat, and finally the heroic struggle against the exclusive law in Germany and the prolonged, stubborn, disciplined work—a work setting an example for the workers of the whole world—of creating mass proletarian organisations in Germany. All these examples of proletarian heroism and historic creative work serve as a guarantee that the workers of the above-mentioned countries understand the duties which devolve upon them now in the cause of the liberation of humanity from the horrors of war and its consequences, a cause which these workers by their resolute and energetic activity will help us to bring to a successful end—the cause of peace, and, together with this, the cause of the liberation of the labouring and exploited.

2. *Note from R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Allied Ambassadors. November 22nd, 1917.*¹

I herewith have the honour to inform you, Mr. Ambassador, that the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies organised on November 8th a new Government of the Russian Republic, the Council of People's Commissars. The chairman of this Government is Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, and the direction of foreign policy is entrusted to me as the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs.

Calling your attention to the text of the proposed armistice and democratic peace without annexations and indemnities, and on the basis of self-determination of nations which was approved by the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, I have the honour to request you to consider the above-mentioned document as a formal proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts and the immediate opening of peace

¹ No reply to this is recorded.

negotiations, with which proposal the plenipotentiary Government of the Russian Republic appeals simultaneously to all the warring peoples and their Governments.

Accept assurances, Mr. Ambassador, of the sincere respect of the Soviet Government for the people of the United States, who like all other people are worn out by this unexampled butchery and who cannot but aim for peace.

3. *Appeal by Council of People's Commissars for the R.S.F.S.R. to the People of the Belligerent Countries with a proposal to join in the negotiations for an armistice. Petrograd, November 28th, 1917.*

In reply to our proposal for an immediate armistice on all fronts with a view to the conclusion of a democratic peace without annexations and contributions, and with a guarantee of the rights of national self-determination, the German High Command agreed to the conduct of peace negotiations. Krylenko, Commander-in-Chief of the Armies of the Republic, proposed the postponement of the opening of negotiations for an armistice for five days, until December 1st, in order once again to invite the Allied Governments to define their attitude to the question of peaceful negotiations. Military action was suspended on the Russian front by mutual consent. Obviously there could be no transference of troops during those five days, on either side. The decisive step has been taken. The victorious Workers' and Peasants' Revolution in Russia brought the question of peace into the forefront of world attention. The period of vacillations, delays and red-tape agreements is over. Now all Governments, all classes, all parties in all the belligerent countries are called upon to give a plain answer to the question: "Do you agree to join us on December 1st in negotiations for an immediate armistice and general peace?" The avoidance by the workers in field and factory of another winter campaign, with all its horrors and disasters, or the continuance of bloodshed in Europe, hangs upon their answer to this question. We, the Council of People's Commissars, appeal with this question to the Governments of our allies: France, Great Britain, Italy, the United States, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Japan, and China. We ask them, in the face of the whole world: "Will you begin peaceful negotiations with us

from December 1st ? ” We, the Council of People’s Commissars, appeal to the allied peoples and, first and foremost, to their toiling masses : “ Will they consent to drag on with this pointless slaughter, and go blindly to the ruin of the whole of European culture ? ” We demand that the labour parties in the allied countries give an immediate answer to the question : “ Do they want open peace negotiations on December 1st ? ” A plain question has been put. Soldiers, proletarians, toilers, peasants ! Do you want to join us in a decisive step towards a people’s peace ?

We, the Council of People’s Commissars, appeal to the toiling masses in Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. The peace which we propose must be a people’s peace. It must be an honest agreement, guaranteeing to each nation freedom for economic and cultural development. Such a peace can only be concluded by means of a direct and courageous struggle of the revolutionary masses against all imperialist plans and aggressive aspirations. The Workers’ and Peasants’ Revolution has already declared its peace programme. We have published the secret agreements of the Tsar and the bourgeoisie with the allies and have declared them not binding for the Russian people. We proposed to all nations openly to conclude a new agreement on the principles of consent and co-operation. The official and semi-official representatives of the ruling classes in the allied countries replied to our proposal by a refusal to recognise the Soviet Government and enter into an agreement with it for peace negotiations. The Government of the victorious revolution does not require recognition from the professional representatives of capitalist diplomacy, but we do ask the people : “ Does reactionary diplomacy express your ideas and aspirations ? Do the people agree to allow the diplomats to let the great opportunity for peace offered by the Russian Revolution slip through their fingers ? ” The answer to these questions must be given without delay, and it must be an answer in deeds and not merely in words. The Russian army and the Russian people cannot and will not wait longer. On December 1st we shall begin peace negotiations. If the Allied nations do not send their representatives, we shall carry on negotiations with the Germans alone. We want a general peace, but if the bourgeoisie in the allied countries force us to

conclude a separate peace the whole responsibility will be theirs. Soldiers, workers and peasants, in France, England and Italy, the United States, Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Japan, and China ! On December 1st peace negotiations will begin ! We await your representatives ! Act, without the loss of a single hour !

No more winter campaign ! No more war !

Long live peace and the fraternity of nations !

4. *Appeal of Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. to all Mohammedan Workers in Russia and the East. December 7th, 1917.*

Comrades ! Brothers !

Great events are occurring in Russia ! An end is drawing near to the murderous war, which arose out of the bargainings of foreign powers. The rule of the plunderers, exploiting the peoples of the world, is trembling. The ancient citadel of slavery and serfdom is cracking under the blows of the Russian Revolution. The world of violence and oppression is approaching its last days. A new world is arising, a world of the toilers and the liberated. At the head of this revolution is the Workers' and Peasants' Government in Russia, the Council of People's Commissars.

Revolutionary councils of workers', soldiers' and peasants' deputies are scattered over the whole of Russia. The power in the country is in the hands of the people. The toiling masses of Russia burn with the single desire to achieve an honest peace and help the oppressed people of the world to win their freedom.

Russia is not alone in this sacred cause. The mighty summons to freedom emitted by the Russian Revolution, has aroused all the toilers in the East and West. The people of Europe, exhausted by war, are already stretching out their hands to us, in our work for peace. The workers and soldiers of the West are already rallying around the banner of socialism, storming the strongholds of imperialism. Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by the European " torchbearers of civilisation " for so many centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organising its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the people of the East to the struggle for freedom.

The sway of capitalist plunder and violence is being under-

mined. The ground is slipping from under the feet of the imperialist pillagers.

In the face of these great events, we appeal to you, toiling and dispossessed Mohammedan workers, in Russia and the East.

Mohammedans of Russia, Volga and Crimean Tartars, Kirghisi and Sarti in Siberia and Turkestan, Turcos and Tartars in the Trans-Caucasus, Chechenzi and mountain Cossacks ! All you, whose mosques and shrines have been destroyed, whose faith and customs have been violated by the Tsars and oppressors of Russia ! Henceforward your faith and customs, your national and cultural departments, are declared free and inviolable ! Organise your national life freely and unimpeded. It is your right. Know that your rights, like those of all the peoples of Russia, will be guarded by the might of the revolution and its organs, the Councils of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies !

Support this revolution and its representative Government !

Mohammedans of the East ! Persians, Turks, Arabs and Indians ! All you whose bodies and property, freedom and native land have been for centuries exploited by the European beasts of prey ! All you whose countries the plunderers who began the war now desire to share among themselves ! *We declare that the secret treaties of the deposed Tsar as to the annexation of Constantinople, confirmed by the late Kerensky Government—are now null and void. The Russian Republic, and its Government, the Council of People's Commissars, are opposed to the annexation of foreign lands: Constantinople must remain in the hands of the Mohammedans.*

We declare that the treaty for the division of Persia is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military activities troops will be withdrawn from Persia and the Persians will be guaranteed the right of free self-determination.

We declare that the treaty for the division of Turkey and the subduction from it of Armenia, is null and void. Immediately after the cessation of military activities, the Armenians will be guaranteed the right of free self-determination of their political fate.

It is not from Russia and its revolutionary Government that you have to fear enslavement, but from the robbers of European imperialism, from those who have laid your native lands waste and converted them into their colonies.

Overthrow these robbers and enslavers of your lands ! Now,

when war and ruin are breaking down the pillars of the old world, when the whole world is burning with indignation against the imperialist brigands, when the least spark of indignation bursts out in a mighty flame of revolution, when even the Indian Mohammedans, oppressed and tormented by the foreign yoke, are rising in revolt against their slave-drivers—now it is impossible to keep silent. Lose no time in throwing off the yoke of the ancient oppressors of your land ! Let them no longer violate your hearths ! You must yourselves be masters in your own land ! You yourselves must arrange your life as you yourselves see fit ! You have the right to do this, for your fate is in your own hands !

Comrades ! Brothers !

Advance firmly and resolutely towards an honest, democratic peace !

We bear the liberation of the oppressed peoples of the world on our banners !

Mohammedans in Russia !

Mohammedans in the East !

We look to you for sympathy and support in the work of renewing of the world !

5. *Appeal from the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R. to the Toiling, Oppressed and Exhausted Peoples of Europe. December 19th, 1917.*

An armistice has been signed in Brest-Litovsk. Military operations on the Eastern front have been suspended for twenty-eight days. This alone is a tremendous victory for humanity. After nearly three and a half years of uninterrupted slaughter, with no issue in sight, the workers' and peasants' revolution in Russia has opened the way to peace.

We have published the secret treaties. We shall continue publishing them in the near future. We have declared that these treaties will in no way bind the policy of the Soviet Government. We have suggested to all nations the way of open agreement on the principle of recognition for each nation, great or small, advanced or backward, the right to free self-determination of its own fate. We do not attempt to conceal the fact that we do not consider the existing capitalist Governments capable of a democratic peace. Only the revolutionary struggle of the toiling masses

against the existing Governments can bring Europe nearer to such a peace. Its full realisation can only be guaranteed by the victorious proletarian revolution in all capitalist countries.

The Council of People's Commissars, while entering into negotiations with the existing Governments, penetrated as are both sides with imperialist tendencies, has never for a moment turned from the path of social revolution. A true, democratic people's peace will still have to be struggled for. The first round in this struggle finds in power, everywhere except Russia, the old monarchist and capitalist Governments which were responsible for the present war, and which have not yet accounted before their duped peoples for the waste of blood and treasure. We are forced to begin negotiations with those Governments which still exist at the present moment, just as, on the other hand, the monarchist and reactionary Governments of the Central Powers are forced to carry on negotiations with the representatives of the Soviet Government, because the Russian people have confronted them with the fact of a Workers' and Peasants' Government in Russia. In negotiating for peace the Soviet Government has set itself a double task : first, to achieve the speediest possible cessation of the shameful and criminal slaughter which is laying Europe waste ; and second, to assist with all means at our disposal the working class in all lands to overthrow the sway of capital and seize State power for the purpose of a democratic and socialist reconstruction of Europe and the whole of humanity.

An armistice has been signed on the Eastern front. But the war is going on on the other fronts. Peace negotiations are only just beginning. It should be clear to socialists in all countries, but especially to socialists in Germany, that there is an irreconcilable difference between the peace programme of the Russian workers and peasants and that of the German capitalists, land-owners and generals. If nothing but these two programmes were to meet, peace would obviously be impossible, for the Russian people have not overthrown the monarchy and bourgeoisie in their own land merely to bow before the monarchs and capitalists in other lands. Peace can only be brought nearer, realised and guaranteed, if the voice of the workers makes itself heard, firmly and resolutely, both in Germany and in the lands of her allies. The German, Austro-Hungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish workers must oppose

to the programme of imperialism brought forward by their ruling classes, their own revolutionary programme of agreement and co-operation between the toilers and exploited classes in all countries.

An armistice has been signed on one front only. Our delegation, after a long struggle, wrung out of the German Government an undertaking, as one of the conditions of the armistice, not to transfer troops to other fronts. Thus, those German troops which were situated between the Black Sea and the Baltic have had a month's respite from the gruesome nightmare of war. The Rumanian army also, against the will of the Rumanian Government, adhered to the armistice.¹ But on the French, Italian and all other fronts the war is still going on. The truce remains partial. The capitalist Governments fear peace, because they know they will have to reckon with their people. They are endeavouring to postpone the hour of their ultimate bankruptcy. Are the peoples willing to go on patiently enduring the criminal work of Stock Exchange cliques in France, Great Britain, Italy and the United States?

The capitalist Governments of these countries are masking their treacherous and venal calculations under phrases about eternal justice and the future society of nations. They do not want an armistice. They are fighting peace, but you, peoples of Europe, you, proletariat of France, Italy, England, Belgium, Serbia, you, our brothers in suffering and struggle, do not you, together with us, desire peace—an honest, democratic peace among nations?

Those who tell you that peace can only be guaranteed by victory are deceiving you. In the first place they have been unable, in the course of nearly three and a half years, to give you victory, and show no signs of doing so, should the war go on for years longer. And in the second place, if victory should appear possible for one side or another, it would only mean fresh violation of the weak by the strong, thus sowing the seeds of future wars.

Belgium, Serbia, Rumania, Poland, the Ukraine, Greece, Persia and Armenia can only be liberated by the workers in all belligerent and neutral countries, in the victorious struggle against all imperialists, and not by the victory of one of the coalitions.

¹ An armistice between the Central Powers and Rumania was drawn up at Fokshani on December 9th, 1917.

We summon you to this struggle, workers of all countries ! There is no other way. The crimes of the ruling, exploiting classes in this war have been countless. These crimes shriek for revolutionary revenge. Toiling humanity would be forswearing itself and its future if it continued humbly to bear on its shoulders the yoke of the imperialist bourgeoisie and militarists, with their Governments and their diplomacy.

We, the Council of People's Commissars, empowered by the Russian workers, peasants, soldiers, sailors, widows and orphans, summon you to the joint struggle with us for the immediate cessation of war on all fronts. May the news of the signing of the armistice in Brest-Litovsk ring like a tocsin for the soldiers and workers in all the belligerent countries.

Down with war ! Down with its authors ! The Governments opposing peace must be swept away, like the Governments masking aggressive intentions under phrases of peace. The workers and soldiers must tear the affairs of war and peace from the criminal hands of the bourgeoisie and take them into their own hands. We have the right to demand this from you, because this is what we have done in our own country. Such is the only path to salvation for you and for us. Close up your ranks, proletarians of all countries, under the flag of peace and the social revolution !

6. Declaration made by the R.S.F.S.R. Delegation at the First Plenary Session of the Peace Conference in Brest-Litovsk. December 22nd, 1917.

The Russian delegation takes its stand from the clearly expressed will of the people of revolutionary Russia to achieve the speediest possible conclusion of a general, democratic peace. The delegation considers that the only principles of such a peace, which would be equally acceptable for all, are the principles expressed in the decree of peace unanimously passed at the All-Russian Congress of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, and confirmed at the All-Russian Peasants' Congress.

This Decree states : " A just or democratic peace, such as the overwhelming majority of the workers and the toiling classes in all the belligerent countries, exhausted and tormented by war, long for, such as the Russian workers and peasants have demanded in the most definite and decided fashion, after the overthrow of

the Tsarist monarchy, the Government considers to be an immediate peace without annexation (that is without the seizure of foreign lands, or violent unification of foreign peoples) and without contributions. By annexation or seizure of foreign lands the Government understands, according to the conception of right recognised by democracy as a whole and the toiling classes in particular, any addition to a great or strong state of a small or weak nationality, without the precise, clear and voluntarily expressed consent and desire of this nationality, independent of when this violent addition was made, or the degree of development or backwardness of the nation added or retained by violence in the frontiers of a given state, and whether such a nation is in Europe or overseas.

If any nation whatsoever is retained in the frontiers of a given state by force and is—despite its expressed desire (whether expressed in the press, at mass meetings, by party resolutions, or by uprisings and revolts against nationalist oppression)—not given the right of free voting, with complete withdrawal of the troops of the annexing or stronger nation, without the slightest compulsion, on the question of the forms of its own existence as a state, its retention will be considered as annexation, *i.e.*, seizure and violence.

The Government considers the continuance of this war for the purpose of deciding how to divide among the stronger and richer nations the weaker nationalities seized by them would be the greatest crime against humanity, and solemnly declares its decision instantly to sign peace conditions putting an end to this war on the aforementioned conditions, equally fair for all nationalities without exception.

Taking its stand upon these principles the Russian delegation proposes the following six points as the basis of peace negotiations :

1. Not to allow any forced unification of territory seized during the war. Troops occupying these territories to be withdrawn from them in the shortest possible time.
2. To revive in full the political independence of such nations which have been deprived of this independence during the present war.
3. National groupings not enjoying political independence before the war to be guaranteed an opportunity to decide

freely the question of their adherence to any given state or their state independence by means of a referendum. This referendum to be so organised as to guarantee full freedom of voting for the whole population of the given territory, not excluding emigrants and refugees.

4. In regard to territories inhabited by several nationalities, the right of minorities to be protected by special laws, guaranteeing them cultural national independence, and, wherever possible, administrative autonomy.
5. None of the belligerent countries to be bound to pay other countries so called " war costs " ; contributions already paid to be returned. With regard to compensation for losses of private persons, suffering from the war, such to be paid from a special fund, formed by proportional levies from all the belligerent countries.
6. Colonial questions to be decided on the lines laid down in points 1, 2, 3, and 4.

In supplement to these points the Russian delegation proposes that the contracting parties consider impermissible any indirect restriction of the freedom of weaker by stronger nations, such as : economic boycott, economic subjection of one country to another by means of compulsory commercial agreements, separate customs agreements, restricting the freedom to trade of other countries, sea-blockade without direct military purposes, etc. Such are the fundamental principles, acceptable to all, without the recognition of which the delegation of the Russian Republic cannot conceive of the possibility of concluding a general peace.

7. *Note from R.S.F.S.R. Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to the Peoples and Governments of Allied Countries. December 29th, 1917.*

The peace negotiations which are being carried on at Brest-Litovsk between the delegation of the Russian Republic and the delegations of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria have been interrupted for ten days until January 8th, 1918, in order to give the last opportunity to the Allied countries to take part in further negotiations, and by doing this to secure themselves from all consequences of a separate peace between Russia and the enemy countries.

At Brest-Litovsk there are represented two programmes—one which expresses the point of view of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, and the other that of the Governments of Germany and her allies.

The programme of the Republic of Soviets is the programme of a consistent socialist democracy. This programme has for its aim the creation of conditions under which, on the one hand, each nationality regardless of its will and the state of its development would receive complete freedom of national development, and, on the other hand, all peoples could be united in economic and cultural co-operation.

The programme of the Governments of the countries at war with us is characterised by their statement that "it is not the intention of the Allied Powers (Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria) forcibly to annex territories occupied during the war." This means that the enemy countries are ready to evacuate by a peace treaty the occupied territories of Belgium, the Northern Departments of France, Serbia, Montenegro, Rumania, Poland, Lithuania and Courland, in order that the future fate of disputed territories should be decided by the population concerned in the matter. That step which the enemy Governments, under the pressure of conditions, and especially of their own labouring masses, are taking to meet the programme of democracy, consists in their renunciation of new forcible annexations and indemnities. But while renouncing new forcible annexations, the enemy Governments base their conclusion on the idea that old annexations, old violations by the strong of the weak, are hallowed by historic remoteness. This means that the fate of Alsace-Lorraine, Transylvania, Bosnia, Herzegovina, etc., on the one hand, and of Ireland, Egypt, India, Indo-China, etc., on the other hand, is not to be reconsidered. Such a programme is highly inconsistent and presents a plan of unprincipled compromise between the aims of imperialism and the resistance of the labour democracy. But the very fact of the proposal of this programme is a great step forward.

The Governments of the Allied peoples up to now have not joined the peace negotiations, for reasons which they stubbornly refused to state.

Now it cannot be said again that the war is being carried on for

the liberation of Belgium, of the Northern Departments of France, Serbia, etc., because Germany and her Allies are expressing their readiness to evacuate these territories in case of a general peace. Now, after the proposal by the opposite side of the terms of peace, general phrases about the necessity of carrying on the war to a finish are not sufficient. It is necessary clearly and definitely to state what is the peace programme of France, Italy, Great Britain and the United States : whether they demand together with us the right of self-determination for the peoples of Alsace-Lorraine, Galicia, Posen, Bohemia and Jugo-Slav territories. If they do, are they ready on their part to give the right of self-determination to the peoples of Ireland, Egypt, India, Madagascar, Indo-China, etc., in the same way that the Russian revolution gave this right to the peoples of Finland, Ukraine, White Russia, etc. ? For it is clear that to demand self-determination for peoples who form part of the enemy states and to deny self-determination to peoples of their own state or their own colonies means the advancement of a programme of most open, cynical imperialism. If the Governments of the Allied countries would display a readiness, together with the Russian revolution, to build a peace on the basis of complete and unquestionable recognition of the principle of self-determination for all peoples and in all states, if they would begin with the real granting of this right to the oppressed peoples of their own states, it would create international conditions under which the compromising, internally contradictory programme of Germany and especially of Austria-Hungary would appear in all its inconsistency and would be overcome by the pressure of the peoples concerned.

But up to now the Allied Governments did not demonstrate, and owing to their class character could not demonstrate by any move whatever, a readiness to make a real democratic peace. They are no less suspicious of and opposed to the principle of national self-determination than the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary. But regarding this the class-conscious proletariat of the Allied countries has as few illusions as we.

With the existing Governments it is a case of presenting in opposition to the programme of imperialist compromise, which is represented in the peace terms of Germany and her allies, another programme of imperialist compromise from the side of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States. What is the

programme of the latter ? In the name of what aims could they demand a continuation of the war ? To these questions now, after the two programmes of peace have been presented at Brest-Litovsk, it is necessary to give a clear, definite, categorical answer.

Ten days separate us from the renewal of peace negotiations. Russia will not be bound in these negotiations by the consent of the Allied Governments. If the latter continue to sabotage the cause of general peace, the Russian delegation will appear anyhow for the continuation of negotiations. A separate peace signed by Russia would no doubt be a heavy blow to the Allied countries, especially to France and Italy. But the foreseeing of the inevitable consequences of a separate peace must define the policy not only of Russia but also of France, Italy and the other Allied countries. The Soviet Government until now has struggled by all means for a general peace. Nobody can deny the importance of results attained by us in this direction. But in the future everything depends on the Allied peoples themselves. The question of compelling their own Governments immediately to present their peace programmes and to participate on the basis of them in the negotiations now becomes a question of national self-preservation for the Allied peoples.

The Russian resolution opened the door to an immediate general peace by agreement. If the Allied Governments are ready to take advantage of this last opportunity, general negotiations can immediately open in one of the neutral countries. In these negotiations, on the indispensable condition of their full publicity, the Russian delegation will, as before, defend the programme of international socialist democracy as a counter-weight to the imperialist programmes of the Governments of the enemy as well as of the Allied countries. The success of our programme will depend on to what degree the will of imperialist classes will be paralysed by the will of the revolutionary proletariat in each country.

If the Allied Governments, in the blind stubbornness which characterises decadent and perishing classes, once more refuse to participate in the negotiations, then the working classes will be confronted by the iron necessity of taking the power out of the hands of those who cannot or will not give the people peace.

During these ten days is being decided the fate of hundreds of

thousands and millions of human lives. If on the French and Italian fronts an armistice will not be made now, a new offensive just as senseless and merciless and inconclusive as all the previous offensives will swallow innumerable victims on both sides.

The ultimate logic of this butchery let loose by the ruling class leads to the complete annihilation of the flower of the European nations. But the people want to live and have the right to. They have the right and they must throw aside all those who interfere with their living.

Addressing to the Governments the last proposal to participate in the peace negotiations, we at the same time promise full support to the working class of each country which will rise against its national imperialists, against chauvinists, against militarists, under the banner of peace, brotherhood of peoples, and socialist reconstruction of society.

8. *Declaration made by the Soviet Delegation at a Session of the Political Commission of the Brest-Litovsk Peace Conference. February 10th, 1918.*¹

. . . We consider that after long discussion and all-round survey of the question, the time for decision has come. The people await with impatience the result of the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk. They are asking when will be the end of this unexampled destruction of human beings, caused by the venal and despotic interests of the ruling classes in all countries. If the war was ever a war of defence it has long ceased to be so for either side. If Great Britain has taken possession of the African colonies, Baghdad and Jerusalem, it is no longer a defensive war ; if Germany is occupying Serbia, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania and Rumania and seizing the Moonzund Islands, this is also no defensive war. It is a struggle for the partition of the world. This is now clear : clearer than ever before.

We no longer desire to take part in this imperialist war, in which the claims of the propertied classes are being blatantly redeemed

¹ The conditions proposed by the German High Command at Brest-Litovsk were so onerous that the Soviets could not possibly sign them. Hence the formula : " Withdrawal from the war, but no signing of peace ! " The first three signatures to the declaration to the Allies were those of Bolsheviks, the other two of Left S.R.'s.

with human blood. We are equally intolerant of the imperialism of either side, and we no longer consent to shed the blood of our soldiers for the protection of the interests of one imperialist camp against another.

In expectation of that hour which we hope to be drawing near, when the oppressed toiling classes of all countries take the power in their hands as the toilers of Russia have done, we are withdrawing our army and our people from the war. Our soldier-ploughman must go back to his ploughshare, so that this spring he may in peace prepare the soil which the revolution took from the land-owners and gave over to the peasantry. Our worker-soldier must go back to his bench, there to produce, not weapons of destruction, but tools for creation, and, together with the ploughman, build up a new socialist economy.

We are withdrawing from the war. We inform all nations and their Governments of this. We are giving an order for the complete demobilisation of our armies now opposing the troops of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria. We expect and firmly believe that other nations will soon follow our example. At the same time we declare that the conditions proposed to us by the Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary are radically opposed to the interests of all peoples. These conditions will be swept away by the toiling masses of all countries, including those of Austria-Hungary and Germany. The people of Poland, the Ukraine, Lithuania, Courland and Esthonia consider these conditions as a violation of their will; for the Russian people they imply a constant threat. The popular masses of the whole world, governed by political consciousness or moral instinct, will sweep away these conditions: in expectation of that day when the toiling classes of all countries will lay down their own conditions for peaceful co-existence and friendly co-operation among nations. We refuse to sanction those conditions which German and Austro-Hungarian imperialism are carving out of the living bodies of the people. We cannot set the seal of the Russian Revolution to conditions which bear with them a yoke, sorrow and misfortune for millions of human beings.

The Governments of Germany and Austria-Hungary want to own lands and peoples by right of military seizure. Let them do their work openly. We cannot sanction violence. We are with-

drawing from the war, but we are forced to refuse to sign a peace treaty.

In connection with this declaration I transmit to the combined allied delegations the following written and signed declaration :

" On behalf of the Council of People's Commissars, the Government of the Russian Federated Republic, we herewith bring to the notice of the Governments and peoples at war with us, and to allied and neutral nations, the fact that, while refusing to sign a rapacious treaty, Russia, for its part, declares the state of war with Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria, at an end. An order is simultaneously being given to the Russian troops for complete demobilisation all along the front."

9. *Note from Russian Socialist Federative Republic of Soviets. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to the Toiling Masses of England, America, France, Italy and Japan. August 1st, 1918.*¹

The whole capitalist press of your countries howls like a vicious unleashed dog for the " intervention " of your Governments in Russian affairs, shouting loudly, " now or never ! " But even at this moment when these hirelings of your exploiters have dropped their masks, are clamouring for an advance against the workers and peasants of Russia—even at this moment they lie unscrupulously, and shamelessly deceive you. For at the moment when they *threaten* " intervention " in Russian affairs, *they are already conducting military operations against Russia of the workers and peasants.*

The Anglo-French bandits are already executing Soviet workers on the Murman Railway which they have seized. In the region of the Ural Mountains they are breaking up the workers' Soviets, are shooting their representatives through the medium of Czechoslovak troops, which are maintained at the expense of French people and are commanded by French officers.

In compliance with the orders of your Governments they are cutting off the Russian people from its bread stores so as to compel the workers and peasants to put their necks once more into the

¹ Russia, devastated by war and rendered powerless, was compelled not only to withdraw from the war but also to sign the degrading Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The Allies, on pretext that the Soviets betrayed them to Germany (the documents prove that the Soviets fought against German imperialism) embarked upon unjustifiable intervention.

noose of the Paris and London Stock Exchanges. The open attack of Franco-English capital on the workers of Russia is only a completion of *eight months'* long *underground struggle* against Soviet Russia. From the first day of the October Revolution, from the moment when the workers and peasants of Russia declared that they will no longer shed either their own or other people's blood in the interests of capital, either their own or foreign ; from the first day when they threw to the ground their exploiters and appealed to you to follow their example, to put an end to the international slaughter, to put an end to exploitation—from that same moment your exploiters swore that they will demolish this country, the workers of which dared for the first time in the history of humanity, to overthrow the yoke of capitalism, to get their necks out of the noose of war. Your Governments supported the *Ukrainian Rada* against the workers and peasants of Russia, the Rada which sold itself to German imperialism and called in the help of German bayonets against the Ukrainian workers and the Ukrainian peasants ; they supported the *Rumanian Oligarchy*, the very oligarchy which, by its attacks on our south-western front had helped to destroy the defensive powers of Russia. Their agents bought for ready cash that same General *Krasnov*, who now, hand in hand with German military authorities, is trying to cut Russia off from the coal of the Donetsk region and from Kuban grain so as to render her a defenceless victim of German and Russian capitalism. They supported morally and financially the part of the *Right* wing of *Social-Revolutionaries*, the party of traitors to the Revolution, who rose with arms in hands against the Government of the workers and peasants.

But when they saw that all their attempts were unsuccessful, when it became evident that hired bandits are an insufficient force—they decided to sacrifice your blood as well and they undertake an open attack upon Russia, throwing into the fire the strength of the workers and peasants of France and England.

You who are shedding your blood in the interests of capital at the Marne and on the Aisne, in the Balkans, in Syria and in Mesopotamia, in addition to that you are compelled to die in the snows of *North Finland* and on the *Mountains of the Ural*.

In the interests of Capital you must play the part of the Executioner of the Russian Workers' Revolution.

To cover up this crusade against the Russian workers' revolution your capitalists declare to you that this crusade is undertaken *not against the Russian Revolution ; that it is the struggle against German Imperialism*, to which they claim we have sold ourselves. The falsehood and hypocrisy of the declaration will become evident to everyone of you if you will only compare the following facts : (1) The Brest peace treaty dismembers Russia, and still we were compelled to sign it for the very reason that your Governments, knowing full well that Russia was not able to carry on the war any longer, have refused to participate in the international peace negotiations in which the strength of your Governments would have saved Russia and would have given you an acceptable peace. It was *not Russia, bled white as she was for three and a half years, that has sold your cause*, but it was your own Governments *that have thrown Russia under the heel of German Imperialism*. (2) When we were compelled to conclude the Brest peace treaty owing to the fact that the masses of our people were not able to carry on the war any further, and when the agents of your Governments tried constantly to draw us again into war, tried to make us believe that Germany would not allow us to remain in a state of peace with her, our press replied : " If Germany destroys the peace which we have bought at such great sacrifices, if she raises her hand against the Russian Revolution, then we will defend ourselves. If the Allies wish to help us in our sacred cause of defence, then let them help us to repair our railways, to set in order our economic affairs, for economically weak Russia is not capable of seriously defending herself." But the Allies *did not reply* to these appeals of ours. Their only thought was to pump out of us the interests due on old loans which French capital advanced to Tsarism in order to draw the Tsar's Government into the war, and which loans the Russian people have long since paid off by a sea of blood and mountains of corpses. (3) It is not only that the Allies did not in any way help us to re-establish our capacity for defence, but, as we have shown above, they tried to destroy this capacity for defence by whatever means they could, increasing the internal disorganisation, cutting us off from the last reserves of bread. (4) The Allies were warning us that the Germans will seize the Siberian and Murman Railways, the last two direct lines which connect us with the rest of the world, and

which are beyond German control, *but in the end these lines were seized not by Germany who were not able to seize them as they are too far from those lines, it was the noble Allies that seized them in the Murman district, and in Siberia the Allies are carrying on a struggle not against the Germans, who are not there, but against the Russian workers whose Soviets are everywhere being destroyed.*

All that the press of your capitalists and their agents say in the defence of the barbaric assault upon Russia, is nothing but hypocrisy which is intended to hide from you the substance of the question. It is for other purposes that they are preparing their campaign against Russia. They have three aims in view ; their first aim is *the seizure of as much territory of Russia as possible in order to use her wealth, her railroads as security for payment to French and English capital of the interests on loans* ; their second aim is *the suppression of the Workers' Revolution* lest the Revolution inspires you, lest it shows you how it is possible to throw off the yoke of capitalism. Their third aim is to create a *New Eastern Front* so as to draw off the German forces from the Western Front on to Russian territory.

The agents of your capitalists declare to you that in this manner they will diminish the pressure of the German legions over German imperialism. They lie ; they were not capable of defeating Germany when a great Russian army was fighting, thus securing for the Allies a numerical superiority ; so much the less are they able to secure victory on the field of battle now that the Russian army is just being created. *German imperialism can only be defeated when the imperialism of all states is defeated by the united onslaught of the world's proletariat.* Not by the continuation of the war, but by bringing it to an end shall we secure this object. Then both you and the German workers will be freed of the fear of the foreign capitalist class and its aims of conquest—the ending of the war of peoples and the commencement of an international civil war—a war of the exploited against the exploiters—will finally put an end to all kinds of injustice, social as well as national.

The attempts to draw Russia into war will not save you from bloodshed ; they can only put the Russian workers, the Russian Workers' and Peasants' *Revolution* under the sword—and nobody wants this more than the leaders of the German military party, who being close neighbours to the Russian Revolution, are more

than anybody else afraid of its inflammatory sparks. *By becoming docile tools in the hands of your Governments in their criminal conspiracy against Russia, you, the workers of France and England, America and Italy, become the executioners of the Workers' Revolution.*

The descendants of the heroes of the Paris Commune are *in the role of assistants to Gallie*. Such is the role that your masters are assigning to you, workers of France. The sons of those workers of *England* who rose in a body when the English textile barons wanted to come to the aid of American slave-owners, you are now playing the part of executioners of the Russian Revolution—such is the depth of the degradation to which your rulers want to bring you. You, workers of *America*, you who have ever detested the despotism of the Tsar, you are now to help—at the bidding of the Trust Kings—in erecting a new Tsarism in Russia. This is the real issue, working men of *America*. And you, workers of *Italy*, you were watching with enthusiasm every manifestation of the proletarian war for emancipation, your masters want to transform you into participators in the counter-revolutionary campaign against the Workers' Russia !

The Russia of the working class is stretching out her hand to you, proletarians of the Allied countries !

These men whose hands are reeking with the blood of workmen of Kem, of Samara, of Tomsk, who were shot at the command of the leaders of the Murman landing, the organisers of the Czecho-Slovak rebellion, these are the people who cry out that under the order of Germany we are *breaking the bond which ties us to the peoples of France, England, Italy, America and Belgium*.

Too long have we suffered calmly the derisive jeers of the representatives of Allied Imperialism over Soviet Russia ; we have allowed people who once were licking the boots of Tsarism to remain in Russia although they did not recognise the Government of the workers. We did not resort to repression against them, though the hand of their military mission was seen in every counter-revolutionary plot directed against us. And even now when it is proved that French officers are leading the Czecho-Slovaks, when the Murman outrages have begun, even now we have not protested by a single word against the presence of your diplomats on the territory of the Soviet Russia which has not

been recognised by them. We have demanded only their removal from Vologda to Moscow, so as to place us in a position to defend them from attempts on their lives by people whom their misdeeds have moved to deepest indignation.

We did all this only for the reason that we did not want to give them an opportunity to tell you that we are breaking with you. And now after the departure of the Allied ambassadors not a single hair will fall from the head of the peaceful citizens of your countries who live in our midst, who abide by the laws of the Workers' and Peasants' Republic. And we are convinced that should we retort to every blow of the rapacious "Allies" by two blows, you will see in that not only legitimate defence, but will also see in it the upholding of your own interests, for the salvation of the Russian Revolution is the common interests of the proletariat of all countries. We are certain that every measure against those who on Russian territory are hatching plots against the Russian Revolution will meet with your sincere sympathy, for these plots are directed against you as well as against us. Driven to fight the allied capitalism, which in addition to the fetters put on us by German Imperialism wished to add new fetters, we address ourselves to you with the appeal :

Long live solidarity of the workers of the world !

Long live solidarity of the proletariats of France, England, America and Italy with the Russian proletariat !

Down with the bandits of International Imperialism, long live the International Revolution !

Long live peace between the nations !

10. *Note from Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to D. C. Poole, American Consul in Moscow. August 6th, 1918.*¹

Dear Mr. Poole :

At the time when Citizen Lenin, in a speech referring to the unjustifiable Anglo-French invasion, declared that the British and French were in fact at war with us and you came to ask whether peace or war existed between us and whether you were to remain with us, I replied that our people were still at peace with yours and that to enable you to continue acting as repre-

¹ See Introduction.

sentative of the United States the same facilities would be granted you as heretofore.

This possibility still holds good as far as we are concerned, inasmuch as the interruption of cable communication by way of the Murman coast is the work of Great Britain, not ours. As the only possibility of communicating with your Government we have placed our wireless station at your disposal.

We therefore request you to inform your Government and peoples abroad that a completely unjustifiable attack and a pronounced act of violence is being committed upon us. We have done nothing to deserve such an attack. Our people want nothing but to live in peace and friendship with the masses and workers of all nations. Despite the existing state of peace Anglo-French armed forces have invaded our territory, taken our towns and villages by force, dissolved our workers' organisations, imprisoned their members and driven them from their homes without any reason possibly warranting these predatory acts.

Without a declaration of war and without the existence of a state of war, hostilities are opened against us and our national property is pillaged. Toward us no justice is observed and no law acknowledged by those who sent these invading troops against us, for we are the first in the world to establish a Government for the oppressed poor. Barefaced robbery is held permissible against us.

These people, who did not declare war against us, act like barbarians toward us, but we, who represent the oppressed poor, are no barbarians like these invaders. Our retaliation against those who shoot the members of our Soviets does not take the shape of similar acts against representatives of these Governments. The official Government representatives enjoy an immunity which is refused by the latter's official departments to our Soviet members.

While we take this attitude toward the official representatives of Great Britain and France we take into consideration your own urgent request, because we regard you as the representative of a nation, which to use your own words, will undertake nothing against the Soviets if we retaliate with precautionary measures against the warlike measures directed against us.

It is in pursuance of this that we intern the nationals of invading powers in concentration camps. We regard these nationals as civilian prisoners. We apply these precautionary measures only

against the members of the property classes, who are our opponents. No such measures are taken against our natural allies, the working men of these same countries who happen to be here. The working classes of the whole world are our friends.

Precisely at this moment we say to these countries whose armies proceed with open violence against us, and we call out to their peoples, "Peace be to the homes of the poor!"

As you stated to us that your nation does not purpose to destroy the Soviets, we ask you now if you cannot tell us plainly what Great Britain wants with us. Is Great Britain's aim to destroy the most popular Government the world has ever seen, namely, the Councils of the Poor and the Peasants? Is her aim a counter-revolution?

In view of the acts referred to by me I must assume that this is true. We must believe that her intention is to re-establish the worst tyranny in the world, namely, the hated Tsarism. Or does she contemplate seizing any special town or territory we can name?

Remembering your kindness, I hope you will help us to elucidate these problems.

11. *Note from Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Woodrow Wilson, President of the United States of America. October 24th, 1918.*¹

Mr. President :

In your message of January 8th to the Congress of the United States of North America, in the sixth point, you spoke of your profound sympathy for Russia, which was then conducting, single-handed, negotiations with the mighty German Imperialism. Your programme, you declared, demands the evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of

¹ This is one of the most interesting documents of the Soviet Government during the first year of its existence, the most strenuous period for the young Soviet Republic. The note exposes Wilson's fake pacifism, the contradiction between his declaration and his participation in the intervention which cost so much blood and human life among the masses of Soviet workers and peasants.

her political development and national policy, and assure her a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing ; and more than a welcome assistance of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. And you added that " the treatment accorded to her by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their goodwill, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy."

The desperate struggle which we were waging at Brest-Litovsk against German Imperialism apparently only intensified your sympathy for Soviet Russia, for you sent greetings to the Congress of the Soviets, which under the threat of a German offensive ratified the Brest peace of violence—greetings and assurances that Soviet Russia might count upon American help.

Six months have passed since then, and the Russian people have had sufficient time to get actual tests of your Government's and your Allies' good-will, of their comprehension of the needs of the Russian people, of their intelligent unselfish sympathy. This attitude of your Government and of your Allies was shown first of all in the conspiracy which was organised on Russian territory with the financial assistance of your French Allies and with the diplomatic co-operation of your Government as well—the conspiracy of the Czecho-Slovaks to whom your Government is furnishing every kind of assistance.

For some time attempts had been made to create a pretext for a war between Russia and the United States of North America by spreading false stories to the effect that German war prisoners had seized the Siberian railway, but your own officers and after them Colonel Robins, the head of your Red Cross Mission, had been convinced that these allegations were absolutely false. The Czecho-Slovak conspiracy was organised under the slogan that unless these misled unfortunate people be protected, they would be surrendered to Germany and Austria ; but you may find out, among other sources, from the open letter of Captain Sadoul, of the French Military Mission, how unfounded this charge is. The Czecho-Slovaks would have left Russia in the beginning of the year, had the French Government provided ships for them. For several months we have waited in vain that your Allies should provide the opportunity for the Czecho-Slovaks to leave. Evi-

dently these Governments have very much preferred the presence of the Czecho-Slovaks in Russia—the results show for what object—to their departure for France and their participation in the fighting on the French frontier. The best proof of the real object of the Czecho-Slovak rebellion is the fact that although in control of the Siberian railway, the Czecho-Slovaks have not taken advantage of this to leave Russia, but by the order of the Entente Governments, whose directions they follow, have remained in Russia to become the mainstay of the Russian counter-revolution. Their counter-revolutionary mutiny which made impossible the transportation of grain and petroleum on the Volga, which cut off the Russian workers and peasants from the Siberian stores of grain and other materials and condemned them to starvation—this was the first experience of the workers and peasants of Russia with your Government and with your Allies after your promises of the beginning of the year. And then came another experience: an attack on North Russia by Allied Troops, including American troops, their invasion of Russian territory without any cause and without a declaration of war, the occupation of Russian cities and villages, executions of Soviet officials and other acts of violence against the peaceful population of Russia.

You have promised, Mr. President, to co-operate with Russia in order to obtain for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her political development and her national policy. Actually this co-operation took the form of an attempt of the Czecho-Slovak troops and later, in Archangel, Murmansk, and the Far East, of your own and your Allies' troops, to force the Russian people to submit to the rule of the oppressing and exploiting classes, whose dominion was overthrown by the workers and peasants of Russia in October 1917. The revival of the Russian counter-revolution which has already become a corpse, attempts to restore by force its bloody domination over the Russian people—such was the experience of the Russian people, instead of co-operation for the unembarrassed expression of their will which you promised them, Mr. President, in your declarations.

You have also, Mr. President, promised to the Russian people to assist them in their struggle for independence. Actually this is what has occurred while the Russian people were fighting on the

Southern front against the counter-revolution, which has betrayed them to the German Imperialism and was threatening their independence: while they were using all their energy to organise the defence of their territory against Germany at their Western frontiers, they were forced to move their troops to the East to oppose the Czecho-Slovaks who were bringing them slavery and oppression, and to the North—against your Allies and your own troops which had invaded their territory, and against the counter-revolutions organised by these troops.

Mr. President, the acid test of the relations between the United States and Russia gave quite different results from those that might have been expected from your message to the Congress. But we have reason not to be altogether dissatisfied with even these results, since the outrages of the counter-revolution in the East and North have shown the workers and peasants of Russia the aims of the Russian counter-revolution and of its foreign supporters, thereby creating among the Russian people an iron will to defend their liberty and the conquests of the revolution, to defend the land that it has given to the peasants and the factories that it has given to the workers. The fall of Kazan, Symbyrsk, Syzran, and Samara should make it clear to you, Mr. President, what were the consequences for us of the actions which followed your promises of January 8th. Our trials helped to create a strongly united and disciplined Red Army, which is daily growing stronger and more powerful and which is learning to defend the revolution. The attitude toward us, which was actually displayed by your Government and by your Allies could not destroy us; on the contrary, we are now stronger than we were a few months ago, and your present proposal of international negotiations for a general peace finds us alive and strong and in a position to give in the name of Russia our consent to join the negotiations. In your note to Germany you demand the evacuation of occupied territories as a condition which must precede the armistice during which peace negotiations shall begin. We are ready, Mr. President, to conclude an armistice on these conditions, and we ask you to notify us when you, Mr. President, and your Allies intend to remove troops from Murmansk, Archangel and Siberia. You refuse to conclude an armistice, unless Germany will stop the outrages, pillaging, etc., during the evacua-

tion of occupied territories. We allow ourselves therefore to draw the conclusion that you and your Allies will order the Czecho-Slovaks to return the part of our gold reserve fund which they seized in Kazan, that you will forbid them to continue as heretofore their acts of pillaging and outrage against the workers and peasants during their forced departure (for we will encourage their speedy departure, without waiting for your order).

With regard to other peace terms, namely, that the Governments which would conclude peace must express the will of their people, you are aware that our Government fully satisfies this condition, our Government expresses the will of the Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Red Army Deputies, representing at least eighty per cent. of the Russian people. This cannot, Mr. President, be said about your Government. But for the sake of humanity and peace we do not demand as a prerequisite of general peace negotiations that all nations participating in the negotiations shall be represented by Councils of People's Commissars, elected at a Congress of Councils of Workmen's, Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies. We know that this form of Government will soon be the general form, and that precisely a general peace, when nations will no more be threatened with defeat, will leave them free to put an end to the system and the clique that forced upon mankind this universal slaughter, and which will, in spite of themselves, surely lead the tortured peoples to create Soviet Governments, which give exact expression to their will.

Agreeing to participate at present in negotiations with even such Governments as do not yet express the will of the people we would like on our part to find out from you, Mr. President, in detail what is your conception of the League of Nations, which you propose as the crowning work of peace. You demand the independence of Poland, Serbia, Belgium, and freedom for the peoples of Austria-Hungary. You probably mean by this that the masses of the people must everywhere first become the masters of their own fate in order to unite afterwards in a league of free nations. But strangely enough, we do not find among your demands the liberation of Ireland, Egypt, or India, nor even the liberation of the Philippines, and we would be very sorry to learn that these people should be denied the opportunity to participate

together with us, through their freely elected representatives, in the organisation of the League of Nations.

We would also, Mr. President, very much like to know, before the negotiations with regard to the formation of a League of Nations have begun, what is your conception of the solution of many economic questions which are essential for the cause of future peace. You do not mention the war expenditures—this unbearable burden, which the masses would have to carry, unless the League of Nations should renounce payments on the loans to the capitalists of all countries. You know as well as we, Mr. President, that this war is the outcome of the policies of all capitalist nations, that the Governments of all countries were continually piling up armaments, that the ruling groups of all civilised nations pursued a policy of annexations, and that it would, therefore, be extremely unjust if the masses, having paid for these policies with millions of lives and with economic ruin, should yet pay to those who are really responsible for the war a tribute for their policies which resulted in all these countless miseries.

We propose, therefore, Mr. President, the annulment of the war loans as the basis of the League of Nations. As to the restoration of the countries that were laid waste by the war, we believe it is only just that all nations should aid for this purpose the unfortunate Belgium, Poland and Serbia, and however poor and ruined Russia seems to be, she is ready on her part to do everything she can to help these victims of the war, and she expects that American capital, which has not at all suffered from this war, and has even made billions in profits out of it, will do its part to help these peoples.

But the League of Nations should not only liquidate the present war, but also make impossible any wars in the future. You must be aware, Mr. President, that the capitalists of your country are planning to apply in the future the same policies of encroachment and of super-profits in China and Siberia, and that, fearing competition from Japanese capitalists, they are preparing a military force to overcome the resistance which they meet from Japan. You are no doubt aware of similar plans of the capitalist ruling circles of other countries with regard to other territories and other peoples. Knowing this, you will have to agree with us that the

factories, mines and banks must not be left in the hands of private persons who have always made use of the vast means of production created by the masses of the people to export products and capital to foreign countries in order to reap super-profits in return for the benefits forced on them, their struggle for spoils resulting in imperialist wars. We propose, therefore, Mr. President, that the League of Nations be based on the expropriation of the capitalists of all countries. In your country, Mr. President, the banks and the industries are in the hands of such a small group of capitalists that, as your personal friend, Colonel Robins, assured us, the arrest of twenty heads of capitalist cliques and the transfer of the control, which by characteristic capitalist methods they have come to possess, into the hands of the masses of the people is all that would be required to destroy the principal sources of new wars.

If you will agree to this, Mr. President—if the source of future wars will thus be destroyed, then there can be no doubt that it would be easy to remove all economic barriers and that all peoples, controlling their means of production, will be vitally interested in exchanging the things they do not need for the things they need. It will then be a question of an exchange of products between nations, each of which produces what it can best produce, and the League of Nations will be a league of mutual aid of the toiling masses. It will then be easy to reduce the armed forces to the limit necessary for the maintenance of internal safety.

We know very well that the selfish capitalist class will attempt to create this internal menace, just as the Russian landlords and capitalists are now attempting with the aid of American, English, and French armed forces to take the factories from the workers and the land from the peasants. But, if the American workers, inspired by your idea of a League of Nations, will crush the resistance of the Russian capitalists, then neither the German nor any other capitalists will be a serious menace to the victorious working class, and it will then suffice, if every member of the commonwealth, working six hours in the factory, spends two hours daily for several months in learning the use of arms, so that the whole people will know how to overcome the internal menace.

And so, Mr. President, though we have had experience with your promises, we nevertheless accept as a basis your proposals

about peace and about a League of Nations. We have tried to develop them in order to avoid results which would contradict your promises, as was the case with your promise of assistance to Russia. We have tried to formulate with precision your proposals on the League of Nations in order that the League of Nations should not turn out to be a league of capitalists against the nations. Should you not agree with us, we have no objection to an "open discussion of your peace terms," as your first point of your peace programme demands. If you will accept our proposals as a basis, we will easily agree on the details.

But there is another possibility. We have had dealings with the President of the Archangel attack and the Siberian invasion and we have also had dealings with the President of the League of Nations Peace Programme. Is not the first of these—the real President actually directing the policies of the American capitalist Government? Is not the American Government rather a Government of the American corporations, of the American industrial, commercial, and railroad trusts, of the American banks—in short, a Government of the American capitalists? And is it not possible that the proposals of this Government about the creation of a League of Nations will result in new chains for the peoples, in the organisation of an International trust for the exploitation of the workers and the suppression of weak nations? In this latter case, Mr. President, you will not be in a position to reply to our questions, and we will say to the workers of all countries: Beware! Millions of your brothers, thrown at each others' throats by the bourgeoisie of all countries are still perishing on the battlefields and the capitalist leaders are already trying to come to an understanding for the purpose of suppressing with united forces those that remain alive, when they call to account the criminals who caused the war!

However, Mr. President, since we do not at all desire to wage war against the United States, even though your Government has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissars and your post is not yet taken by Eugene Debs, whom you have imprisoned; since we do not at all desire to wage war against England, even though the cabinet of Mr. Lloyd George has not yet been replaced by a Council of People's Commissars with MacLean at its head; since we have no

France, even though the capitalist Government of Clemenceau has not yet been replaced by a workmen's Government of Merheim, just as we have concluded peace with the imperialist Government of Germany, with Emperor Wilhelm at its head, whom you, Mr. President, hold in no greater esteem than we, the Workmen's and Peasants' Revolutionary Government, hold you, we finally propose to you, Mr. President, that you take up with your Allies the following questions and give us precise and businesslike replies : Do the Governments of the United States, England and France intend to cease demanding the blood of the Russian people and lives of Russian citizens, if the Russian people will agree to pay them a ransom, such as a man who has been suddenly attacked pays to the one who attacked him ? If so, just what tribute do the Governments of the United States, England and France demand of the Russian people ? Do they demand concessions, that the railways, mines, gold deposits etc. shall be handed over to them on certain conditions, or do they demand territorial concessions, some part of Siberia, or Caucasia, or perhaps the Murmansk coast ?

We expect from you, Mr. President, that you will definitely state what you and your Allies demand, and also whether the alliance between your Government and the Governments of the other Entente Powers is in the nature of a combination which could be compared with a corporation for drawing dividends from Russia, or does your Government and the other Governments of the Entente Powers have each separate and special demands, and what are they ? Particularly are we interested to know the demands of your French allies with regard to the three billions of roubles which the Paris bankers loaned to the Government of the Tsar—the oppressor of Russia and the enemy of his own people ? And you, Mr. President, as well as your French Allies surely know that even if you and your Allies should succeed in enslaving and covering with blood the whole territory of Russia—which will not be allowed by our heroic revolutionary Red Army—that even in that case the Russian people, worn out by the war and not having sufficient time to take advantage of the benefits of the Soviet rule to elevate their national economy, will be unable to pay the French bankers the full tribute for the billions that were used by the Government of the Tsar for purposes injurious to the

people. Do your French Allies demand that a part of this tribute be paid in instalments, and if so, what part, and do they anticipate that their claims will result in similar claims by other creditors of the infamous Government of the Tsar which has been overthrown by the Russian people? We can hardly think that your Government and your Allies are without a ready answer, when your and their troops are trying to advance on our territory with the evident object of seizing and enslaving our country.

The Russian people through the People's Red Army are guarding their territory and are bravely fighting against your invasion and against the attack of your Allies. But your Government and the Governments of the other powers of the Entente undoubtedly have well prepared plans, for the sake of which you are shedding the blood of your soldiers. We expect that you will state your demands very clearly and definitely. Should we, however, be disappointed, should you fail to reply to our quite definite and precise questions, we will draw the only possible conclusion—that we are justified in the assumption that your Government and the Governments of your Allies desire to get from the Russian people a tribute both in money and in natural resources of Russia, and territorial concessions as well. We will tell this to the Russian people as well as to the toiling masses of other countries, and the absence of a reply from you will serve for us as a silent reply. The Russian people will then understand that the demands of your Government and of the Governments of your Allies are so severe and vast that you do not even want to communicate them to the Russian Government.

12. *Proposal of Armistice to the Allies. Resolution of the Sixth All Russian Extraordinary Congress of Soviets, passed at the Session of November 8th, 1918.*

The Sixth All Russian Extraordinary Congress of Councils of Workers', Peasants', Cossack and Red Army Deputies considers it its duty once more in the face of the whole world to declare to the Governments of the United States of America, England, France, Italy and Japan, waging war against Russia, that, with a view to the cessation of bloodshed, the Congress proposes to open negotiations for the conclusion of peace.

The Congress charges the All Russian Central Executive Com-

mittee to take immediate steps necessary for the carrying out of this decision.

13. *Peace Proposal by Government of R.S.F.S.R. to Allied Powers and United States of America. Note from M. Litvinov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Woodrow Wilson, President of United States. Stockholm, December 24th, 1918.*

Mr. President :

In addition to the general peace offer recently addressed by the Soviet Government to the Allies, I formally informed to-day the Stockholm Ministers of the United States and of the Allied countries that I am authorised to enter into negotiations for a peaceful settlement of all questions making for hostilities against Russia. The principles proclaimed by you as a possible basis for settling European questions, your avowed efforts and intentions of making the settlement conform to the demands of justice and humanity, induce and justify me to send you this statement, inasmuch as most points of your peace programme are included in the more extensive aspirations of the Russian workers and peasants, now rulers of their country.

It was they who first proclaimed and actually granted to nations the right of self-determination, who suffered most sacrifices in fighting Imperialism and militarism both at home and abroad, who dealt the severest blow to secret diplomacy. And it is partly for these innovations in politics that they have been fiercely attacked by the former ruling classes of Russia and their counterparts in other countries. To justify this attack a network of lies and calumnies has been woven round the activities of the Soviets and forged documents put into circulation.

Unfortunately, Allied statesmen accept all the monstrous accusations against the Soviets at their face value, without taking the trouble to check them. Whilst agents of anti-Soviet parties are allowed and encouraged to move freely in Allied countries and disseminate untruth, representatives of the accused side have never been allowed to put fully their case and to answer the charges made against them.

In fact, the chief aim of the Soviets is to secure for the toiling majority of the Russian people economic liberty, without which political liberty is of no avail to them. For eight months the Soviets

endeavoured to realise their aims by peaceful methods without resorting to violence, adhering to the abolition of capital punishment, which abolition had been part of their programme. It was only when their adversaries, the minority of the Russian people, took to terrorist acts against popular members of the Government and invoked the help of foreign troops that the labouring masses were driven to acts of exasperation and gave vent to their wrath and bitter feelings against their former oppressors.

For the Allied invasion of Russian territory not only compelled the Soviets against their own will to militarise the country anew and to divert their energies and resources—so necessary to the economic reconstruction of Russia, exhausted by four years of war in the defence of the country—but also cut off the vital sources of foodstuffs and raw materials, exposing the population to most terrible privations, bordering on starvation. I wish to emphasise that the so-called “Red Terror”—which is grossly exaggerated and misrepresented abroad—was not the cause but the direct result and outcome of Allied intervention.

The Russian workers and peasants fail to understand how foreign countries, which never dreamed of interfering with Russian affairs when Tsarist barbarism and militarism ruled supreme, and even supported that regime, can feel justified in interfering in Russia now, when the working people themselves, after decades of strenuous struggling and countless sacrifices, succeeded in taking power and the destiny of their country into their own hands, aiming at nothing but their own happiness and international brotherhood, constituting no menace to other nations.

The Russian workers and peasants are determined to defend their dearly won power and liberties against invaders with all the means their vast country puts at their disposal, but mindful of the inevitable wanton loss of life and treasure on both sides, and wishing to avert the further ruining of Russia which must result from the continuation of internal and external fighting—they are prepared to go any length of concessions, as far as the real interests of their country are concerned, if they can secure thereby conditions enabling them to work out peacefully their social schemes.

I understand that the question of relations with Russia is now engaging the attention of Allied statesmen. I venture, then, to

submit to you, Mr. President, that there are now only two courses open to them.

One is continued open or disguised intervention on the present or on a still larger scale, which means prolongation of war, further embitterment of the Russian masses, intensification of internal strife, unexampled bloodshed, and perhaps total extermination of the Russian bourgeoisie by the exasperated masses, final devastation of the country, and, in case of the interventionists after a long struggle obtaining their end, a White Terror eclipsing the atrocities of the Finnish White Guardists, the inevitable introduction of a military dictatorship, and the restoration of the monarchy, leading to interminable revolutions and upheavals, and paralysing the economic development of the country for long decades.

The other alternative, which I trust may commend itself to you, is impartially to weigh and investigate the one-sided accusations against Soviet Russia, to come to an understanding with the Soviet Government, to withdraw the foreign troops from Russian territory, and to raise the economic blockade—soothing thereby the excited passions of the masses—to help Russia to regain her own sources of supply, and to give her technical advice how to exploit her natural richness in the most effective way, for the benefit of all countries badly in need of foodstuffs and raw materials.

The dictatorship of toilers and producers is not an aim in itself, but the means of building up a new social system under which useful work and equal rights would be provided for all citizens, irrespective of the class to which they had formerly belonged. One may believe in this ideal or not, but it surely gives no justification for sending foreign troops to fight against it, or for arming and supporting classes interested in the restoration of the old system of exploitation of man by man.

I venture to appeal to your sense of justice and impartiality.

I hope and trust, above all, that before deciding on any course of action you will give justice to the demand of *audiatur et altera pars*.

14. *Peace Proposal of Government of R.S.F.S.R. to Government of United States of America. Telegram from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Secretary for State of United States of America. January 12th, 1919.*

On behalf of M. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, I am sending you the following statement :

A radio telegram from Washington, received *via* Lyons on January 12th, relates that a statement has been made by Senator Hitchcock, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, about the causes for the sending of American troops to Russia. The principal cause is said to have been a desire to prevent the establishment of a German submarine base in Archangel. Whether there ever has been such a cause or not, it does not exist any more.

In respect to the second alleged cause for the invasion, namely, that the intention was to safeguard Allied supplies in Archangel, I beg to remind you that even last year we had started negotiations for this purpose, and we are now still willing to enter into a satisfactory solution of this question. There can no longer be any danger of the supplies falling into German hands.

The third reason for the invasion was stated to be a desire to maintain an open way for diplomatic representatives travelling from and to Russia. I beg to call your attention to the fact that the best method to attain this aim would be to have an understanding with my Government. Mr. Francis, the American Ambassador, was quite free to return to his home and unhindered at the time he left Russia. Our only cause in asking him not to remain in Vologda was the great danger threatening his personal security, and we offered him particularly inviting quarters in or around Moscow.

The fourth alleged ground for invasion is the protection of the Czecho-Slovaks. Yet there has never been any obstacle to reaching an understanding about this issue with my Government. We have officially offered the Czecho-Slovaks free passage to their homeland through Russia on the condition that we should protect their safety. We have now reached a full understanding on this matter with Professor Max, the President of the Czecho-Slovak National Council in Russia. He has returned to Bohemia in order to communicate our proposition to the Bohemian Government.

Finally, Senator Hitchcock maintains that one reason for the invasion was to prevent the formation of any army composed of German and Austrian prisoners. The only now existing obstacle to the return of all war prisoners to their homelands is the presence

of the Allied troops, or White Guards who are under the protection of the Allied troops. We therefore cannot understand why this should be a cause for a further maintenance of American troops in Russia.

Judging from statements contained in the above-mentioned radio telegram, some prominent members of the principal political party in the United States could not quite understand the reasons of Senator Hitchcock. They expressed their wish that American troops in Russia should be withdrawn as soon as possible. We share their wish to re-establish normal relations between the two countries, and we are ready to eliminate everything which may be an obstacle to such relations.

This is not the first time we are making an offer of this kind. In October we sent an offer of this character through the Norwegian Minister in Russia. A week later we made a similar offer through Mr. Christiansen, an attaché of the Norwegian Legation, at the time of his leaving Moscow. On November 3rd we invited the representatives of the neutral countries in Moscow and asked them to deliver a written proposition to the Allies, with the view to entering into negotiations which would put an end to the struggles against Russia. On November 26th the All Russian Congress of Soviets declared to the Allies, and to the whole world, that Russia was willing to enter into peace negotiations. On December 23rd our representative, M. Litvinov, communicated once more with the Allied Ambassadors in Stockholm the desire of the Russian Government to reach a friendly settlement of all questions at issue. He also sent an appeal to President Wilson in London ; thus the responsibility for the fact that no agreement has been thus far reached does not lie with us.

We have an opportunity to hear various American officers and soldiers express their astonishment at their being held in Russia, especially when we pointed out to such soldiers that the reason for their being in Russia seemed to be to put back on the shoulders of the Russian people the yoke which they have thrown off. The results of these explanations of ours have not been unsatisfactory to our personal relations with these American citizens.

We hope that the desire for peace expressed by the above-mentioned Senator is shared by the entire American Government and that the American Government will kindly name a place and

a time for opening of peace negotiations with our representatives.

15. *Peace Proposal of the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America. January 17th, 1919.*

The Government of the Russian Soviet Republic has learned that the General Confederation of Labour in France and the permanent administrative commission of the French Combined Socialist Party have passed resolutions noting with satisfaction the official and semi-official declarations of the Entente Governments' renunciation of military intervention in Russia. The Government of the Russian Soviet Republic is unable to see that this renunciation has as yet been expressed in action. The military forces of the Entente Powers are endeavouring as formerly to penetrate into the heart of Russia from the North, as formerly they are supporting insurgents attacking Russia from Siberia and in the Don region. In the west and the south they are invading the young Soviet Republics, newly formed and combining with the Russian Soviet Republic with identical political and social structure, and are providing all insurgents against the Soviet Government with war material. The Government of the Soviet Russian Republic asks the above-mentioned five Governments if they intend soon to follow up their declarations with corresponding action, what this action will be and if negotiations between the Entente Powers and the Government of the Russian Soviet Republic with a view to the actual carrying out of these declarations will soon be begun.

16. *Reply of R.S.F.S.R. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Proposed Conference at Prinkipo. February 4th, 1919.*

The Russian Soviet Government has learned, through a radiogram which contained a review of the press, of an invitation, stated to have been addressed by the Entente Powers to all *de facto* Governments of Russia, to send delegates to a conference on Prinkipo Island.

As the Soviet Government of Russia has received no such invitation addressed to it, but has learned—and again through a radio review of the press—that the absence of an answer from the

Soviet Government is interpreted as a refusal to reply to this invitation, the Russian Soviet Government desires to remove any false interpretation of its actions. On the other hand, in view of the fact that the foreign press systematically reports its actions in a false light, the Russian Soviet Government takes advantage of this opportunity to express its attitude with the utmost clearness and frankness.

In spite of the fact that both the military and internal conditions of Soviet Russia are constantly improving, the Soviet Government is so anxious to secure an agreement that would put an end to hostilities, that it is ready to enter at once into negotiations to this end, and, as it has more than once declared, is even willing in order to obtain such an agreement to make serious concessions, provided they will not menace the future development of Soviet Russia. In view of the fact that the power of resistance of the enemies which Soviet Russia has to fight depends exclusively on the aid which they receive from the Entente Powers, and that these are, therefore, its only real adversaries, the Russian Soviet Government addresses to these Powers a statement with regard to those questions on which it would consider such concessions possible in order to put an end to all conflicts with these Powers.¹

In view of the particular importance which is attached not only by the press, but also by the numerous declarations of the representatives of the Entente Governments to the question of Russian loans, the Soviet Government first of all declares its readiness to make concessions in this matter to the demands of the Entente Powers. It does not refuse to recognise its financial obligations to its creditors who are subjects of the Entente Powers, leaving the precise formulation of the manner in which this point is to be enforced to the special treaties the elaboration of which is to be one of the tasks of the proposed negotiations.

Secondly, in view of the difficult financial position of the Russian Soviet Republic and the unsatisfactory condition of its credit abroad, the Russian Soviet Government offers to guarantee the payment of interest on its loans by a certain amount of raw

¹ During the most difficult period in the life of Soviet Russia the Soviet Government suddenly discovered that the allies were organising a conference of Russian white governments existing on Russian territory on the remote Prinkipo Island. In its desire for peace the Soviet Government agreed to participate in that conference.

materials, which should be determined through a special agreement.

Thirdly, in view of the great interest which foreign capital has always evinced toward the question of the exploitation in its interests of the natural resources of Russia, the Soviet Government is willing to grant to subjects of the Entente Powers concessions in mines, forests, and other resources, which must be carefully formulated in such manner that the economic and social order of Soviet Russia shall be in no way violated by the internal regulations of these concessions.

The fourth point which, in the opinion of the Russian Soviet Government, might be dealt with in the proposed negotiations is the question of territorial concessions, for the Soviet Government does not intend to insist on excluding from these negotiations the consideration of the question of annexation of Russian territories by the Entente Powers. The Soviet Government adds that the presence in the territory of the former Russian Empire, with the exception of Poland and Finland, of armed forces of the Entente or of forces which are maintained at the expense of the Governments of the Entente or receive financial, technical, military, or any other kind of support from them, should also be characterised as annexation.

As for points two and four, the scope of the concessions to which the Soviet Government will agree will depend on its military situation with regard to the Entente Powers, and this situation is at present constantly improving.

Emphasising again that the situation of the Soviet Republic will necessarily affect the extent of the proposed concession, the Russian Soviet Government, nevertheless, stands by its proposal to enter into negotiations on the above-mentioned questions. As for the complaints frequently expressed in the Entente press with regard to the international revolutionary propaganda of the Russian Soviet Government, that Government declares that it is ready, if necessary, to include in the general agreement with the Entente Powers the obligation not to interfere in their internal affairs, pointing out, however, that it cannot limit the freedom of the revolutionary press.

On the above-mentioned basis the Russian Soviet Government is ready to enter into immediate negotiations on Prinkipo Island

or at any other place with all the Entente Powers or with individual powers of their number or with certain Russian political groups, according to the wish of the Entente Powers. The Russian Soviet Government requests the Entente Powers to make known to it without delay the place to which it should send its representatives, as well as the time and the route.

17. *Draft Treaty drawn up by Representatives of the Soviet Government and William Bullitt, in Russia on behalf of President Wilson. March 12th, 1919.*¹

The Allied and Associated Governments to propose that hostilities shall cease on all fronts in the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland on—(the date of the armistice to be set at least a week after the date when the Allied and Associated Governments make this proposal)—and that no new hostilities shall begin after this date, pending a conference to be held at—(the Soviet Government greatly prefers that the conference should be held in a neutral country and also that either a radio or a direct telegraph wire to Moscow should be put at its disposal)—on—(the conference to begin not later than a week after the armistice takes effect and the Soviet Government greatly prefers that the period between the date of the armistice and the first meeting of the conference should be only three days, if possible).

The duration of the armistice to be for two weeks, unless extended by mutual consent, and all parties to the armistice to undertake not to employ the period of the armistice to transfer troops and war material to the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The conference to discuss peace on the basis of the following principles, which shall not be subject to revision by the conference.

1. All existing *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to remain in full control of the territories which they occupy at the moment when the armistice becomes effective, except in so far as the conference may agree upon the transfer of territories ; until the peoples inhabiting the territories controlled by these *de facto*

¹ The President of the United States was then in Europe participating in the Versailles' Peace negotiations. Bullitt was his secretary.

Governments shall themselves determine to change their Governments. The Russian Soviet Government, the other Soviet Governments and all other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire, the Allied and Associated Governments, and the other Governments which are operating against the Soviet Governments, including Finland, Poland, Galicia, Roumania, Armenia, Azerbaidjan, and Afghanistan, to agree not to attempt to upset by force the existing *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and the other Governments signatory to this agreement.

The Allied and Associated Governments to undertake to see to it that the *de facto* Governments of Germany do not attempt to upset by force the *de facto* Governments of Russia. The *de facto* Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire to undertake not to attempt to upset by force the *de facto* Governments of Germany.

2. The economic blockade to be raised and trade relations between Soviet Russia and the Allied and Associated countries to be re-established under conditions which will ensure that supplies from the Allied and Associated countries are made available on equal terms to all classes of the Russian people.

3. The Soviet Governments of Russia to have the right of unhindered transit on all railways and the use of all ports which belonged to the former Russian Empire and to Finland and are necessary for the disembarkation and transportation of passengers and goods between their territories and the sea.

4. The citizens of the Soviet Republics of Russia to have the right of free entry into the Allied and Associated countries as well as into all countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland ; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of those countries.

It is considered essential by the Soviet Government that the Allied and Associated Governments should see to it that Poland and all neutral countries extend the same right as the Allied and Associated countries.

Nationals of the Allied and Associated countries and of the other countries above named to have the right of free entry into the

Soviet Republics of Russia ; also the right of sojourn and of circulation and full security, provided they do not interfere in the domestic politics of the Soviet Republics.

The Allied and Associated Governments and other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into the various Russian Soviet Republics. The Soviet Governments of Russia to have the right to send official representatives enjoying full liberty and immunity into all the Allied and Associated countries and into non-Soviet countries which have been formed on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland.

5. The Soviet Governments, the other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, to give a general amnesty to all political opponents, offenders, and prisoners. The Allied and Associated Governments to give a general amnesty to all Russian political opponents, offenders, and prisoners, and to their own nationals who have been or may be prosecuted for giving help to Soviet Russia. All Russians who have fought in, or otherwise aided the armies opposed to the Soviet Governments, and those opposed to the other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland, to be included in this amnesty.

All prisoners of war of non-Russian powers detained in Russia, likewise all nationals of those powers now in Russia to be given full facilities for repatriation. The Russian prisoners of war in whatever foreign country they may be, likewise all Russian nationals, including the Russian soldiers and officers abroad and those serving in all foreign armies to be given full facilities for repatriation.

6. Immediately after the signing of this agreement all troops of the Allied and Associated Governments and other non-Russian Governments to be withdrawn from Russia and military assistance to cease to be given to anti-Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire.

The Soviet Governments and the anti-Soviet Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland to begin to reduce their armies simultaneously,

and, at the same rate, to a peace footing immediately after the signing of this agreement. The conference to determine the most effective and just method of inspecting and controlling this simultaneous demobilisation and also the withdrawal of the troops and the cessation of military assistance to the anti-Soviet Governments.

7. The Allied and Associated Governments, taking cognisance of the statement of the Soviet Government of Russia, in its note of February 4th, in regard to its foreign debts, propose as an integral part of this agreement that the Soviet Government and the other Governments which have been set up on the territory of the former Russian Empire and Finland shall recognise their responsibility for the financial obligations of the former Russian Empire, to foreign states parties to this agreement and to the nationals of such states. Detailed arrangements for the payments of these debts to be agreed upon at the conference, regard being had to the present financial position of Russia. The Russian gold seized by the Czecho-Slovaks in Kazan or taken from Germany by the Allies to be regarded as partial payment of the portion of the debt due from the Soviet Republics of Russia.

The Soviet Government of Russia undertakes to accept the foregoing proposal provided it is made not later than April 10th, 1919.

The Soviet Government is extremely desirous of receiving semi-official guarantees from the American and British Governments that they will do all that lies in their power to get France to observe the conditions of the armistice.

18. *Protest against blockade and support of Russian Counter Revolution. Appeal from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., to the Toilers in the Entente Countries. April 18th, 1919.*

Toilers of the Entente Countries! The workers and peasants of Russia, who have rid themselves of all exploiters and oppressors, and been the first in the world to throw off the yoke of capitalism, charge you to be on the *qui vive* and not to weaken your pressure on your Governments to prevent them from strangling the people's revolution in Russia. There are those who would deceive you, assuring you that your Governments have renounced the

idea of intervention and crushing the freedom of the toiling masses in Russia, while all the time they are preparing new attacks on us and continuing to exert all their energy for our enslavement. Over a year has elapsed since the first troops of the Entente invaded our territory, step by step preparing for intervention with a view to crushing the Russian revolution and turning Russia into an enslaved colony of the advanced capitalist countries.

When the troops of Japan and England disembarked early in April last at Vladivostok, when, subsequently, the British and French troops refused to evacuate Murmansk, and a fresh expedition was sent for their reinforcement, which began at once to penetrate into Russia, when after this the troops of the Allied Powers occupied Archangel and endeavoured thence to penetrate into the very heart of Russia, when the Czecho-Slovakian counter-revolutionary insurgents were declared to be Allied troops, under the protection of the Entente Powers, and Allied bands were hurried to their aid through Siberia, when, within Russia, White Guard insurrections began to break out on Allied money and with the direct participation of Allied officers, and intrigues against the Soviet Government were prepared by Allied agents, your Governments explained that all this was necessary in order to transfer the struggle with Germany to the east, since the existence of France was threatened on the west by the powerful pressure of the German army. And yet the troops of your rulers did not behave anywhere in Russia like the enemies of Germany, for the sake of the struggle with whom they were supposed to have been sent here. On the contrary, they behaved like the Allies of Germany, even when the world war was still going on between your Governments and the Central Powers. Although they may have fought in isolation from the German troops, they fought against the same foe as did Germany—the people's revolution in Russia. The attack of the Allied troops prevented the Russian revolution from protecting itself against the invasion of German troops, and the attack of the latter distracted its forces from the defence of its frontiers against the Allied invasions. Wherever the troops of the enemies of the revolution came into contact, those same troops which in the arena of the world war had shed each other's blood by the million, when confronted by the common foe—the workers' and peasants' revolution—in such

places as the Don and the Cuban, acted in full concert, so that it would have been impossible to distinguish where the German allied troops ended and where the Entente troops began. When the German masses came to their senses and shook off the imperial régime, when Germany, deprived of her military might, surrendered to the mercy of the conquerors, and ceased to be of danger to any opponents, your Governments could no longer justify their intervention in Russia by the supposed demands of the struggle against Germany, and they frankly and openly inscribed on their banners the slogan of a crusade against the workers' and peasants' revolution.

The myriad armies of the mercenaries of the capitalist press were mobilised to blacken and slander with the most ridiculous scurrilous accusations the people's revolution in Russia, threatening every day with increasing strength to spread to the peoples of the whole world, by the force of its example.

In the same way, however, that the whole might of German imperialist militarism vanished like a pricked bubble when the people came to their senses and understood that they were serving their own enemy and oppressor, the whole military might of the Entente Powers was powerless to crush the young revolutionary Red Army of Russia, despite its lack of military experts, because the workers and peasants in the Entente countries were coming to their senses and began to refuse to serve the enemies of the freedom of the Russian masses. The armies of your Governments in the Ukraine, the Crimea and Bessarabia refused to be the helpless weapons of despotism, and in the far off northern regions also indignation began to increase in the ranks of the troops of your rulers. At the same time the workers began to come out in their masses in the streets of London in spectacular demonstrations demanding the cessation of the endeavours to strangle the Russian revolution, and hundreds of thousands of Parisian workers threatened the French Government with their wrath if they continued to send armed bands for the suppression of freedom in Russia.

Your Governments made as if they gave in and began to vie with each other, in parliaments and press, in their assertions that intervention in Russia had been given up.

Workers of the Entente Countries—do not believe them ! Your

Governments are deceiving you ! They merely intend to pursue the same end in different ways. After the declaration by the French Minister, Pichon, that Bolshevism is the enemy of the human race, his assistant, Abrami, said on March 29th in the Chamber of Deputies, that the French Government did not intend to send military expeditions to Russia, but had decided to afford active help to the nations fighting Bolshevism. "The French Government," he said, "will help them with the provision of arms, money, equipment, clothing and supplies of all sorts." At first he declared : "From this day not a single soldier will be sent to Russia," and then continued : "We shall afford every help against the Bolsheviks to Poland, Roumania and other countries." In the same way, after Churchill, Minister for War, had in the House of Commons called the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government a handful of murderers and robbers, the Prime Minister, Lloyd George, in his speech on the same question declared that the dispatch of a military expedition to Russia would be a great mistake, but that the Entente Governments would organise all the Allied countries against Bolshevism and help with arms the insurgents against the Bolsheviks in Russia itself. Simultaneously your Governments were never tired of declaring that the blockade, depriving Russia of raw material, fuel, transport, supplies, in a word, implying incredible sufferings for the whole nation, would be continued with unremitting perseverance, as it still is.

Military expeditions are no longer sent directly to Russia, for your soldiers have refused to fire upon Russian workers and peasants fighting for their freedom. Instead, however, your rulers have created and are supporting a régime of the utmost reaction in Poland, where, thanks to them, the Polish workers are being shot down *en masse*, and the workers' and peasants' movement of the Polish people themselves is being suppressed by barbarous measures. In precisely the same way, thanks to them, the barbarous Boyars are being supported in their oppression of the Roumanian people. Precisely in the same way the support of your rulers makes possible the power of a handful of extreme reactionaries in Finland, a military party shedding the blood of the people wholesale and still responding with barbarous repressions to any attempt at a people's movement among the Finnish toilers.

The sway of the wildest military adventurers, the most extreme

reactionaries, the most bloodthirsty exploiters in Poland, Roumania and Finland, makes it possible to send the enslaved workers and peasants in these countries, who have not yet succeeded in throwing off the yoke of their oppressors, by force against the Russian revolution, accompanying them by bands of German counter-revolutionaries.

Precisely in the same way it is only with the help of your Governments that the most furious counter-revolution is kept alive in those parts of the former Russian Empire where Allied or German intervention has crushed the people's Soviet power. In the Cuban, the Caucasus and those parts of the Don which are still in the hands of reaction, ex-officers of the Tsar, supported by your Governments are bathing in the blood of the masses of the people, shooting down the workers and poorest peasants, suppressing all resistance by a régime of the most furious terror. In the far north, also, in the districts around Archangel, the agents of your Governments, and their Allies the Russian reactionaries, are only able by shooting and terrible acts of repression to keep the local workers and peasants in subjection. Wild reaction prevails in the domain of Kolchak, the hireling of your rulers, in Siberia, where the most persevering and desperate of the Russian monarchists have rallied, where not only the supporters of the Soviet Government and the people's revolution, but even the supporters of the bourgeois Constitutional Assembly, not sufficiently ardent servants of reaction, are slaughtered *en masse*, while every new advance of the Dictator Kolchak's troops is accompanied by mass destruction of the working class population.

Reactionaries in Poland, Roumania, Finland and Germany, Russian monarchists in the south and in Siberia, abundantly supplied with all the necessities of war, supported in every way by your rulers—this is what is sent against the Russian revolution, desperately beating off foes from every direction, while Soviet Russia, cut off from essential supplies and goods, labours in the toils of famine and unemployment. Your rulers openly call the people's revolution in Russia the scourge of humanity, openly say that an end must be put to this handful of murderers and robbers. They deceive you when they say that they have given up intervention, for their aim remains what it was.

At the same time they would like to convince us that they are

so anxious to help us in our disasters that they are preparing to send provisions to the hungry people of Soviet Russia.

They, who only do not send their hands against us any more because their own soldiers refuse to fire on us, they, who grudge neither money, arms, nor munitions for the support of the wildest reaction, the most extreme monarchists, the most barbarous despots, if only they can crush the worker-peasant revolution in Russia, would have us believe in their sincerity when they declare that they want to send us supplies to mitigate the sufferings of the workers and peasants in revolutionary Russia.

Toilers in the Entente countries ! The workers and peasants of Russia will not lay down their arms until they have driven their enemies beyond the frontiers of revolutionary Russia and conquered the dangers threatening the conquests of the workers' and peasants' revolution. The revolutionary workers and peasants of Russia, however, hesitating before no sacrifices, enduring the torments of famine and want, challenge you also not to lay down your arms and not to diminish your pressure on your Governments, until you force them to put an end to all attacks on revolutionary Russia, every threat to its freedom, every support to its sworn foes.

It is none other than your rulers who are keeping civil war alive among us by giving help to counter-revolutionaries and creating hunger and unemployment by the criminal blockade of Soviet Russia. Without their help Russian counter-revolution would be powerless.

Lift the blockade ! That is the only way to put an end to famine in Russia. Force your rulers to cease their diabolical game and treacherous attempts to strangle, with the hands of the counter-revolutionary bands they are supporting, the freedom from all exploitation and oppression won by the workers and peasants of Russia !

19. *Appeal by G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., to the Toilers in the Entente Countries with regard to the Imperialist Policy of their Governments. January 28th, 1920.*

The toiling masses of Russia, who have now supported for over eighteen months a heroic struggle against the imperialists of the whole world, aspire to a single aim—the defence of their freedom and of the conquests of the revolution. All intentions to extend

their power to any foreign country, or to force the Soviet structure on any other country, contrary to the will of the people themselves, are alien to them. The Seventh All Russian Congress of Soviets appealed once more with peace proposals to the Entente Governments, which, however, summarily rejected them, not even bringing them to the notice of their people. At the present moment, when the counter-revolution supported by Yudenitch, Denikin and Kolchak has, by the titanic efforts of the Russian workers and peasants, been crushed, when hopes arise for the end of the civil war at a near date and for the possibility of devoting all the energies of the toilers to positive, constructive work and the development of the Soviet structure in Russia, at this very moment the dark forces in Europe, the Clemenceaus, the Churchills, the Northcliffes, are zealously preparing a fresh attack on Soviet Russia. We know for certain of the energetic efforts of the French Government and the Polish Committee in Paris, with a view to throwing Poland against Soviet Russia and forcing the Poles to go to the assistance of Denikin. In this very moment, when Polish workers' organisations of all tendencies are loudly demanding peace with Soviet Russia, and the Polish people, harried by the innumerable disasters of years of war and its attendant ruin, are in urgent need of peace, the Entente Governments want to force them to shed their blood for the representatives of the same Tsarist reaction which has oppressed the Polish people for centuries.

Soviet Russia for its part constitutes no threat to Poland. It is ready at any moment to cease military operations and conclude an agreement for a prolonged peace with Poland, as was declared last spring to Ventzkovsky, the Polish representative, and as was recently proposed by wireless to the Polish Government direct. The toiling masses of Russia threaten no country, they recognise the right of all nationalities to self-determination.

The only impediment to the establishment of peace and the cessation of the countless disasters from which the toiling masses in Russia and her neighbouring countries are, together with the whole of Europe, suffering, is the reactionary imperialist policy of the Entente Governments.

Toilers of the Entente Countries ! It is up to you to put an end to this policy of your Governments !

PART II
SOVIET RUSSIA AT PEACE CONFERENCES

PART II

Soviet Russia at Peace Conferences

1. PROTEST OF R.S.F.S.R. GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITS EXCLUSION FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. TELEGRAM FROM G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, CHINA AND JAPAN, ON JULY 19TH, 1921.

2. PROTEST OF R.S.F.S.R. GOVERNMENT AGAINST ITS EXCLUSION FROM PARTICIPATION IN THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE. TELEGRAM FROM G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE R.S.F.S.R., TO THE GOVERNMENTS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, ITALY, JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. NOVEMBER 2ND, 1921.

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1. *Protest of R.S.F.S.R. Government against its Exclusion from Participation in the Washington Conference. Telegram from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Governments of Great Britain, France, the United States of America, China and Japan, on July 19th, 1921.*¹

THE Russian Government learns through the foreign press that a conference of Pacific powers, or powers having special interests on the shores of the Pacific, will shortly be held in Washington. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R., as a Pacific power, cannot conceal its astonishment to learn of the existence of the intention to call such a conference without its participation. Although the Russian Republic and the Far Eastern Democratic Republic have territories on the shores of the Pacific Ocean, the powers passing the decision to meet in Washington did not consider it necessary to invite the Russian and Far Eastern Republic to this conference. This fact, extremely serious as it is, is made still more serious by the circumstance that, during the exchange of opinion on this question, reported in the press, the right of Russia to participate in the conference, as a power with objects for discussion connected with the Pacific, was fully admitted, but the above-mentioned powers declared that they would themselves undertake to watch the interests of Russia without the latter's representation, and reserve to themselves the right to invite subsequently a new Russian Government which should substitute the present one, to submit to the decisions and agreement to be passed by themselves.

The Russian Government can by no means agree to other powers undertaking the right to speak for it, the more that this ostracism is intended to apply only to the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and that any counter-revolutionary Government which might replace it would not be ostracised. The position taken up by the aforementioned powers can only be interpreted as an obvious favour for Russian counter-revolution, and yet another demonstration of the system of intervention.

The Russian Government protests against its exclusion from a conference which touches it directly, and protests equally against any intention of any power whatsoever to undertake the decisions touching the Pacific shores without the authority of Russia.

¹ See Introduction

The Russian Government solemnly declares that it will not recognise any decision passed by the above-mentioned conference, inasmuch as it is being called without the participation of Russia. Whatever may be the decisions of this conference the Russian Government, not participating in it, maintains for that reason complete freedom of action in all questions there discussed, and will carry out this freedom of action in all circumstances and by all means which it considers proper. It will thus be able to upset any plans whose realisation may be prepared by this conference which may be hostile towards the Soviet Government or not in accordance with its point of view. The Soviet Government considers that it has grounds for the assertion that the decisions of this conference will be ineffective and devoid of significance in view of the absence from and non-participation in it of one of the principal interested parties.

At the same time the Russian Government considers itself obliged to declare that it considers this action as a hostile act directed against itself and against the Russian workers and peasants whose will it represents, and any privilege which may be shown by the above-mentioned Governments to any counter-revolutionary Governments replacing the Soviet Government will be regarded as hostile by it.

The Government of Russia has also learned that a question of the most general interest—that of disarmament, or at least naval disarmament—will be discussed at the coming conference. The Russian Government can only welcome any attempts at disarmament or reduction of the military expenditure under which the toilers in all countries are groaning. It considers it, however, indispensable that preliminary guarantees should be given that this disarmament will really be effected, taking into consideration that the possibility of such guarantees at the present time seem to it highly doubtful. Nevertheless, the very idea of disarmament can only seem to the Soviet Government as worthy of approval. This disarmament in its opinion is one of the results towards which the extension of those social changes which have occurred in Russia is bound to lead. The absence, however, of the Russian Government during international discussion of this subject will merely have the effect of forcing Russia to ignore its decisions, in which the Russian Government, not being represented, will have

no part. The policy tending to leave Russia outside collective decisions of various powers on questions concerning it, not only cannot assist the settlement of the conflicts at present disturbing the world—it can only render them more acute and more complicated.

2. *Protest of R.S.F.S.R. Government against its exclusion from participation in the Washington Conference. Telegram from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., to the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United States of America. November 2nd, 1921.*

The protest made by the Russian Government as early as July 19th, 1921, against the convening of an international conference on Pacific questions without its participation, was left by the powers addressed without an answer. In view of the nearness of the opening of the conference, the Russian Government repeats its protest against these efforts to decide, in the absence of representatives of Russia, questions directly touching it, and repeats also its declaration that it will reserve to itself complete freedom of action in all questions which may be discussed at this conference, and will make use of this freedom in all circumstances and by all means which it considers proper. The toiling masses of Russia have received this fresh demonstration of the policy of violence and injustice towards the Soviet Government, with the utmost indignation. The Workers' and Peasants' Government of Russia declares that a population of a hundred and thirty millions will not allow its will to be violated and will not be treated as a dumb object for alien decisions. The toiling masses of Russia, working with all their energies strained on the economic revival of their country, know that, despite the famine caused by blockade and drought, the moment of its economic and political stability is approaching with rapid steps. Those who now infringe the most elementary demands of the dignity and sovereign rights of Russia will one day be confronted with the results of their own acts towards Russia. The people of Russia can only feel the utmost indignation at the declaration that the Great Powers will undertake to watch the interests of Russia. Russia has had enough attention from the Great Powers during the last few years. Those very

Governments which have drowned Russia in blood, sending Tsarist generals against it, and tightening a merciless blockade around it, now undertake to watch the interests of Russia ! The toiling masses of Russia understand perfectly that when these powers undertake to decide for Russia questions touching its interests, these questions will be decided under the influence of absolutely alien conceptions, and not in the interests of Russia, but to its detriment. The Russian people know in advance that any agreement by the powers who would undertake to decide for Russia will undoubtedly be acts of the nature of the Versailles or Sèvres treaties. But Russia is not a conquered country : it has emerged victorious out of all the torments caused to it by those same powers which now undertake to watch its interests. The toiling masses of Russia have already shown sufficiently that they can defend themselves against attempts at violence from without and they will beat off all fresh endeavours of the kind with equal success. Whatever may be the agreements concluded in Washington the suspicion, almost the conviction, will remain that secret agreements have been come to to the detriment of Russia, and a superfluous element of suspicion, bad faith and complications will have been introduced into international relations. In such circumstances the decisions of the Washington Conference will inevitably become merely a source of fresh conflicts, fresh confusion and fresh outbreaks. It will contribute to international relations not harmony, but discord and hatred, and will be the cause of fresh disasters for the whole world.

3. *Telegram from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the R.S.F.S.R., sent to the Supreme Council on January 8th, 1922.*¹

The Russian Government accepts with satisfaction the invitation to the European Conference to be convened in March next. The Russian delegation's election will be preceded by an extraordinary session of the All Russian Central Executive Committee, which will give the delegation extensive authority. Even if Lenin, the President of the Council of People's Commissars, should be

¹ A reply to a memorandum sent by the Italian Government by the Russian trade delegation in Rome on January 7th, 1922, inviting Soviet Russia to attend the Genoa Conference.

unable, owing to pressure of work, particularly in connection with the famine, to leave Russia, the composition of the delegation and the powers entrusted to it will make it equally as authoritative as if citizen Lenin himself took part in it. Thus there will be no obstacle on the part of Russia to the rapid course of work at the conference.

3A. *Telegram from G. Chicherin to Bonomi, Prime Minister of Italy. January 19th, 1922.*

The Russian Government, recognising, together with the Governments represented in the Supreme Council, the enormous importance of the problems of economic and financial restoration now confronting all Governments, expresses gratitude to H.M. Government for its supplementary information to the memorandum of January 7th, transmitted through the Russian delegation in Rome, and for its part would add to its communication of January 8th a request to H.M. Government to inform the powers represented in the Supreme Council that an extraordinary session of the Pan-Russian Central Executive Committee will be called on January 27th for the purpose of making up a Russian delegation to the conference and furnishing it with full powers of representation. After this date the Russian Government will be able to inform H.M. Government of the names of the members of the Russian delegation ; information as to the route to be taken by the delegation will be furnished at the first opportunity. The Russian Government will, moreover, be extremely grateful to H.M. Government for the speediest possible information as to the exact date of the proposed conference. It would also be desirable to know if the Governments represented in the Supreme Council have considered the programme of the conference, in order that the Russian Government might have the opportunity of considering it in good time.

4. *Speech by G. Chicherin, Vice-chairman of Russian Delegation, at First Plenary Sitting of Genoa Conference. Genoa, April 10th, 1922.*¹

The Russian Delegation, representing the Government which has always sustained the cause of peace, receive with a particular

¹ See Introduction.

satisfaction the declarations of the preceding speakers proclaiming the primordial necessity of peace. They specially associate themselves with the declaration of the Italian Prime Minister when he says that there is here neither conqueror nor conquered, and with that of the Prime Minister of Great Britain assuring us that we are all here on a footing of equality.

The Russian Delegation desire to declare before everything else that they have come here in the interests of peace and the general reconstruction of the economic life of Europe ruined by prolonged war and by the after-war policy.

Whilst themselves preserving the point of view of Communist principles, the Russian delegation recognise that in the actual period of history which permits of the parallel existence of the ancient social order and of the new order now being born, economic collaboration between the States representing the two systems of property is imperatively necessary for the general economic reconstruction.

The Russian Government in consequence attributes great importance to the first point of the Cannes Resolutions, which deals with reciprocal recognition of different systems of property and different political and economic forms actually existing in the different countries. The Russian Delegation have come here not with the intention of making propaganda for their own theoretical views, but in order to engage in practical relations with the Governments. The industrial and commercial interests of all countries on the basis of reciprocity, equality and universal economic reconstruction is, in present conditions, so immense and colossal that it can only be solved if all countries, both European and non-European, have the sincere desire to co-ordinate their efforts, and are convinced of the necessity of consenting to temporary sacrifices. The economic reconstruction of Russia, the largest state in Europe, with its incalculable natural riches, appears as an indispensable condition of universal economic reconstruction. Russia, on her side, declares herself fully disposed to contribute to the solution of the problem placed before the Conference by all the means in her power, and these means are not insignificant. In view of the economic need of the world, and of the development of universal political forces, the Russian Government is ready to open its frontier consciously and voluntarily for

the creation of international traffic routes. It is ready to deliver to cultivation millions of acres of the most fertile land in the world. It is ready to grant forest concessions, mining concessions for coal and minerals of an infinite richness, particularly in Siberia, and concessions of all kinds throughout the territory of the Federated Socialist Soviet Republics of Russia. It proposes, between the industry of the west on the one hand and the agriculture and industry of Siberia on the other, collaboration of such a nature as to enlarge the basis of Europe in industry so far as concerns raw materials, grain and fuel, in proportions far surpassing the pre-war level. A detailed draft of a plan of general economic reconstruction can, if necessary, be presented by the Russian Delegation in the course of the Conference. The perfect possibility of its present realisation from the financial and economic point of view results from the fact that the whole of the capital which every year ought to be invested in this work, in order to guarantee the future of European production, would only constitute a small fraction of the annual expenses of the countries of Europe and of America in respect of their armies and their fleets. In making these proposals the Russian Delegation comes back to the ideas of the Cannes Resolution, which they adopt in principle, while reserving the right to present on their own part supplementary articles and amendments to the existing articles. However, the work of the economic reconstruction of Russia will be rendered absolutely vain (and with it the work of putting an end to European economic chaos), and will be directed on a false and fatal course, if the nations which are economically more powerful, instead of creating the necessary conditions for the economic rebirth of Russia and of facilitating her progress in the future, crush her under the weight of demands which are beyond her strength—the survivals of a past which to her is odious.

We must also remark that the recent measures of the Russian Government in the domain of internal legislation, measures conforming to the new policy of Russia in economic matters, have anticipated the desiderata contained in the Cannes Resolutions, so far as concerns the legal guarantees necessary for economic collaboration between Soviet Russia and States based upon private property. However, all efforts towards the reconstruction of the economic position of the world are vain, so long as there remains

suspended over Europe and the world the menace of new wars, perhaps still more devastating than those of the past years. In this respect also Russia is disposed to contribute to the consolidation of peace to the extent which is possible and within the limits of the social and economic order existing in the majority of countries. The Delegation intend to propose, in the course of the conference, the general limitation of armaments, and to support all proposals tending to lighten the weight of militarism, on condition that this limitation is applied to the armies of all countries, and that the rules of war are completed by the absolute prohibition of its most barbarous forms, such as asphyxiating gas and aerial warfare, as well as the use of means of terrorising peaceful populations. It follows that Russia is equally ready herself to realise the limitation of armaments, on condition of a full and complete reciprocity, and on condition that she is furnished with the necessary guarantees against any sort of attack upon or interference with her internal affairs. We greet with satisfaction this first European Conference, and especially the proposal of the British Prime Minister that similar conferences shall take place periodically in future; but the Russian Delegation desire to emphasise the importance of enlarging these conferences, and securing the participation in them of all the peoples of the world. In our view, the establishment of universal peace should be accomplished by a Universal Congress, the basis of which would be the equality of all peoples and the recognition of the right of each of them to determine its own destiny. We also feel that the method of representation at these conferences needs to be modified. We regard it as absolutely indispensable that the workers' organisations should be officially represented at these congresses. The decisions of these conferences must in no case be applied by force or by the exercise of pressure on minorities, but on the contrary, by the free-will of all taking part in them.

The Russian Government is even willing to adopt as its point of departure the old agreements with the Powers which regulate international relations, subject to some necessary modifications, and to take part in the revision of the constitution of the League of Nations so as to transform it into a real League of Peoples without any domination of some nations by others, and without the existing division between victors and vanquished. The

universal Congress of which I speak would have to appoint technical commissions to outline and elaborate a programme for the economic reconstruction of the world. This programme cannot possibly be enforced by violence ; it must be such as to appeal to all those taking part in it. International railway, river and maritime routes must be mapped out, and the internationalisation of these routes must be attained by progressive stages. Technical international commissions would be able to lend their assistance to the different countries for the regulation of international rivers, for the utilisation of international ports, and for the technical improvement of the great world routes. The infinite wealth of Central Siberia would in this way be thrown open for the use of the whole world, and would produce among other benefits an increase in the prosperity of all peoples, if the peoples are all sincere in their desire for economic co-operation. If they seek in this way, by a common effort, to bring the world economic crisis to an end, if they are willing to make sacrifices, it will not prove difficult to find means of stabilising the exchanges.

One of these means might be the redistribution of the existing gold reserves among all the countries, in the same proportion as before the war, but by means of long term loans, without prejudice to the interests of the countries which are at present in possession of this gold. This redistribution should be combined with a rational redistribution of the products of industry and commercial activity, and with a distribution of fuel (naphtha, coal, etc.), according to a settled plan.

I have merely outlined the basic principles of the proposals which the Russian Delegation might put forward if they are granted an opportunity. I desire to repeat once more that, as Communists, we do not entertain any special illusion as to the responsibility for the existing state of affairs ; but we are nevertheless ready to contribute, in the interests of Russia and of all Europe, in the interests of tens of millions of men who are suffering beyond the limits of human endurance owing to the present economic chaos—we are willing to contribute our aid to every effort calculated to afford if only palliatives to the economic situation of the world, and to remove the threat of a second war. We are prepared to support all proposals of a progressive nature brought forward, with this object, by other countries.

5. *Memorandum of Russian Delegation to Genoa Conference.*
April 20th, 1922.

Cannes Resolutions

In the opinion of the delegation the three principal theses of the Cannes resolutions serve as grounds for agreement on controversial questions. These theses are : (1) Recognition of full sovereignty for every nation, according to its system of property, economy and administration ; (2) the legal, juridical and administrative guarantee of personal and property rights of those foreigners desiring to visit Russia for economic activities, and (3) the recognition of the principle of mutuality in the execution by all Governments of their obligations and in the compensation for losses borne by foreign citizens, as expounded in the communication to the press, prepared by ministers and experts in Cannes, the official nature of which was alluded to by the British Prime Minister in his parliamentary speech on April 3rd of this year.

Report of Experts, and Cannes Resolutions

The report drawn up by the experts of the Allied powers in London, March 20th to 28th last, represents a definite retreat, in its most essential points, from the theses of the Cannes Conference, and contradicts in its practical demands those principles expressed in the Preamble to the Memorandum. The Report, while affirming that the Russian question was regarded from the point of view of " justice " and the necessity of the " economic restoration " of Russia without " exploitation " of the Russian people, nevertheless advances practical demands, involving not only exploitation, but utter enslavement of the toiling population of Russia to foreign capital, at the same time utterly ignoring the more essential question of the means of restoring Russian economy. This omission is the more incomprehensible in that, without the revival of productive forces in Russia, the economic revival of Europe, suffering from a prolonged and ever intensifying industrial crisis, accompanied by reduction of markets, lack of raw material and products, and ever-growing unemployment, is impossible. The number of unemployed in Europe and America of late has not been below nine millions. . . .

Taking their stand from the aforementioned general principles in the Preamble to the Report, the representatives of European Governments meeting at the conference should have paid most of their attention to the question of the necessary means for the restoration of productive forces in Russia, and not, as was done in the Memorandum, to the ways for satisfying the claims of Russia's creditors.

The claims of private persons in individual countries, however just, should be allowed to give place to the vast problems of the restoration of industrial relations in Europe, ruined by war, post-war politics, and an unprecedented crisis, and to the improvement of the living conditions of the broad toiling masses. The speedy restoration of the economic powers of Russia can only be achieved by immediate and energetic help to the Russian people from the forces of European capital and technique, in the form of long-term goods and money credits, and not by the ruin of the Russian people and the retardation of Russia's economic development, for the sake of satisfying the interests of foreign capitalists.

Realising the necessity for the restoration of national economy in Russia by all means at present available, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R., after the transfer to the New Economic Policy, reformed its civil legislation and juridical processes for the purpose of supplying perfectly adequate guarantees to foreign capitalists and placing them in conditions in which, within the limits of the existing structure, their interests and legal rights are such as fully to guarantee their successful work. . . .

The Russian Delegation, attributing the greatest importance to the creation of the most favourable conditions for foreign capital, is ready to listen to all wishes that may be expressed by the other side for the development and reinforcement of the aforementioned guarantees. The delegation is convinced that there will be no practical difficulties in the way of attaining an agreement with regard to conditions for the work of foreigners in Russia and guarantees for their persons and property.

It cannot, however, refrain from drawing the most serious attention to the fact that the legal and administrative measures of the Soviet Government can give an effective and reliable guarantee to foreign capital, both in Russia, and in international relations, only when this Government is recognised *de jure*, and its rights

and competence are not disputed from any side. Foreign business circles, understanding better than the Governments themselves the importance and necessity for their getting a footing in Russia, now hesitate, not because the creditors of the former Government have not been paid, but because the formal rights of the Soviet Government are still, in their eyes, matter for controversy, so that fresh conflicts, threatening risk to foreign capitalists, might arise on that ground.

At the same time the delegation considers it necessary to remark that the authors of the London report, noting in its second section the guarantees for economic work in Russia for foreign capital which they consider essential, go back flagrantly upon Clause 1 of the Cannes resolutions, in endeavouring to impose upon Russia definite internal legislation, alien to its present structure, and, on the excuse of creating "conditions for successful work" for foreign capital, to introduce into Russia the system of capitulation, and attacking its sovereignty. The most striking example of this is clause 24 of the Report, which aims at the establishment of legal ex-territorialism for foreigners, and for all organisations for a commission for the Russian debt, a plan of which is laid out in Appendix I, and which, if realised, would undoubtedly become an organ for foreign control over the whole economic life of the Russian Republic, on the pattern of the Reparations Commission established under the Versailles Treaty.

The Soviet Government and its Obligations

The delegation declares that the Soviet Government, arising out of the great revolution, always has fulfilled and intends always to fulfil, all obligations undertaken by itself, and that, therefore, all its public and legal guarantees are no less solid than those of any other sovereign powers. . . .

If the Soviet Government has refused to undertake the obligations of former Governments or the satisfaction of the claims of persons bearing losses owing to measures of internal policy, such as the nationalisation of enterprises, the municipalisation of houses, the requisition or confiscation of property, this is not because it is incapable of adhering to its obligations, or disinclined to do so, but because of matters of principle and political necessity.

The revolution of 1917, utterly sweeping away all old economic,

social and political relations, and substituting a new society for the old, transferring by the sovereignty of the revolting people State power in Russia to a new social class, in thus doing broke the continuity of civil obligations which were an integral part of economic relations in the society which has disappeared, and which together with them, also disappeared. This revolution was a vast elemental upheaval such as the world only undergoes in exceptional moments and its nature, as an irresistible force, cannot be disputed by any impartial thinker. The views of authorities on international law who deny the right of Governments, whose citizens may suffer in moments of spontaneous movements and risings to demand compensation under the law, and still less to use force for the satisfaction of such demands, apply to Russia more than to any other country.

The Russian Delegation, while unconditionally denying any responsibility whatever for the destruction of foreign property arising out of the economic crisis caused by the war and its consequences, or ensuing on the abandonment of property by its owners on going abroad, and also for destruction of foreign property during Allied intervention and the civil war supported by the Allied Governments, would draw the attention of the conference to the fact that neither the systematic activities of the Soviet Government itself, such as the nationalisation of industrial equipment, nor the requisition of property belonging to foreigners, imposes upon the Soviet Government the obligation to compensate persons suffering loss. The Allied Governments, and the Governments of the neutral countries under their influence, greeted the very fact of the Soviet Revolution with hostility, and refused to enter into official relations with the new Russian Government even before it took the first measures for nationalisation. Not the slightest attempt was made by them to enter into an agreement with the Soviet Government for the protection of the interests of their fellow-citizens and the amicable liquidation of their property rights in Russia, despite the fact that in all cases of individual representatives of foreign Governments entering into relations with the Soviet Government for the protection of the interests of their fellow-citizens, the requisition of property was, whenever possible, rescinded, and many losses compensated. . . . Foreign property was abandoned to its fate, which threatened serious

danger for the industry of the country in view of the fact that many foreign enterprises were of the greatest importance for the general national economy of Russia.

Foreign Intervention

Not content with this rupture of relations with Soviet Russia, the Entente Powers began military intervention and blockade, quite openly supporting local risings provoked by their own agents (Czecho-Slovakian, Don and Kuban Cossacks, White Guards in Siberia, Yaroslav, etc.), and reinforcing the military activities of the armies of Kolchak, Denikin, Yudenich, Wrangel and others, by the despatch of their own military forces to the north of Russia, the Black Sea and the Caucasus. It is actually established that the Soviet Government even in the first months of its existence coped without difficulty with the attempts at revolt of the dissatisfied elements, and that only where these elements were actively organised and supported by the Allied Governments providing them with money, ammunition, uniforms and military instructors, did these sporadic and petty risings compose fronts for the civil war, accompanied by furious excesses, such as the destruction of whole villages, ghastly Jewish pogroms and other atrocities. Military experts have definitely asserted that, without the aforementioned interference of foreign powers, individual local risings in Russia could never have assumed the nature of a devastating civil war, and thus the guilt and responsibility of the Allied Governments for the organisation and support of civil war in Russia, and enormous losses to the Russian people and State, is indubitably established. . . .

A share of the responsibility for all this falls upon those neutral countries which, offering hospitality to counter-revolutionary elements for the instigation on their territories of intrigues against Russia and for the recruiting of participants in the civil war, the purchase and transit of arms, etc., at the same time took part in the boycott and blockade of Russia. Placed by foreign intervention and blockade under the necessity of making a desperate self-defence, the Soviet Government was forced to speed up the nationalisation of industry and trade and also to apply to the owners of foreign property in Russia those measures for the

liquidation of enterprises, the confiscation or uncompensated nationalisation of property which were put into international practice, as a new "usus," by the belligerent, and, first and foremost by the Allied Governments. The Soviet Government, however, never applied measures for the limitation of personal and property rights of foreigners simply because the state of defence against intervention entitled it to do so. These measures were applied only inasmuch as was demanded by the interests of social safety and welfare, in particular for the realisation of the plan of the nationalisation of industry and trade, inevitably arising out of the new economic and legal relations and the necessity for rapid reorganisation of production and distribution within the limits of a state isolated and cut off from the rest of the world by blockade. Here also the Soviet Government merely employed the right incontrovertibly belonging to all states, to subordinate to public requirements and to dispose of the property of its own and foreign citizens, when the urgent interests of the country require this.

The intervention and blockade of the Allied powers and the civil war supported by them for more than three years have caused Russia losses far exceeding any possible claims on it from foreigners suffering losses from the Russian revolution. The Russian Government demands, as well as the gold and many stores and goods sequestered abroad and taken out of Russia, compensation for railways, bridges, rolling stock, port and other equipment, sunk vessels, factories, works and an innumerable quantity of private property, such as houses in towns and peasant homesteads in villages, destroyed by military activities. In addition to this it advances demands for the return of its naval and merchant services both seized by the Allied Powers themselves or by the White armies under the protection of the Allied Powers. Together with these claims, representing direct detriment to state and private economy in Russia, there is a long list of losses both by nationalised and private industry caused by military activities in territories occupied by foreign and White Guard armies to be satisfied, as well as compensation to the thousands of civil war invalids and the families of the fallen.

These losses of the Russian people and State have a far more incontrovertible right for compensation than the claims of former property owners in Russia and of Russian loans granted by nations

victorious in the world war and receiving vast contributions from the vanquished, while making claims on a country wrecked by war and foreign intervention and desperately fighting for its own existence in those state forms which it considers as the only possible ones for itself. . . .

The Soviet Government ready for Mutual Compensation for Losses

Nevertheless, the Government of the R.S.F.S.R., desirous of finding a basis for agreement and the revival of business relations with foreign capital, is ready to recognise the rights of foreign citizens to compensation for losses, on, however, strict condition of the observation of mutuality.

The So-called " War " Debts of the Russian Government

Unfortunately, the experts of the Allied powers, renouncing the principles of justice, economic revival and non-exploitation of Russia declared in their Report, refuse to adopt this standpoint, and propose the compensation of Russian claims for losses by claims of their own of a most remarkable type—the so-called war-debts of the Russian Government (See clauses 5 and 6 of Report).

This desire to extinguish the incontrovertible claims of the Russian people on foreign governments for losses directly caused by military intervention, and to set up against them so-called war debts, *i.e.*, that category of inter-allied obligations as to the annulment of which the Allies themselves are raising the question, appears to the Russian Delegation extremely strange, to put it mildly. It is forced to repudiate altogether, in the most categorical manner, the account for these debts presented to it, as an intolerable attempt to lay upon the shoulders of the impoverished Russian people a considerable share of the war expenses of the Allied Powers. That which is called the war debt of Russia represents military stores manufactured in the factories of the Allied countries and sent to the Russian front for the guarantee of the success of the Allied armies. The Russian people sacrificed to Allied war interests more lives than all the rest of the Allies together ; they suffered vast material losses and, as a result of the war, lost large territories extremely important for their state development. And after the other Allies have been awarded, under the Peace Treaties,

vast territories, and great contributions, it is desired to make the Russian people contribute to the expenses of operations which were so profitable to the other powers. The Russian Delegation appeals to all the members of the Conference to estimate the illegality and unjustifiability of such demands.

Efforts to revive Private Property and Private Industry in Russia

Despite the right declared in the Cannes Resolutions of every nation to establish that system of private property and national economy which seems to it good, the Report of the experts advances the question of the restitution of nationalised enterprises to their former owners, *i.e.*, the revival openly, or in a concealed form, of the right of private property in industrial enterprises, in the place of the State property established in Russia. The Soviet Government, guided by the desire for the most successful revival of industry and its maximum output, always endeavours, in making concessions of mines, works and other enterprises, to show preference to their former owners, as persons with experience and knowledge of the country. It cannot, however, accept conditions of the restitution of these enterprises to private property, nor even undertake in all cases to rent them to their former owners, since this would infringe the sovereignty of the Russian republic and its freedom to dispose of available productive forces according to the demands and interests of the Russian people. . . .

Obligations of Russia under the London Report and its National Revenue

The following figures will show the abnormally great demands for payment made to us: the Tsarist Government paid before the war an annual sum on its debts, amounting to 3.3 per cent of the net or annual revenue and about 13 per cent of the whole State budget. The Report of the experts sees fit to demand from Russia payment in five years' time of a sum amounting to 20 per cent of the revenue, which would only have increased 30 per cent, and about 80 per cent of the present State budget of Russia, which payment is to be made to countries whose annual revenue per head of the population is seven or eight times greater than that of Russia.

Payment of Old Debts and the Restoration of Russian National Economy

If the Soviet Government undertook to pay from the revenue of an economically ruined country even a part of those sums arising from the obligations enumerated in the London Report, it would be causing not only systematic lowered consumption and chronic degeneration of the population, but also retarding in the most serious manner the whole process of the revival of its national economy. Russia would then be unable, in the shortest time possible, again to play the role in world economy of the biggest provider of bread and raw materials for Europe, and once again to become a vast market for European industry, and, reviving its own national economy, to serve as an important element in the revival of world economy as a whole. . . .

6. *Note from G. Chicherin,¹ Vice-Chairman of Russian Delegation to Genoa Conference, to Lloyd-George, First Delegate of British Delegation. April 20th, 1922.*

Sir,

The Russian Delegation has carefully considered the proposals of the Allied Governments laid down in the Annex to the Minutes of April 15th, and has been in the meantime in consultation with its Government upon this subject.

The Russian Delegation is still of the opinion that the present economic condition of Russia and the circumstances which are responsible for it should fully justify the complete release of Russia from all her liabilities mentioned in the above proposals by the recognition of her counter-claims. However, the Russian Delegation is prepared to make a further step towards finding a solution for the adjustment of the differences and to accept items 1, 2, and 3(a) of the above-mentioned Annex, provided (1) that the war debts and the arrears of interests or postponed interests of all debts are written down and (2) that adequate financial help is given to Russia, assisting her to recover from her present economic state in the shortest possible period. With regard to 3(b) subject to the above two stipulations, the Russian Government would be

¹ The Chairman was Lenin. See telegram from Chicherin, 8th January, 1922.

willing to restore to its former owners the use of property, nationalised or withheld, or where this is not possible, then to satisfy the just claims of the former owners, with arrangements, the details of which will be discussed and agreed during the present conference.

Foreign financial help is absolutely essential for the economic reconstruction of Russia and as long as there is no prospect of this reconstruction, the Russian Delegation cannot see its way to put upon their country the burden of debts which could not be discharged.

The Russian Delegation wishes also to make it clear, although it seems to be self-evident, that the Russian Government could not admit liability for the debts of its predecessors until it has been formally recognised *de jure* by the Powers concerned.

7. *Reply of the Russian Delegation at Genoa Conference to the Memorandum of Eight Delegations sent on May 2nd, 1922.*
May 11th, 1922.

A. *Prohibition of Revolutionary Propaganda*

The Russian Delegation observes, not without a certain astonishment, this striking contrast in the Memorandum of May 2nd—that to the principal question of the restoration of Russia are devoted general considerations containing no precise proposals, while the question of the settlement of State debts and private claims is presented in the form of an agreement which attempts to prescribe the most minute details.

The Russian Delegation is no less surprised to find that in this financial contract, and at the head of all its clauses, are political clauses which have never heretofore figured in the discussions of the Russian Delegation with the other Delegations.

Selecting from the Cannes conditions which have a political character, and which, by the way, have been accepted by the Russian Government, a single condition, namely the 5th, which deals with subversive propaganda, the Memorandum ascribes to it at the same time a new meaning and makes it a one-sided obligation for Russia. Yet the Russian Government has proved more than once that the true subversive propaganda, through the organisation and despatch of armed bands, has been conducted by

certain countries, neighbours of Russia and even signatories of the Memorandum.

Giving a new scope to this Cannes condition, the Memorandum demands that Russia should "suppress upon her territory all attempts to aid revolutionary movements in other countries." If, however, by this formula the Memorandum means to forbid the activities of political parties, or organisations of workers, the Russian Delegation cannot accept such a prohibition unless the activities in question transgress the laws of the country.

In the same clause the Memorandum requests that Russia should "abstain from all action tending to disturb the political and territorial *status quo* in other States." The Russian Delegation considers this demand a veiled attempt to make Russia recognise treaties concluded by other States. But that is a political question which Russia is ready to discuss at the proper moment with the Powers involved.

Another political question artificially introduced into the Memorandum is that of the relations between Rumania and Russia, contemplated in Clause 13. As this question forms part of the totality of political, territorial and other questions at issue between Russia and Roumania, it cannot be examined separately.

B. *Restoration of Peace in Asia Minor*

But the Russian Delegation expresses above all its surprise at seeing raised in the Memorandum the question of peace in Asia Minor—all the more so as in spite of the proposal of Russia that Turkey should be invited to the Conference of Genoa, she was excluded from it. The presence of Turkey at the conference is precisely what would have contributed to the re-establishment of peace in Asia Minor. Russia, on her part, in view of her relations of close friendship with Turkey, would have contributed to the achievement of this desired end.

As regards the strict neutrality which the Memorandum of May 2nd requires from Russia in the war which is being waged on Turkish territory, this can be only such neutrality as law and international conventions demand from all the Powers.

Passing to other financial clauses (2-6) of the Memorandum, the Russian Delegation is obliged to observe that all the claims

set forth therein result from changes produced by the Russian Revolution.

It is not for the Russian Delegation to justify this great act of the Russian people before an Assembly of powers, many of whom count more than one revolution in their own history ; but the Russian Delegation feels obliged to recall that principle of law according to which revolutions which are a violent rupture with the past, carry with them new juridical relations in the foreign and domestic affairs of States. Governments and systems that spring from revolution are not bound to respect the obligations of fallen Governments. The French Convention, of which France declares herself to be the legitimate successor, proclaimed on December 22nd, 1792, that " the sovereignty of peoples is not bound by the treaties of tyrants." In accordance with this declaration, revolutionary France not only tore up the political treaties of the former régime with foreign countries, but also repudiated her national debt. She consented to pay only one-third of that debt and that from motives of political expedience. This was the "*tiers consolidé*," the interest on which did not begin to be regularly paid until the commencement of the nineteenth century.

This practice, which has been elevated to the rank of a doctrine by eminent legal authorities, has been followed almost universally by Governments born of a revolution or a war of liberation.

The United States repudiated the treaties of its predecessors, England and Spain.

On the other hand, the Governments of the victorious States did not hesitate during the war, and especially on the conclusion of the Treaties of Peace, to seize the property of the nationals of the vanquished States situated upon their territory, and even upon foreign territory.

In conformity with these precedents, Russia cannot be obliged to assume any responsibility whatever toward foreign Powers and their nationals for the cancellation of public debts and for the nationalisation of private property.

Another question of law : Is the Russian Government responsible for damages caused to the property, rights and interests of foreign nationals by reason of civil war, apart from those which were caused to these persons by the acts of the Government itself—that is, the cancellation of debts and the nationalisation of pro-

perty? Here again the juridical doctrine is entirely in favour of the Russian Government. Revolution, assimilated like all great popular movements being akin to *force majeure*, does not confer any title to indemnity upon those who have suffered from it. When foreign nationals, supported by their Governments, demanded from the Tsarist Government the repayment of the losses caused to them by the revolutionary events of 1905 and 1906, the Government rejected their demands, basing its refusal upon the fact that not having accorded damages to its own subjects for similar losses, it could not place foreigners in a privileged position.

Thus, from the legal point of view, Russia is in no wise obliged to pay the debts of the past, to restore property, or to compensate the former owners, nor is she obliged to pay indemnities for other damages suffered by foreign nationals, whether as a result of legislation adopted by Russia in the exercise of her sovereignty, or as a result of the revolutionary events. Nevertheless, in a spirit of conciliation and in order to arrive at an understanding with all the Powers, Russia has accepted under the reserve of reciprocity the principle contained in the third Cannes Resolution. This reciprocity, that is the obligation resting on every Government to pay compensation for damages caused by its acts or its negligence, has been confirmed in the official interpretations of the third Cannes Resolution to which reference has already been made in the first Russian Memorandum.

With the exception of the war debts which, having a specific origin, were extinguished by the very fact that Russia, having withdrawn from the war without participating in the division of its advantages, could not assume its costs—the Russian Delegation has declared itself ready to accept liability for the payment of public debts provided that the damages caused to Russia by the Allied intervention and the blockade be recognised.

In law, the Russian counterclaims are infinitely more justified than the claims of the foreign powers and their nationals. Practice and theory agree in imposing the responsibility for damages caused by intervention and blockade upon the Governments which instituted them. Without citing other cases, we shall limit ourselves to recalling the decision of the Court of Arbitration at Geneva of September 14th, 1872, condemning Great Britain to

pay to the United States 15½ million dollars for the damages caused to that country by the privateer "Alabama" which in the Civil War between the Northern and Southern States gave help to the latter.

The intervention and the blockade of the Allies and neutrals against Russia constituted official acts of war on their part. The documents published in Annex 2 of the first Russian Memorandum prove with evidence that the chiefs of the counter-revolutionary armies were such only in appearance and that their real commanders were the foreign generals sent especially for that purpose by certain powers. These powers not only took direct part in the civil war, but they were its authors.

Nevertheless, in its desire to reach a practical agreement, the Russian Delegation, as a result of the discussions which took place at the Villa de Albertis, adopted a policy of most far-reaching concessions, and declared itself prepared to renounce conditionally its counterclaims, and to accept the engagements of the former Governments, in exchange for a number of concessions on the part of the Powers, the most important being real credits placed at the disposal of the Russian Government amounting to a sum to be agreed upon in advance. Unfortunately, this engagement of the Powers has not been carried out. The Memorandum says nothing of definite credits which the signatories would be ready to grant to the Russian Government, and the credits which they promised to extend to their nationals for the purpose of trading with Russia are of an optional character.

Moreover, the Memorandum raises again the whole question of the war debts whose cancellation was one of the conditions of the renunciation by Russia of her counterclaims. The Memorandum likewise discusses the moratorium and the cancellation of the interest on pre-war debts, leaving the final decision of this question to the competence of a Court of Arbitration, a procedure contrary to the provisions even of the Memorandum of London, instead of settling it in the agreement itself.

Thus the signatories of the Memorandum, by withdrawing from its obligations, recognise that the opposing party is equally free from his. In this manner the laborious negotiations which resulted in the agreement of the Villa de Albertis have been rendered vain. The Russian Delegation does not wish to seek out

the Powers upon whom the responsibility for this may fall, but in any case it does not fall upon Russia.

The negotiations have been rendered still more difficult by the obstinacy of certain States in imposing upon Russia, by Article 7, obligations inconsistent with her social system and with Article 1 of the Cannes Resolutions.

Private Interests—Clause 7

Clause 7 begins with a fine preamble, recognising the sovereign right of Russia to organise as she thinks fit within her own territory her system of property, her economic system and her Government ; but the text of the clause itself is in flagrant contradiction with its preamble. The sovereignty of the Russian State becomes the plaything of chance. It can be defeated by the decisions of a mixed Court of Arbitration composed of four foreigners and one Russian, which will decide in the last instance whether the interests of foreigners are to be subject to restoration, restitution, or compensation.

On this subject, the Russian Delegation must call attention to the fact that in the trial of disputes of this kind, the specific disagreements will inevitably end in opposing to one another two forms of property, whose antagonism assumes to-day for the first time in history, a real and practical character. In such circumstances there can be no question of an impartial super-arbiter, and according to the sense of Clause 7 the part of super-arbiter would inevitably be filled by the other interested party, a thing which would beyond a doubt lead to the intervention of foreigners in the domestic affairs of Russia, and would be tantamount to an abolition in practice of the inviolability of the system of property existing in Russia recognised at the beginning of Clause 7.

Furthermore, the Russian Delegation considers that Clause 7 has no practical character. Its presence in the Memorandum of May 2nd can only be explained as a result of the desire to satisfy class or party feeling, and not by any means as the result of an adequate knowledge of the state of affairs in Russia. To say nothing of the perpetual conflicts to which this clause would give rise between the claimants and the Russian Governments between the latter and foreign Powers, Clause 7, far from creating between the Soviet régime and the capitalist system that mutual tolerance

which is the condition of fertile collaboration, will only tend to poison their relations. Foreigners who went into Russia, not in consequence of a friendly agreement with the Russian Government to work under the protection of Russian laws, but in virtue of the decisions of a mixed Arbitral Tribunal, would soon feel a general hostility toward themselves.

The Russian Government, on its part, in order to enable the former owners of nationalised property to apply their technical knowledge and their capital to the economic restoration of Russia for their own advantage, has recognised in their favour a preferential right in every case where their former property is to be granted as a concession, whether under the form of a lease, a mixed company formed by the State and the foreign capital, or under any other form providing for the participation of foreigners.

The Russian Delegation similarly observes that the interested States, whilst reserving all their solicitude for a small group of foreign capitalists and manifesting an inexplicable doctrinaire intransigence, have sacrificed a large number of foreign capitalists desirous of profiting by the facilities and guarantees offered them by the Russian Government to return and work in Russia, and they have sacrificed as well the interests of a multitude of small holders of Russian bonds and small foreign proprietors whose property has been nationalised or sequestered and whom the Russian Government had intended to include among those the justice and merit of whose claims she recognised. The Russian Delegation cannot refrain from expressing its surprise that Powers like France, in which are found the majority of the small holders of Russian bonds, should have insisted most upon the restitution of property, thus subordinating the interests of the small holders of Russian bonds to those of certain groups who demand the restitution of property.

Conclusions and Proposals

The Russian Government sent its representatives to the Conference of Genoa in the hope of achieving an agreement with the other States which, without affecting the social and political system established as a result of the revolution and of the intervention victoriously repulsed, would bring about not an aggravation but an improvement of the economic and financial situation

of Russia, and would at the same time pave the way to an amelioration of the economic situation of Europe.

But this object presupposed that the foreign Powers who organised the armed intervention in Russia would cease to hold toward Russia the language of a victor to the vanquished, Russia not having been conquered. The only language which could have led to a common agreement was that which States adopt toward each other when negotiating upon a footing of equality.

Russia is still prepared, in order to assure the success of the Agreement, to consent to important concessions to the foreign Powers, but on the absolute condition that equivalent concessions in favour of the Russian people shall be made by the other contracting party. The popular masses of Russia could not accept an agreement in which concessions were not balanced by real advantages.

Another issue suggested by the difficulties of the situation would be the reciprocal translation of the claims and counter-claims between Russia and the other Powers arising out of the past. But in this case also, the Russian Government is determined to respect the interests of the small bondholders.

If, nevertheless, the Powers desire to examine the solution of the financial disputes between themselves and Russia, inasmuch as this question demands a deeper study of the nature and extent of the claims presented to Russia and a more exact appreciation of the credits that could be placed at her disposal, this task might be entrusted to a mixed commission of experts appointed by the Conference whose work should begin at a date and in a place to be determined by mutual agreement.

The Russian Delegation observes that the great obstacle which has, up to the present time, impeded the labours of the Conference, is the fact that the idea of reciprocity expressed above is not yet sufficiently shared by all the Powers. But the Russian Delegation cannot refrain from emphasising the fact that the negotiations which have taken place have opened the way to a rapprochement between Soviet Russia and other Powers. The Russian Delegation is of opinion that the disagreements which have arisen in the course of the solution of the financial differences between Russia and the other Powers ought not to constitute an

obstacle to the solution of other problems which can and ought to be solved here at Genoa—problems interesting all countries—and especially the problems involved in the economic reconstruction of Europe and of Russia and the consolidation of peace. Russia came to the Conference with conciliatory intention, and she still hopes that her efforts in this direction will be crowned with success.

8. *Resolution of the All Russian Central Executive Committee on the Report of the Work of the Russian Delegation at Genoa and the Treaty with Germany signed at Rapallo, passed on May 18th, 1922.*

The Delegation of the R.S.F.S.R. and Allied Soviet Republics has correctly fulfilled its task, insisting on the complete state independence of the R.S.F.S.R., resisting attempts to enslave the Russian workers and peasants and offering strenuous resistance to the endeavours of foreign capitalists to revive private property in Russia ; the delegation has also reflected quite correctly the interests of the toilers in the R.S.F.S.R. and fraternal Soviet Republics, concluding a treaty with Germany on the principles of absolute equality and mutuality. The All Russian Central Executive Committee would particularly emphasise the correctness and appropriateness with which the R.S.F.S.R. delegation put forward the proposal for general disarmament in its first speech. In this speech the interests and desires, not only of the toiling masses in Russia, but the kindred interests of the toiling masses of the whole world and all the oppressed and enslaved peoples and nations, found reflection.

It is with profound regret that the All Russian C.E.C. has to affirm that this proposal of the R.S.F.S.R. Delegation found no response among the representatives of other powers represented at the Genoa Conference, and was removed from the discussion. By their rejection of this proposal the powers left their people under an endless threat of fresh wars and mortal conflicts. The toiling masses of the whole world cannot renounce their aspirations to guarantee peace at any cost and will have to seek fresh guarantees for peace.

The international political and economic situation is character-

ised by the extraordinary instability of the capitalist system as a whole.

Politically speaking this is expressed by the absence of real peace, the increase of armaments, the sharpening of antagonism between the great powers, the danger of fresh imperialist wars on a large scale, colonial rebellions and nationalist wars, etc.

The Genoa Conference showed up vividly the profound breaches between England and France, Japan and the United States, between the victorious countries and Germany, Italy and France, etc., made perfectly obvious the fictitious nature of the Entente, as well as of the League of Nations ; on the other hand the civil wars in Ireland, China, India and Egypt, the war of national emancipation in Turkey against its enslavement by foreign capital and the sharpening everywhere of social class-conflicts (strikes in England, rising of workers in South Africa, the Danish lock-out, strikes in Germany, etc.)—are all living examples of the continuous decline in the social-political system of capitalism.

Economically speaking this decline finds its most vivid expression in the fact that the victorious countries, made still more powerful and enriched by the war, which ultimately assumed the form of cynically unashamed plunder, are unable, three and a half years after its end, to revive even the old capitalist relations. The Versailles treaty is bankrupt, both in practice and in the consciousness even of bourgeois circles ; intense world crises, currency chaos, the impossibility of regulating on capitalist principles the question of mutual financial claims and debts, the radically changed relations between England and America, the profound decline in some European countries and the impossibility (obvious even to bourgeois scientists and politicians) of economic revival without getting Russia back into world economy—such are the symptoms of economic decay.

Therefore point one of the Cannes resolutions, admitting the equal rights of two systems of property, private capitalist and communist (so far adopted only in the R.S.F.S.R.), was forced, indirectly, it is true, to assert the failure of the first system of property, its undermining by new forms of property relations, which, despite the most unfavourable conditions, have shown their practicability.

Other points of the Cannes terms, as well as the memorandum of the powers in Genoa, contradict this, and thus inevitably doom themselves to impracticability.

Effective equality for the two systems of property and their reconciliation, if only as a temporary measure, until the whole world has gone over from private property with its accompanying crises, economic chaos, war, etc., to the highest system of property, has so far only been given in the Rapallo Treaty.

However irreconcilably the Genoa Conference may have ended, the whole course of international relations of late testifies to the inevitability at the present stage of historical development of the temporary co-existence of the communist and bourgeois systems of property and is forcing even the most irreconcilable foes of Soviet Russia to seek ways of agreement with the communist system of property, after the failure of the four years of endeavour to liquidate this system by violence.

The All Russian C.E.C. therefore :

Welcomes the Russo-German treaty concluded at Rapallo, as the only true issue from chaos and the danger of war,

Recognises no other type of treaty as normal for relations between the R.S.F.S.R. and capitalist states,

Charges the Council of People's Commissars and the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to conduct its policy in the above-mentioned spirit and

Instructs the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the Council of People's Commissars to allow divergencies from the type of the Rapallo Treaty only in such exceptional cases when such divergence will be compensated by special advantages for the toiling masses of the R.S.F.S.R. and its fraternal Soviet Republics.

9. *Speech of M. Litvinov, Chairman of Russian Commission to Hague Conference, at the Sitting held on July 19th, 1922.*

I want, mainly, to determine the situation of the Russian Commission. We came to The Hague Conference to discuss three questions. These questions caused the non-Russian Commission to divide into three sections. The questions are those of debts, private property and credits. These three questions arose out of negotiations at Genoa and arose not only out of negotiations, but out of an incomplete agreement. The instructions which the

Russian Commission received from its Government were based on suggestions made at Genoa. I cannot repeat it too often. I shall not go back to the initial stages of the Genoa Conference, but to a document which gave to the Delegates at Genoa hope of a possible ultimate understanding at some other place and date, and which was to the effect that the Russian Government was expected to recognise the past debts of the Russian State, to recognise compensation to foreign nationals, who have suffered losses in Russia through the various revolutionary legislation of the Russian Government, on the condition that the Russian State would be accorded substantial financial help in the way of loans and credits.

We have declared in the Second Sub-Commission regarding past debts, that the Russian Government is prepared to acknowledge the debts. We have declared in the First Sub-Commission on Private Property that the Russian Government is prepared to give compensation to owners of property in Russia which has been nationalised by the Russian Government. But further questions have been put to the Russian Commission, questions of detail, and these were whether the Russian Government was prepared to discuss here the various possible forms of compensation. The question put to the Russian Commission was what would be these forms of compensation, and if the Russian Government was going to fix the terms of payment, capital and interest. The Russian Commission did not decline to discuss any of these questions here at The Hague. We said, on the contrary, while a suggestion had been made here that the question of the terms of payment should be left to some future body, or tribunal or other organisation, that the Russian Commission insisted that these questions should be fixed by The Hague Conference. The Russian Commission repeatedly stated that it is prepared also to discuss at The Hague the question of compensation to previous owners of property in Russia, but the Russian Commission added that it could not usefully discuss this question or make any proposals or suggestions until it knew in what way, how and when the Russian State would be placed in the position to carry out the liabilities and obligations which it would take over at The Hague Conference. It was necessary to give some reply with regard to the financial help which it is proposed to give to Russia. That was the point

on which one of the Sub-Commissions decided to break off the negotiations, not because we declined to discuss the question, but simply because we could not discuss it until we had some other information from other Sub-Commissions at The Hague. The Russian Commission thought that that was not such a serious question. It was a point of procedure and not a point of principle. The Russian Commission thought it might perhaps be possible by good-will on both sides to bridge this gap. The rupture, nevertheless, took place. It was only after this at our last meeting with the Sub-Commission on Credits that we were given some of the definite information for which we had asked. The Russian Delegation was then told for the first time that the demand for credits to the Russian Government could not be entertained. That this demand was refused was not stated in the form of a decision of the Sub-Commission, but it was made quite clear to the Russian Commission by speeches of the Chairman, Baron Avezana, and by the British Delegate, Commander Hilton Young. The Russian Commission assumes that the declarations made by these Delegates reflect the actual decision of the Third Sub-Commission. If no one contradicts this I assume that I have fully understood the speeches made at the Third Sub-Commission. Thus one piece of information of paramount interest, if not indeed of a satisfactory nature, was given to the Russian Commission. The Russian Commission then found itself in quite a new position. One of the cardinal conditions of agreement as it was contemplated at Genoa had been removed. The Russian Government cannot expect any credits, it cannot expect any financial help at the present moment, and it is expected still to accept the other conditions put by the Genoa Conference and other Sub-Commissions here. Credits have been refused. The Russian Commission now finds itself in a difficult position when it is asked whether it has any new proposals to make. We cannot make any proposals for the reason that the instructions received from our Government were based on the assumption that credits would be given. Since it has been decided otherwise, since the experts have found that credits cannot be given, it would be natural to inform our Government and to ask what the Russian Government is prepared to do under the new circumstances—if it is prepared to continue negotiations and to acknowledge the conditions put to it. It would be too

great a responsibility for the Russian Commission to decide this question without consulting its Government. We are prepared to consult our Government, but we want to be quite clear as to what is demanded from the Russian Government now. I would presume that since there can be no question of financial help to Russia, there is no means of gauging the speed of recovery of Russia, and therefore I should think that the non-Russian Commission would not insist any longer on discussing the various details of the Russian payments. It would not be fair and practical to expect the Russian Commission to discuss in detail the various forms of compensation which the Russian Government would give to previous owners in cases where property is not given to them in some form or another. You know very well what forms of compensation can be, and what forms have been given in other countries where private undertakings have been nationalised. Compensation in some such forms as these is expected from Russia. The conditions of this compensation cannot be determined at the present moment during the present state of affairs in Russia. It would take some time to find out what could be done in this matter. If the non-Russian Commission is prepared to give the Russian Commission the opportunity to refer to its Government, the Russian Commission would be prepared to do so. In order not to lose time, I should like to have the demands stated quite clearly and explicitly. In my mind the demands could be formulated in this way : Presuming that credits to the Russian Government—credits in the sense as they were demanded here by the Russian Government—cannot be given at the present moment, is the Russian Government prepared to acknowledge the debts due by past Governments of Russia to foreign nationals ?—to agree to give effective compensation to foreign nationals for property, previously owned by them, which has been nationalised by the Russian Government ? Of course, provided the terms of payments of the debts and terms of compensation, whether in the form of concessions or otherwise, were left to be agreed upon between the Russian Government and the persons concerned, in a period of let us say, two years. A proposal of this kind was once made with regard to bondholders. I think you would extend this to other claims. I think this would be the best method to ascertain the views of the Russian Government. If the non-Russian Commission

wishes to have a reply to this question, and if the non-Russian Delegations are prepared to ask their Governments whether an affirmative reply from the Russian Government would be acceptable and satisfactory to them as a basis of an agreement, the Russian Commission is prepared to put these questions to its Government. We take no responsibility for this, we do not commit thereby either our Government or ourselves. It is only a suggestion. I think it would make it easier to ascertain the views of both sides and then a basis would be formed for further negotiations. I think for the sake of convenience I will put these proposals down in writing. If the non-Russian Delegations will ask for a definite reply from their Governments, the Russian Commission will refer it to Moscow, and try to obtain a reply in the shortest time possible.

PART III
THE U.S.S.R. AND DISARMAMENT

PART III

The U.S.S.R. and Disarmament

1. MOSCOW REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS CONFERENCE.

- a. PROPOSAL BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE R.S.F.S.R. FOR THE CONVOCAION IN MOSCOW OF A CONFERENCE ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. NOTE FROM M. LITVINOV, ASSISTANT PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO MINISTERS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN ESTHONIA, FINLAND, LATVIA AND POLAND. JUNE 12TH, 1922.
- b. SPEECH OF M. LITVINOV, CHAIRMAN OF RUSSIAN DELEGATION, AT FIRST SITTING OF MOSCOW DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE. DECEMBER 2ND, 1922.
- c. ARTICLES OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION OF NON-AGGRESSION AND ARBITRATION FINALLY PASSED ON THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION AT A SESSION OF THE BUREAU OF THE MOSCOW DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE ON DECEMBER 8TH, 1922.
- d. DECLARATION OF RUSSIAN DELEGATION AT THE FINAL SITTING OF THE MOSCOW DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (MILITARY AND TECHNICAL COMMISSION). DECEMBER 12TH, 1922.

2. CONSENT OF GOVERNMENT OF R.S.F.S.R. TO ATTEND CONFERENCE ON REDUCTION OF NAVAL ARMAMENTS. NOTE SENT BY PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS TO GENERAL SECRETARY OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS. MARCH 15TH, 1923.

3. REPLY OF G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO INVITATION FROM PRESIDENT OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS TO TAKE PART IN PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION. JANUARY 16TH, 1926.

4. NOTE FROM G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FOR THE U.S.S.R., TO SIR ERIC DRUMMOND, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS, WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE PARTICIPATION OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE WORK OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS ON DISARMAMENT. APRIL 7TH, 1926.

5. EXTRACT FROM RESOLUTION OF FOURTH U.S.S.R. CONGRESS OF SOVIETS ON GOVERNMENT REPORT. MOSCOW, APRIL 19TH, 1927.

6. SESSION OF PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION.

- a. STATEMENT BY M. LITVINOV REGARDING FOURTH SESSION OF PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION MADE TO REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVIET AND FOREIGN PRESS. NOVEMBER 22ND, 1927.
- b. DECLARATION BY U.S.S.R. DELEGATION PRONOUNCED BY M. LITVINOV AT SESSION OF PREPARATORY DISARMAMENT COMMISSION ON NOVEMBER 30TH, 1927.
- c. MEMORANDUM OF SOVIET DELEGATION. NOVEMBER 30TH, 1927.
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1. *Moscow Reduction of Armaments Conference.*

- a. *Proposal by the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. for the Convocation in Moscow of a Conference on the Reduction of Armaments. Note from M. Litvinov, Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to Ministers for Foreign Affairs in Esthonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland. June 12th, 1922.*

THE Genoa Conference has not justified the hopes placed upon it by the broad masses of the workers in Europe. Convoked under the slogan of economic revival and consolidation of peace in Europe, the Genoa Conference concentrated almost all its attention on the insistence on the material interests of a comparatively small group of persons suffering losses as a result of the European war, and revolution and intervention in Russia, and avoided that solution of the tasks confronting it which would really have to a considerable extent removed the causes of the economic crises which the whole of Europe is undergoing, and which are not confined to Europe, and would have averted the danger of fresh wars.

The initiators of the conference cannot have failed to realise that one of the causes of the economic crisis and the political instability of Europe is its superlatively armed condition, taking thousands away from productive labour, imposing on the rest of the population heavy burdens of taxation, retarding the financial recovery of most countries, creating and encouraging an atmosphere of lack of confidence between nations and perpetual expectation of armed conflicts. None the less the initiators of the conference, out of respect to the venal interests and desires of a few countries, found it possible not even to include the question

of partial reduction of armaments, not to speak of complete disarmament, on the agenda of the conference.

Although Russia has only recently resisted successfully foreign attacks, outside invasions and raids by counter-revolutionary bands ; although the remains of armed counter-revolutionary armies still infest districts not far from her frontiers, supported by foreign money and ready at the first opportunity again to invade her and subject the country to useless devastation and ruin ; although certain states stubbornly reject the revival of normal relations with Russia, which continue to be the object of the hatred of the whole political world, the Russian Delegation, despite all this, drew the attention of the conference to the necessity, in the interests of all countries, at the first sitting of the Genoa Conference, for the inclusion on the agenda of the question of general disarmament. Unfortunately, owing to the opposition of the French Delegation, the proposal of the Russian Delegation was rejected, and the question of disarmament found no place on the agenda of a conference " for the consolidation of peace and economic revival in Europe."

The Russian Government, however, sees no obstacles in the way of States more interested, desiring to live in friendship among themselves, and sincerely believing that debatable questions when arising could be resolved by peaceful means excluding the necessity for supporting huge armies, coming together for the partial solution of the tasks not fulfilled by the Genoa Conference.

The Russian Government, true to its peaceable policy, finding expression, among other things, in the corresponding proposals of the Russian Delegation registered in the minutes of the Riga Conference of March 30th, and in its above-mentioned proposal at the Genoa Conference, and aspiring to further reinforcement of friendly relations with its nearest neighbours, has decided to appeal to the Governments of the Latvian, Polish, Finnish, and Esthonian Republics with a proposal to delegate its representatives to a conference for joint consideration with the representatives of Russia of the question of proportional reduction of armed forces in the countries represented by them.

The Russian Government, appealing with the above-mentioned proposal to the Governments of its neighbouring countries maintaining normal diplomatic relations with it, considers it necessary

to point out that it is also ready to begin negotiations on the same question with those neighbouring countries with whom it has not yet regulated territorial and other questions, and also with more distant countries.

b. Speech of M. Litvinov, Chairman of Russian Delegation, at First Sitting of Moscow Disarmament Conference. December 2nd, 1922.

In its note of invitation of June 14th last the Russian Government laid down both the general principles which it established for the consideration of the question of mutual reduction of armaments, and the principal tasks confronting the conference. Noting with profound satisfaction that this invitation met with a response from the Western neighbours of Russia, the Russian Government can regard these principles and tasks as the ruling principle for the work of the conference.

At Genoa the Russian Government endeavoured to place the question of complete disarmament before the meeting of delegates from almost all the world powers. But this proposal met with no sympathy from precisely those powers whose people are bearing the heaviest burden of militarism in the world, and who, apparently, should be more than any others interested in the maximum reduction of armaments and the non-productive expenditure connected with armaments. Forced by this refusal to narrow the task before them and to put the question for the present of reduction of armaments only, and that only in relation to its Western neighbours, the Russian Government is nevertheless convinced that even the solution of this problem, given good will and complete mutual confidence, will lead to results of sufficient value for all the interested nations, and make still closer the ties of peaceful co-operation with which present-day Russia is bound to her Western neighbours.

From this standpoint the Russian Government invites the conference through its delegation to establish a precise plan for common reduction of land armed forces, based on the diminution during the next eighteen months to two years of the existing Russian army to one quarter of its present dimensions, *i.e.*, to 200,000 persons, and to a corresponding diminution of the armies of states on the Western frontiers of Russia. The Russian Govern-

ment, while assuming that the establishment of precise figures, terms and other details of such an agreement can only be made after close investigation of the question in a special commission to be attended by expert authorities, nevertheless considers it necessary to emphasise in advance that in all single points of its proposal it will be ruled by the principle of absolute mutuality and the impartial calculation of all circumstances making it essential for each country to support its armed forces at a given level. The Russian Government expresses its full conviction that these conditions will convince the whole world of its peaceable intentions and its complete absence of any aggressive intentions whatever.

However far the actual reduction of the existing state of armed forces may go it cannot be in a position fully to resolve the question of the mutual limitation of armaments, unless it is at the same time accompanied by the fixing of the war budgets of the contracting parties at a certain level. Only strict fixation of the maximum sum of military expenditure can relieve the contracting parties of the threatening danger of rivalry in the matter of technical superiority in army equipment, and this alone can guarantee effective limitation of non-productive expenditure for military purposes. Assuming that such financial disarmament can best be achieved by means of establishing maximum budget, *per capita* figures, figures to be identical for all the contracting parties, the Russian Government empowers its delegation to establish this figure finally after corresponding discussion in a commission and taking into account all its determining factors.

The Russian Government, proposing to establish, by means of agreement, the maximum figures both for the existing dimensions of land forces and for military budgets, considers that the simultaneous liquidation by all the contracting parties of military formations of an irregular nature, embracing definite sections of the civil population, would be the best guarantee of real and loyal execution of this measure. The Russian Government, impelled by the desire to remove all obstacles in the way of mutual limitation of armaments and to guarantee the smoothest working of this, declares, for its part, its readiness to carry out this liquidation on condition of simultaneous measures being taken by the Governments in the contracting countries. . . .

The Russian Government considers that it would be well to make a special point with regard to mutual neutrality in frontier zones. The events of the last eighteen months with their frequent frontier controversies, which narrowly escaped extremely serious conflicts for the countries concerned, and the liquidation of which required no small efforts, give the Russian Government grounds to call the attention of the conference to the great importance of the common regulation of border questions with regard to neutrality in the corresponding zones. . . . The Russian Government, to its profound regret, is unable to make any proposals for the reduction of naval armaments. While it has reduced its navy more than seventy-five per cent as compared with the tonnage in 1917, thus showing that Russia, despite the example of some other sea powers, does not conceive of a navy as a weapon of aggressive policy against weaker states, the Russian Government nevertheless considers it necessary to treat naval armaments as a weapon of defence against possible attacks from stronger powers. It considers it its duty to watch over the protection of the shores of Russia with its own forces until it is able to conclude corresponding agreements with sea-powers whose military vessels could easily enter the seas washing the shores of Russia, an agreement which should guarantee Russia real safety and the inviolability of its unarmed shores, accessible to direct attack even from the more distant of the mighty sea powers. The Russian Government will, however, welcome any decision of the conference tending to hasten the achievement of a general agreement on naval questions.

Even, however, with this forced limitation in its work the present conference is capable, in the opinion of the Russian Government, of uttering a decisive word and playing a prominent rôle in the matter of limiting the dimensions of land armed forces, the reduction of expenditure on military needs, the liquidation of irregular troop units, the removal of frontier misunderstandings and the strengthening of the basis of peaceful economic co-operation between the Russian people and their nearest Western neighbours.

The Russian Government fully realises that with the present social-economic structure of the majority of countries, based upon the exploitation of man by man, and one nation by another, such measures as would completely remove the possibility of armed international conflicts are unthinkable. The attempts made

and still being made by the Great Powers to regulate international relations, while removing some of the formerly existing injustices between nations, have created a set of new and still more crying injustices and new possible sources of war in the future. At the same time the Russian Government is fully convinced that not only complete, but even partial disarmament would greatly diminish the chances of armed conflicts and would, moreover, give direct, tangible results in the form of the reducing of the burden of financial taxation. It is this aim which the proposals of the Russian Government are serving. These proposals are, in the opinion of the Russian Government, perfectly definite and practicable and cannot be substituted by any talk of so-called "moral disarmament," of which so much is heard at international conferences, when their participants want a high-flown excuse to abandon the effective realisation of the popular slogan of disarmament.

If the conference brings a resolution, based on the fundamental questions put forward by the Russian delegation, and really serving the affairs of peace, returning thousands of able workers to productive labour, lifting the burden of militarism from the peoples exhausted by years of war, it will have done work of vital significance not only for those countries which are directly represented here. It will be showing the way to those countries whose Governments are still grappling with post-war difficulties, and have not yet understood that the first step to the issue out of these difficulties can only be made by lifting the yoke of militarism from the backs of the people. It will be laying the foundation for general disarmament—the aim which the Workers' and Peasants' Government has set itself in the interests of the toilers in its own country and those of the whole of humanity.

c. Articles of the Draft Convention of Non-Aggression and Arbitration finally passed on the Proposal of the Soviet Delegation at a Session of the Bureau of the Moscow Disarmament Conference on December 8th, 1922.

Article 1.—The High Contracting Parties bind themselves solemnly and mutually to desist from any armed attacks whatever on corresponding territory, to be defined by peace treaties or other agreements for establishing frontiers between adjacent states, inasmuch as such already exist, and in accordance with the

present *status quo*, inasmuch as peace treaties and other agreements establishing frontiers have not yet been concluded.

Article 2.—The High Contracting Parties bind themselves solemnly and mutually not to afford any support to any third state not subscribing to this convention, if such a state should commit an act of armed attack on the territory of any of the contracting parties.

Article 3.—In case of infringement by one of the contracting parties of this convention, *i.e.*, in case of armed attack by one of the states subscribing to this convention, on the territory of another, the contracting parties undertake not to afford the attacking state any support or aid, and will be freed from all obligations to it arising out of this convention.

Article 4.—The High Contracting Parties declare that they will solve by peaceful means any controversies and conflicts that may arise between their states.

Article 5.—The High Contracting Parties agree, in the case of controversy arising in regard to questions not already solved by peace treaties, and other than territorial questions, the question arousing controversy shall be transferred to arbitration if it is not found possible to settle it through diplomatic channels.

Article 6.—Adherence to this convention is open, given the consent of the contracting parties, to other states not participating in it.

Article 7.—This convention will be presented for ratification of parliaments or other legal bodies in the states subscribing to it. Ratification must take place not later than three months after it has been signed.

Article 8.—Acts of ratification must be sent for preservation to Christiana, and the Norwegian Government will inform the other contracting parties of their deposition. This convention must come into force fifteen days after the depositing of the last ratification act. . . .

d. Declaration of Russian Delegation at the Final Sitting of the Moscow Disarmament Conference (Military and Technical Commission). December 12th, 1922.

Having acquainted itself with the detailed declaration of the combined delegations of Esthonia, Finland, Latvia and Poland,

the Russian delegation finds it necessary to give the following reply :

The declaration of the united delegations contains, in addition to what is actually a refusal to continue the work of the conference, a summary of the principal stages in the history of its preparation and its subsequent activities. The Russian delegation feels bound, first of all, to dwell upon this summary, in order to restore their proper aspect to the facts, and to throw a true light upon them, to prevent the arising of legends for which the declaration of the united delegations affords no little material.

The note of invitation of the Russian Government of June 14th last proposed by way of a fundamental subject for the work of the conference the question of the mutual reduction of armaments, which should be a " proportional " reduction. This proposal was not rejected by any of the Governments invited. More : the Governments, whose delegations have united now in a common declaration, organised in the period of time between June 14th and December 1st several conferences for the consideration of the Russian Government's invitation and the questions connected with it. They could have considered (indeed the Russian delegation has every reason to think that they *did* consider) during this period of time, those very questions whose complexity and difficulty have now been made the excuse to give a new tendency to the actual course of the work of the conference, or, following the example of Rumania, have made preliminary conditions. The baselessness of the references in the declaration of the united delegations to their inability to continue the consideration of practical questions with regard to the reduction of armaments, owing to what is said to be their insurmountable complexity, is shown further by the fact that the military experts of the united delegations have actually taken an active part in their consideration, thus displaying sufficient knowledge of the specific conditions of the problem of the reduction of armaments precisely for the six countries represented at the conference. Finally the Russian delegation did not limit and did not intend to limit the time of the work of the conference by any definite term and had no intention of bringing it to an end in a few days, without reckoning with the difficulties which might arise during the consideration of any given

question. The delegations have had, and still have, full opportunities to put before the consideration of the conference any and every question connected with the actual reduction of armaments, as fully and in as much detail as they desire, and are by no means forced to squeeze all the business of the conference into a few days to the detriment of the work. Thus, neither the course of events during the preparatory period, nor that of the work at the conference itself up to the present, nor the prospects of its work in the future have been such as to give the united delegations the slightest right to demand changes in the course of work and proffer what amounts to a refusal to consider the most important question on the grounds that it is an extremely complex one, or because up to the present discussion of it has not led to unanimity of opinion. The Russian delegation can only regard such implications as an attempt to mask the true position of affairs and conceal the real motives for the behaviour of the united delegations.

Having not the slightest grounds for resorting, as the united delegations have done, to references to the League of Nations protocol, and preferring to this the protocol of this conference, the Russian delegation considers it necessary to state with regard to these references that they are, perhaps, quite characteristic for the League of Nations and the tendencies prevailing in it, but that they have nothing to do with the question of the actual reduction of armaments. The Russian delegation is aware that the League of Nations, led by the Great Powers of the so-called Entente, has systematically rejected and continues to reject all proposals, however modest, to turn to the actual reduction of armaments, rejecting even resolutions of that nature, and prefers to discuss what is known as "moral disarmament," while it is France that is most prominent in such discussions, France who is not diminishing, but increasing her armed forces, and has so far not even ratified the inadequate Washington Convention on the reduction of naval forces and who, with the formula "moral disarmament" on her lips, is heading the policy of strangling Germany, threatening to seize the latter's territory and infringe her frontiers. Confronted by such facts the Russian delegation considers itself entitled to turn from the references to the League of Nations protocol without further remark and proceed to the much more important references to the protocol of this conference.

Whilst acceding to the insistent demands of the united delegations to place before the consideration of the conference in the first place not the question of real, material disarmament for the solution of which the conference was, as a matter of fact, convoked, but that of so-called "moral disarmament," the Russian delegation emphasised and continued to emphasise the fact that, while making this concession it has not changed its point of view one jot or tittle as to the relations between these two questions. Considering that it must be obvious to all that, in order to proceed to the actual reduction of armaments, a firm and resolute will to peace is necessary and an unwavering decision to set up the necessary material basis for the guarantee of peace, and that the so-called "moral disarmament" can be nothing but the readiness to actual disarmament, the Russian delegation considers at the same time that all resolutions on the necessity for disarmament, and even formal-political declarations, isolated from any material base, must remain empty phrases, not only deprived of all significance, but constituting a nucleus for the creation of the most dangerous illusions among the broad masses of the people.

Maintaining this point of view the Russian delegation has at the same time taken the most active part in the discussion of the draft agreement for non-aggression and arbitration introduced by the united delegations, and, regarding this agreement in organic connection with the real business of actual reduction of armaments, has introduced into it a series of amendments. It considers it necessary to point out that all these amendments have gone considerably further than the original draft, and that some of them were rejected, because the united delegations did not wish, in the path of "moral disarmament," to go beyond certain not very extensive limits. Thus the opposition of Poland, not desirous of reconciling its territorial conflict with Lithuania by any arbitration whatsoever, caused the exclusion of the principle of arbitration, despite the insistence of the Russian and Lithuanian delegations. In the question of non-aggression also, the demand brought forward by the Russian delegation as a real guarantee of the political sincerity of all the contracting parties, for the renunciation of all alliances and agreements contradictory to the spirit of a non-aggression agreement, was again, at the insistence of the Polish delegation, withdrawn from the text of the draft and trans-

ferred in a weakened and colourless form to the minutes for the signature of the agreement. Further the clause regarding the prevention of the activities of political, piratical and terroristic organisations, tending to upset neighbourly relations and the inviolability of frontiers, which was introduced by the Russian delegation, was rejected by the united delegations, despite the fact that the non-observation of this clause in peace treaties has frequently placed Russia and her neighbours under the threat of armed conflicts. And yet, despite the fact that the authors of the draft treaty of non-aggression and arbitration themselves did everything they could to prevent even this formal-political document from becoming a real means of the reinforcement and development of peaceful relations, preferring to content themselves with hazy and dubious phrases, the Russian delegation, in the interests of that urgent matter for the sake of which the Russian Government convoked the Moscow conference, undertook to subscribe to the clauses of the non-aggression and arbitration treaty worked out at the conference, on condition that the decisions of the conference on the actual reduction of armaments would be embodied in the general treaty.

Proceeding to this vital matter and bringing before the consideration of the conference its draft for mutual reduction of armaments, based upon the diminution of the Russian army to 200,000 (*i.e.*, one-fourth of its present dimensions), the Russian delegation immediately met with unanimous opposition from the united delegations, categorically declaring that at the present moment their States can only consider a trifling reduction of armies, and a fixation of military budget norms only from 1923. The Russian delegation, thus forced by this opposition to limit the scope of their proposal and bring before the consideration of the conference only the first stage of its suggestion for mutual reduction of armaments, based on the establishment in 1923 of budget norms for a Russian army of 600,000, with corresponding reduction of other armies, then received from the united delegations the figures they proposed for their armies in 1923, with the comment that these figures had been reduced as compared with 1922 almost on the same scale as proposed to be done by Russia, reducing her army from 800,000 in 1922 to 600,000 in 1923. The Polish delegation in particular stated that, taking almost the

same proportion, the budget for the Polish army in 1923 would be defined by an outside figure for 280,000 persons. Further discussion, however, brought to light the fact that the figures quoted by the united delegations really amounted to no diminution as compared with 1922, and that the statements of the delegations were not in accordance with the actual facts. With regard to Poland, in particular, it was established by a reference to a League of Nations questionnaire of June 28th, 1922, that the budget for the Polish army for 1922 was calculated for 293,744 persons, so that the Polish figures of 280,000 for 1923 can hardly be quoted as anything like real reduction.

The Russian delegation would state that only when the discussion began to take this turn, only when it had become obvious that the Governments of Poland, Finland, Latvia, and Esthonia had no intentions of reducing their armies in 1923 as compared with 1922, and that their delegations were merely covering up the absence of any such desire by statements to the contrary, not even hesitating to manipulate their figures, did the united delegates begin to feel the insurmountable complexity of the question and find it impossible to continue discussion on it.

The establishment of this simple fact frees the Russian delegation from the obligation to enter into detailed investigation of arguments which cropped up during discussion, with which the united delegations endeavoured to make use of for the concealment of this insurmountable fact. The Russian delegation considers, however, that the interests of truth require that it should once more point out, in accordance with the conclusions arrived at by it in the discussion, that the proportional reduction of the armed forces of Russia and her Western neighbours, especially at the modest rate suggested at this conference, would not only fail to change the balance of power in favour of Russia, but would, on the contrary, considering the extent of her territory and the length of her eastern and south-eastern frontiers, make this balance worse from the point of view of Russia. The Russian delegation considers the reference to a supposed powerful war-industry in Russia particularly strange, as coming from a group of powers, headed by Poland, who have at their disposal the incomparably greater war industries of France, with whom Poland is bound not only by the theoretical ties of close friendship, but also by the

quite actual ties of a military convention. It will be seen how fantastic is this argument of the united delegations when it is remembered that the Russian delegation agreed to the immediate reduction of the Russian army by one-fourth and this, moreover, despite the absence from this conference of Rumania, whose Government does not desire to establish normal relations with Russia, but is in the closest treaty-relations with Poland.

Turning to the practical proposals made in the declaration of the united delegations, the Russian delegation is the more able to be brief in that these proposals have already occupied the attention of the conference and an exhaustive reply given to them by the Russian delegation.

The Russian delegation is unable to subscribe to a non-aggression and arbitration treaty with the countries represented by the united delegations, not because it considers the obligations arising therefrom unacceptable to itself. On the contrary it has endeavoured to extend and make more exacting these mutual obligations, but it does not and cannot believe in the possibility of creating an atmosphere of mutual confidence by means of subscribing to declarations and resolutions of a formal character so long as the states represented at this conference fail to prove that they have no individual or joint aggressive intentions towards Russia by the only convincing means, namely, real willingness to reduce their regular and liquidate their irregular armed forces. The Russian delegation does not want to place its signature to phrases masking the root cause of the matter and the obstinate desire to evade it.

The Russian delegation notes the budget figures for armies in their countries in 1923, quoted by the united delegations, at the same time remarking that these figures are at least no lower or very little lower than those for 1922, in other words that the Governments of these countries reject for themselves the putting into practice of the idea of the reduction of armaments.

With regard to the third proposal of the united delegations—for the setting-up of a commission of military experts for the investigation of questions connected with the reduction of armaments, and for finding corresponding practical measures—the Russian delegation would state that such a commission already exists and has already begun to work, in the form of this con-

ference. The proposal to interrupt the work of this commission for several months and make its revival dependent upon the signature and ratification of declarations which can only be of significance if embodied in the general results of the work of the conference is, in the opinion of the Russian delegation, a poorly concealed attempt to break up this conference in order to create the appearance of some achievements, which can only lead astray the masses of the people thirsting for peace and the lightening of the burden of militarism.

The Russian delegation considers it necessary, in conclusion, to place before the united delegations once more the question whether they wish to continue further joint work with it on the question of the reduction of armaments along the lines and in the forms already established at this conference. It feels obliged to warn the united delegations that, if they insist on their point of view they will make the continuation of the conference impossible, for they will be showing that the majority of its participants are pursuing aims radically opposed to its original purpose.

If the Russian delegation is obliged to regard as final the declaration of the Polish, Finnish, Latvian and Esthonian delegations of the cessation of the work of this commission, and consequently the Moscow Conference, it will feel bound to regard this declaration as a refusal of the Russian Government's proposal of actual disarmament, and will simply invite public opinion among the masses of the people all over the world, especially those in the countries represented at the conference, to draw their own conclusions from this fact.

2. *Consent of Government of R.S.F.S.R. to Attend Conference on Reduction of Naval Armaments. Note sent by People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to General Secretary of League of Nations. March 15th, 1923.*

. . . The attitude of the Soviet Government to the so-called League of Nations has frequently been expressed in the declarations of its responsible representatives. The Soviet Government's attitude to the so-called League of Nations remains unaltered. It regards it as a coalition of certain states, endeavouring to usurp the power over other states and masking their attempts on the rights and independence of other nations by a false appearance

of groundless legality and in the form of mandates issued by the Council or . . . Assembly of the League of Nations, etc. The Soviet Government maintains its conviction that this pseudo-international body really serves as a mere mask to conceal from the broad masses the aggressive aims of the imperialist policy of certain Great Powers or their vassals. The Soviet Government finds confirmation for its convictions every time that a State assuming the leading rôle in the League of Nations makes a decision on international questions, touching the interests of the Soviet Republic.

The Soviet Government cannot, however, sacrifice to such conceptions its constant aspirations to afford, by every means at its disposal, all possible assistance in the task of easing the burden of militarism lying upon all peoples, the task of preventing armed conflicts and the consolidation of general peace. Weak as are the hopes of the Soviet Government for the achievement of these aims in the present world situation, it would consider it out of the question to refrain from taking the least possible opportunity for doing something, however little, to assist the matter of the reduction of armaments. The Soviet Government, as the interpreter of the will of the toiling masses, has determined never to let slip a single opportunity for easing in any way the burden of armaments and world conflicts pressing upon the toiling masses the world over. Taking this stand, the Soviet Government endeavoured at the Genoa Conference to bring forward the question of general disarmament. At the Lausanne Conference it defended the principle of closing the Straits for warships, the result of which would have been a diminution of the chances of armed conflicts at sea and the reduction of naval armaments. A special conference was convoked at Moscow by the Soviet Government with neighbouring States for the purpose of simultaneous mutual reduction of armaments, and the responsibility for the failure of this conference lies in its entirety at the doors of the other participants.

While in no degree going back upon its expressed attitude to the League of Nations, the Soviet Government is ready to regard the proposed conference as a meeting of representatives of individual States, despite the fact that certain of these States composed a hypothetical League of Nations. The Soviet Government therefore expresses its entire readiness to take part in the aforesaid

conference, independent of whether it is called by the Government of the United States of America, the initiators of the first conference on naval disarmament, or by any other group of powers. The Soviet Government, moreover, considers that without the participation of Russia and her Allies the beforementioned conference will be meaningless, since the measures proposed by its initiators can only be carried out with the participation of all States without exception. Therefore, although the agenda of the above-mentioned conference only mentions members of the so-called League of Nations, the Soviet Government considers that the participation of Russia and her allies, like that of all other States, at the above-mentioned conference, is desirable and essential.

3. *Reply of G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to invitation from Chairman of League of Nations to take part in Preparatory Disarmament Commission. January 16th, 1926.*

Mr. Chairman,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of December 12th, containing an invitation to take part in a preparatory Commission for a Disarmament Conference. The Soviet Government has repeatedly declared that it attributes such great importance to any attempt to diminish the danger of war and ease the burden of armaments lying on the people, that it is ready to take part in any conference connected with this end.

In reference to the above-mentioned invitation I make here the same statement, at the same time emphasising the fact that it in no way implies the adherence of my Government to the views of the League Council.

I am bound to state that if the Soviet Government, aspiring towards the easing of the position of all peoples, decides to be represented at such an assembly, convoked by the League of Nations, this by no means signifies that its unfavourable attitude to the latter has been in any way modified. We can only regret that the assembly setting itself such an extensive task as general disarmament, is convoked by the League of Nations, *i.e.*, by an organisation not recognised by many States. I feel bound to express great astonishment with regard to the fact that the Council of the League of Nations, while considering the participation of

the U.S.S.R. in the preliminary work of the disarmament conference, at the same time appointed the place of convocation of its preparatory commission in Geneva, thus actually excluding all possibility of participation in this commission by the U.S.S.R.

The Council can scarcely fail to be unaware of the frequent declarations of the Soviet Government as to the impossibility of sending its representatives to Switzerland as long as its conflict with the Swiss Government, in connection with the murder of citizen Vorovsky, its representative at the Lausanne Conference, has not been settled.

It will be sufficient to remember that the Soviet Government refused to send its representatives to Switzerland for a preliminary conference on naval disarmament, which was consequently held in Italy.

The behaviour of the Swiss Government in regard to the Soviet Government has considerably assisted the creation of such an atmosphere as made possible the acquittal of the murderer of citizen Vorovsky. The immunity of those who killed citizen Vorovsky and wounded members of his staff can only mean the outlawing of Soviet citizens and especially official Soviet delegates. It is perfectly obvious that the Soviet Government cannot send delegates to such a country, as long as the conditions there prevailing at the time of Vorovsky's murder, and still prevailing, are not changed. It is therefore to be regretted that the Council of the League of Nations did not take these facts into consideration when appointing the place of convocation of this commission. It is highly possible that, from the technical point of view Geneva is the most suitable place for the League of Nations for the work of the commission. The League, however, can scarcely require that States invited to the commission should let their policy in regard to other States depend upon its technical convenience. It might be supposed that participation in a disarmament commission by such a big State as the U.S.S.R. would outweigh arguments touching the technical convenience of the League of Nations.

I would once more definitely state, in order to prevent any misunderstanding, that the Soviet Government, welcoming any initiative and any attempt in the direction of disarmament, sincerely desires to participate both in the disarmament conference

and in the preparatory commission. It is, however, bound to state its inability to send its delegates to commissions or conferences held on the territory of Switzerland until the settlement of the conflict with the latter country, and must admit that it is therefore prevented from taking part in the preparatory commission, unless it is convoked in some other place. The Soviet Government at the same time places the responsibility for the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from participation in this commission at the door of the Council of the League of Nations.

4. *Note from G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for the U.S.S.R., to Sir Eric Drummond, General Secretary of the League of Nations, with regard to the Question of the Participation of the U.S.S.R. in the Work of the League of Nations on Disarmament. April 7th, 1926.*

(Acknowledgment of note from Sir Eric Drummond of March 18th, in which the League of Nations reiterates its decision to convoke preliminary disarmament commissions in Geneva, in spite of the objections of the Soviet Government.)

The declaration of the Swiss Government to which you refer and which asserts the readiness of the Swiss Government to place the Soviet delegates in an equal situation with the delegates of other countries, was known to the Soviet Government before the dispatch to the League of Nations of its note of January 16th. This declaration cannot have the slightest effect on the firm decision taken by the Soviet Government. When the Swiss Government admitted the Soviet delegates to the Lausanne Conference in 1923, and provided them with diplomatic visas, it was also assumed that the Soviet delegates would enjoy equal rights and privileges with the delegates of other states. Nevertheless, the Swiss Government, who were aware of the open threats of extreme right circles with regard to the Soviet delegate Vorovsky in plenty of time, not only failed to take the necessary measures required to prevent the crime, but, when it had been committed, did everything in its power to guarantee the criminals immunity from punishment. The determined refusal of the Swiss Government to fulfil its elementary international obligation and to demonstrate in a sufficiently official manner its condemnation of the

crime committed, makes its declaration to the League of Nations of no value, and gives grounds for the belief that the Swiss Government is still being influenced in its attitude to the U.S.S.R. by the spirit of those very circles which approved of the murder of Vorovsky and subsequently applauded this deed, and that the Soviet delegates can count on more real protection from the Swiss authorities than they could in 1923.

Your notes do not contain a single positive argument in favour of the appointment of the disarmament commission in Geneva. More than one international conference, even when organised by the League of Nations, has been held in various towns in Europe, outside Switzerland. It is not quite clear to the Soviet Government what are the motives for insisting that the disarmament conference, at which it would seem that the participation of the U.S.S.R. would be desirable, cannot be held anywhere else excepting in Geneva. The last session of the League of Nations, held at Geneva, was far from testifying to the prevalence in this residence of the League of Nations of an atmosphere favourable to the solution of international problems in the spirit of peaceableness, impartiality and conciliation.

On first deciding to choose Geneva as the place for the conference the Council of the League of Nations must have had some idea that the Soviet Government would protest against this. Now, having confirmed its decision, the League of Nations Council has had a formal categorical declaration from the Soviet Government of its decision in no case to send delegates to Swiss territory. If, none the less, the League of Nations Council has found it essential to maintain its previous decision, it is impossible to escape the conclusion that they aimed from the very beginning at the exclusion of the U.S.S.R. from participation in the work of the disarmament conference and that their formal declaration of the great importance they attributed to the co-operation of the U.S.S.R. with regard to disarmament must be regarded as lacking in sincerity and real meaning. Taking into consideration the fact that the absence of the Soviet Union at a disarmament conference, and its final fore-ordained exclusion from participation in preliminary conferences, may give an excuse to other States, as they have already declared, to sabotage the matter of general disarmament or the reduction of armaments, it is possible to

draw only one conclusion—namely, that the League of Nations or its leaders, are not in the slightest degree interested in the achievement at such conferences of positive results or, as a prominent American diplomat aptly put it “the preliminary disarmament conference will meet in Geneva, if it does meet at all, for the consideration of proposals as to which they neither wish nor expect to come to an agreement, and which will purposely be advanced with a view to guaranteeing their failure.”

One of the guarantees of failure is the practical exclusion by the leaders of the League of Nations of the U.S.S.R.—that State which, as long ago as the Genoa Conference, in 1922, was the first to put forward the question of general disarmament, which called a conference of its neighbouring states on the same question, and made thereat definite and perfectly practicable proposals, subsequently voluntarily reducing its armies to the minimum which would be accepted by the other States—from participation in the conference.

The Soviet Government having thus given no small real proof of its peaceable intentions and sincere aspirations to the realisation of the idea of general disarmament, or, at least, the easing of the military burden for the peoples, has never once sought to conceal its sceptical attitude towards a conference convoked by the League of Nations. It has, nevertheless, expressed its readiness to participate in the conference should there be the very slightest chance of success. The behaviour of the leaders of the League of Nations with regard to the choice of a place for the conference finally convinces the Soviet Government of the complete lack of seriousness and sincerity of the League's principles and the inability and unsuitability of the League of Nations in such a serious matter as the calling of a general conference on disarmament. The Soviet Government will await with great interest and readiness to afford the utmost assistance, for this matter to be undertaken either by a specially-convened commission, free from the atmosphere of Geneva traditions and intrigues and capable of offering greater guarantee for success than can the League of Nations. . . .

In conclusion I permit myself to express the hope that the League of Nations will in future take the trouble to send the Soviet Government invitations only to such conferences in which the

leaders of the League really consider its participation desirable.

5. *Extract from Resolution of Fourth U.S.S.R. Congress of Soviets on Government Report. Moscow, April 19th, 1927.*

2. Whereas the Congress notes that the activities of the Government with regard to the development and reinforcement of connections with capitalist countries have been much impeded by the increase of hostility towards the Soviet Union on the part of certain capitalist countries, and considers the cause of the increase of hostility the very fact of the existence of a Workers' State, successfully constructing socialism and renouncing all nationalist oppression and violence, thus making the position of the world bourgeoisie ever weaker in regard to its exploitation of the working class and the peoples in colonial countries ;

3. . . . The Congress anxiously draws the attention of all toilers to the extraordinarily rapid increase of late of aggression by the international bourgeoisie towards the U.S.S.R. The extraordinary British note of "warning," and subsequently the unprecedented insolence, without precedent in the history of international relations, of the raids on the organs of U.S.S.R. diplomatic representation in Peking and Shanghai, committed with obvious provocative motives, forces the U.S.S.R. to be on the alert. The Congress charges the Government to be ready to resist any fresh efforts to provoke the U.S.S.R. to war with any country whatever, and to do everything possible for the prevention of war.

4. . . . The Congress warns the whole world that the policy of the international bourgeoisie in relation to the U.S.S.R. and the struggle conducted by the imperialist countries against the national-emancipatory workers and peasant movement in China, are threatening the danger of a fresh world war.

5. . . . The Congress expresses its sympathy with the national-emancipatory movement of the Chinese people and approves entirely of the policy of the U.S.S.R. Government in relation to China, based on the recognition of the complete sovereignty of China, on the principles of equality and complete renunciation by the U.S.S.R. of special privileges enjoyed by foreigners in China.

6. . . . The Congress draws the attention of the people of the whole world to the indisputable fact that the U.S.S.R. is the only

State in the world pursuing a direct and active policy of persevering peaceableness, corresponding to the interests of the whole of humanity. Fully approving of this peace policy, the Congress charges the Soviet Government to continue in future steadily to pursue this policy and to aim at the establishment and reinforcement of friendly relations with foreign States. The Congress notes with satisfaction that these aspirations of the U.S.S.R. have found a response in certain States, the development of economic ties with which is the best evidence of the correctness of this policy.

6. Session of Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

a. Statement by M. Litvinov Regarding Fourth Session of Preparatory Disarmament Commission made to Representatives of Soviet and Foreign Press. November 22nd, 1927.

1. The decision of the Soviet Government to send a delegation to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission has called forth all sorts of commentary and unfounded speculation in certain circles abroad, as to the position the Soviet delegation intends to take up in Geneva. On the one hand it is asserted that the Soviet Government is sending a delegation to Geneva with the exclusive purpose of propaganda and agitation, on the other, it is said that the fact of sending a delegation to Geneva signifies some sort of a change in the attitude of the U.S.S.R. both as regards disarmament, and the League of Nations. I should like, therefore, to give a brief definition of the position of the U.S.S.R. with regard to disarmament and thus put an end to the circulation by the bourgeois press of unfounded statements and tendentious rumours.

2. The Soviet Government has never concealed its lack of confidence in the readiness and capability of capitalist countries to destroy the system of war between nations, and consequently to realise disarmament.

3. This lack of confidence has been sufficiently justified by the whole history of international relations since the world war from 1914 to 1918 (to which pacifists and pseudo-pacifists endeavoured to affix the tag of the "Last War") and by the uninterrupted and systematic increase of armed forces in capitalist states, the doubling and trebling of war budgets in comparison with 1913,

and the progressive increase of the common burden of militarism.

4. The latest justification of this lack of confidence is the seven years fruitless work on disarmament of the League of Nations, which is supposed to make the guarantee of universal peace and the realisation of disarmament its principal aim. It will be sufficient to remind ourselves that the League of Nations only arrived at the question of disarmament in 1924, *i.e.*, in the fifth year of its existence, while the calling of a conference was postponed to 1925. So far not only has the matter of disarmament not been advanced, but even the date of a conference cannot be fixed. In the same way the specifically distinguished question of naval disarmament still remained unsolved. The question of the diminution of war budgets, with which the League of Nations has been "occupied" since 1920, has also been postponed indefinitely. Instead of the real and appreciable disarmament which the masses of people in all countries demand, we still have so far as the only result of League of Nations' work meaningless declarations and a series of resolutions and proposals intended to serve the aims of one or other of the international political groupings.

5. Despite the opposition of capitalist countries the Soviet Government has exerted all its energies during the ten years of its existence to achieve the realisation of at least something in the sphere of general or even partial, but real reduction of the armaments which are such a terrible burden on the shoulders of the toiling masses. References to the first decree of the Soviet Government, on November 8th, 1917, on the subject of peace, the proposal of the Soviet delegation at the Genoa conference in 1922 for the inclusion in the agenda of the question of general disarmament and, finally, the convocation by the Soviet Government in the same year of a conference in Moscow with the participation of the Western neighbours of the U.S.S.R. at which, in the capacity of chairman of the Russian delegation, I proposed a definite and practicable plan of the proportional reduction of armed forces, a plan rejected by all the other participants in the conference, will serve as corroboration for this assertion.

6. Receiving in 1925 the invitation of the League of Nations to take part in the disarmament conference it was preparing, the Soviet Government answered with theoretical consent, declaring

in its note of January 16th, 1926, that "welcoming any initiative and every attempt in the sphere of disarmament, it sincerely desires to take place both in the disarmament conference and in its preparatory commission." The League of Nations, however, deprived the U.S.S.R. of the possibility of taking an actual part in the three sessions of the Preparatory Commission which have already taken place, by appointing them to be held in Switzerland, where, for well-known reasons, the Soviet Union could not at that time send its delegates. Now, owing to the removal of these causes, *i.e.*, following on the settlement of the conflict with Switzerland, the Soviet Government, in accordance with the decision referred to by me, is sending a delegation for participation in the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission and the Disarmament Conference itself, if the latter should ever meet. By this decision the U.S.S.R. deprives its enemies of the power to attribute to it in any degree whatsoever the possible failure of the conference, and its neighbours of the excuse to refuse to disarm on the grounds that the U.S.S.R. did not participate.

7. The Soviet State, of its very nature free from any imperialist designs and annexationist ambitions whatsoever, steadily pursues the policy of peace. It invited and still invites all its neighbours without exception, and not its neighbours only, in a spirit of real peaceableness, to conclude a pact of non-aggression. From the point of view of peace policy the Soviet Union continues to insist on the necessity for full and general disarmament. If the capitalist countries consider the realisation of a plan for complete disarmament in one instalment or during the shortest possible term, unacceptable, the Soviet delegation agrees to the gradual execution of such a plan, during a term to be established at the conference.

8. The Soviet delegation will come forward at Geneva with its own programme. It will consider as its allies at Geneva any delegates who either adhere to this programme, or come forward with proposals tending in the same direction. It will consider as one of its principal tasks the fixation of the attention of the commission, and later of the conference, on the necessity for creating really solid and the most effective possible guarantees of peace, and will struggle against any attempts at distraction in the direction of questions of minor importance and fruitless resolutions,

or the attempt to convert the commission or conference into a weapon of the policy of any given State or group of States.

b. Declaration by U.S.S.R. Delegation pronounced by M. Litvinov at Session of Preparatory Disarmament Commission on November 30th, 1927.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, having been unable to participate in the three sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, entrusted to its delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission the task of making a declaration covering all questions connected with the problem of disarmament.

The Soviet Government adheres to the opinion it has always held that under the capitalist system no grounds exist for counting upon the removal of the causes which give rise to armed conflicts. Militarism and big navies are the essentially natural consequences of the capitalist system. By the very fact of their increase they intensify existing differences, giving a great impetus to all potential quarrels, and inevitably convert these into armed conflicts.

The peoples of all countries, however, enfeebled and impoverished by the imperialist world war, are imbued with determination to struggle against new imperialist wars, and to guarantee peace between the nations.

This is precisely what makes it possible for the Soviet to accept the invitation of the League of Nations, the latter having expressed itself in favour of disarmament. In so doing the Soviet Government demonstrates before the whole world its will to peace between the nations, and makes clear to all the real aspirations and true desires of the capitalist States in regard to disarmament.

Despite the fact that the world war was called the "war to end war," the whole history of post-war international relations has been one of continuous, systematic increase of armed forces in the capitalist States and of a great increase in the general burden of militarism. So far none of the solemn promises of the League of Nations have been even partially fulfilled, while in all its activities in this regard the League has systematically evaded setting the question in a practical light.

All the work done by the Preparatory Commission in this regard has been of a purely decorative nature. Indeed, the

League of Nations only approached the question of general disarmament in 1924. It was decided to call a conference on general disarmament on May 1st, 1925, but up to the present not only has the matter of disarmament not advanced a single step, but no date for the conference has been fixed. Likewise the League of Nations has been fruitlessly engaged upon the question of the limitation of war budgets since 1920.

The reluctance to put into practice the policy of disarmament, both on the part of the League and individual imperialist States, was manifested both in the methods adopted and the alternation of the questions of disarmament and guarantees, while simultaneous attempts are made to sum up in detail all the factors determining the armed power of the various countries concerned. Such a setting of the question, evoking endless fruitless arguments on so-called military potentials, affords an opportunity for indefinite postponement of the fundamental and decisive question of the actual dimensions of disarmament. There can be no doubt that by setting the question thus at the coming Disarmament Conference not only will it be impossible to achieve curtailment of the existing armaments, but the States belonging to the League of Nations may even receive legal sanction for increasing their armaments.

The Soviet Government has systematically endeavoured to get the question of disarmament definitely and practically formulated. Its endeavours have, however, always encountered determined resistance from other States. The Soviet Government, the only one to show in deeds its will to peace and disarmament, was not admitted to the Washington Conference of 1921-22, devoted to questions of the curtailment of marine armaments.

The proposal of general disarmament made by the Soviet delegation to the Genoa Conference was rejected by the conference. Despite this opposition, the Soviet Government never relaxed its determined endeavours in regard to disarmament.

In December, 1922, a Conference was called in Moscow by the Soviet Government of representatives of the Border States for joint discussion of the problem of the proportional curtailment of armaments. The Soviet Government agreed to a considerable diminution of its armaments, despite the fact that this would not affect many of the Great Powers, always ready, whether under

the obligation of treaties or not, to come to the assistance of other countries represented at the Moscow Conference, should these be involved in conflicts with the Soviet Union. A definite and thorough scheme for the diminution of armaments was proposed at that Conference by the Soviet Government. This was, however, rejected.

Despite the sceptical attitude of the Soviet Government towards the labours of the League, it accepted the invitation of December 12th, 1925, to attend the coming Disarmament Conference, and only the Soviet-Swiss conflict, evoked by the assassination of Vorovsky and the subsequent acquittal of the assassin by the Swiss court, has prevented the Soviet Government from attending previous sessions of the Preparatory Commission.

In now sending a delegation to the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference the Government has authorised it to present a scheme for general and complete disarmament. The Soviet delegation is authorised by its Government to propose the complete abolition of all land, marine, and air forces. The Soviet Government suggests the following measures for the realisation of this proposal :—

- a.* The dissolution of all land, sea and air forces, and the non-admittance of their existence in any concealed form whatsoever.
- b.* The destruction of all weapons, military supplies, means of chemical warfare, and all other forms of armament and means of destruction in the possession of troops, or military or general stores.
- c.* The scrapping of all warships and military air vessels.
- d.* The discontinuance of the calling up of citizens for military training, either in armies or public bodies.
- e.* Legislation for the abolition of military service, either compulsory, voluntary, or recruited.
- f.* Legislation prohibiting the calling up of trained reserves.
- g.* The destruction of fortresses and naval and air bases.
- h.* The scrapping of military plants, factories, and war industry plants in general industrial works.
- i.* The discontinuance of assigning funds for military purposes both in State budgets and those of public bodies.
- j.* The abolition of military, naval, and air Ministries, the

dissolution of general staffs and all kinds of military administrations, departments and institutions.

- k. Legislative prohibition of military propaganda, military training of the population, and military education both by State and public bodies.
- l. Legislative prohibition of the patenting of all kinds of armaments and means of destruction, with a view to the removal of the incentive to the invention of same.
- m. Legislation making the infringement of any of the above stipulations a grave crime against the State.
- n. The withdrawal of corresponding alteration of all legislative Acts, both of national and international scope, infringing the above stipulations.

The Soviet delegation is empowered to propose the fulfilment of the above programme of complete disarmament as soon as the respective Convention comes into force in order that all necessary measures for the destruction of military stores may be completed in a year's time. The Soviet Government considers that the above scheme for the execution of complete disarmament is the simplest and the most conducive to peace.

In the case of the capitalist States rejecting the immediate abolition of standing armies, the Soviet, in its desire to facilitate the achievement of practical agreement on complete disarmament, is prepared to make a proposal for complete disarmament to be carried out simultaneously by all the contracting States by gradual stages during a period of four years, the first stage to be accomplished in the course of the coming year.

Under this proposal, the national funds freed from war budgets are to be employed by each State at its own discretion, but exclusively for productive and cultural purposes. While insisting upon the views just stated, the delegation is nevertheless ready to participate in any and every discussion on the questions of the limitation of armaments, whenever practical measures really leading to disarmament are proposed. The delegation declares that the Soviet Government fully subscribes to the Convention on the prohibition of the application to military purposes of chemical and bacteriological substances and processes, and expresses its readiness to sign the Convention immediately. While insisting on an early date being fixed for the ratification by

all States, it considers that in order to ensure the practicability of the Convention, it is necessary to raise the question of the establishment of control by the workers in those chemical industries capable of being rapidly converted to war purposes in States which have a highly-developed chemical industry.

We have laid before you our programme for disarmament. At first sight its radical and exhaustive nature may make it seem to you complex, little possible of realisation, indeed utopian, but such an impression is only due to the freshness of the theme. It must be definitely stated that the question of general disarmament has so far never been seriously dealt with. Up to the present it has been forbidden ground. The realisation of our programme may not, of course, correspond with certain political interests, above all, those of the Great Powers, or with the interests of the heavy industries, and the numerous groups of speculators. We know that very well, but the problem of complete disarmament itself presents no difficulties and can be solved rapidly and completely. This programme at any rate is far more simple and demands far less time for detailed study than do those schemes which have up to the present been the basis of the work of the Preparatory Commission.

I must confess that I have been studying these schemes and have been appalled by their complexity, by the confusion of questions which have been brought forward side by side with the question of disarmament, and indeed the Commission has already devoted several sessions to the discussion of the mere enumeration and headings of the clauses which might form the basis for an international convention on partial disarmament. Unanimity has been reached only on the most insignificant questions. The vast majority of questions or more correctly their mere headings have given rise to a difference of views which no Commission has yet succeeded in reconciling, nor has greater success attended the private negotiations between Governments ; but it is only when these disagreements have been removed (if that ever happens), that the Commission will be faced with the beginning of its fundamental difficulties. The Commission will have to obtain unanimity in order to determine the degree of security of each separate country, to define the extent and importance of each country's international obligation, geographical and other peculiarities ; and

the Commission will have to be in a position to lay down the maximum number of armed men, armaments, fleets, aeroplanes, that each country may possess, and so on.

The enumeration of the above points is surely sufficient to show the absolute hopelessness, if indeed not utopia, of such a treatment of the question of disarmament. To treat the question as the Commission has been treating it, affords no hope whatever of a solution of the problem in the present international position. Recent events, the treaties concluded a short time ago, lead not to the unity but to the further division of the European and non-European States into political groups, and to the intensification of their mutual antagonisms, but this is not all. Attempts have been made to suspend the work of the Preparatory Commission pending the solution of a whole series of political questions no less confused and intricate than those of which I have just spoken. Should the present basis of the work of the Preparatory Commission not be altered and if in spite of that, the Commission is not overwhelmed by the load of innumerable discussions with which it is afflicted, then it will be doomed to labour for years, for scores of years, without results, or at any rate without any appreciable results. This is absolutely certain.

At the same time, we are living in an epoch when the danger of war is not merely a theoretical possibility, but a very real menace. We are not the only ones who affirm this. These same fears were expressed a short time ago by many responsible statesmen of capitalist countries. The shadow of the threatening inevitable war is to be seen and felt everywhere. If war is to be averted then it is necessary to act without any further delay. We consider that complete immediate disarmament is the very best guarantee of security for all peoples. This problem must be dealt with immediately and solved in the shortest possible period. States which refuse to face this problem take upon themselves heavy responsibilities. It is for this reason that I beg permission in the name of the Soviet Delegation to read the following resolution :—

Whereas the existence of armaments and their evident tendency to continuous growth by their very nature inevitably lead to armed conflicts between nations, diverting the workers and peasants from peaceful, productive labour and bringing in their train countless disasters, and whereas an armed force is a weapon in the hands of

the Great Powers for the oppression of the peoples of small and colonial countries, and whereas the complete abolition of armaments is at present the only real means of guaranteeing security and affording a guarantee against the outbreak of war, this fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament resolves:—

- 1. To proceed immediately to the working out in detail of a draft convention for complete general disarmament on the principles proposed by the Soviet Union Delegation, and*
- 2. Proposes the convocation not later than March, 1928, of a Disarmament Conference for the discussion and confirmation of the proposals provided in Clause 1.*

Since no serious points can be urged against the essence of our programme, we foresee that certain groups of people will endeavour to describe our programme and resolution as mere propaganda. This time we are prepared to accept the accusation and we declare that this is indeed propaganda for peace. We are conducting such propaganda and shall continue to conduct it. If the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament is not the place for conducting this propaganda, then we can only conclude that we are here under a misapprehension. The Soviet Government is pursuing and always has pursued a policy of peace with all possible energy, not only in words but by deeds.

Only a few days ago when it seemed that the war clouds had become particularly heavy on the horizon of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Government did everything in its power to prevent the catastrophe. It used every argument it possibly could to influence the Lithuanian Government and to convince the latter of the necessity of making a declaration that the state of war between Lithuania and Poland is being terminated. The Soviet Government had also taken the initiative of persuading two other neighbours of Lithuania of the necessity to give similar advice, on their part, to Lithuania. Similar steps for the maintenance of peace were taken by the Soviet Government in Warsaw. This peace policy of the Moscow Government gives us the right to declare unequivocally that we shall miss no opportunity of intensifying our propaganda for disarmament and peace.

c. Memorandum of Soviet Delegation. November 30th, 1927.

As an addition to its declaration, and with the object of stating

clearly its general view of the present international situation in relation to possibilities of war, the U.S.S.R. Delegation desires to bring the following facts and ideas to the notice of the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the International Disarmament Conference.

It is needless to go into the question of the responsibility of any particular Government which was concerned in the imperialist war of 1914. Discussions, all more or less barren, are still proceeding on this subject.

To the Soviet Government which is estranged from the ex-belligerents in that war, the general reasons that led to the cataclysm from which mankind has still by no means recovered are perfectly clear.

The world war was the utterly inevitable outcome of competition among the great capitalist States, driven as they were to extend their colonial possessions and the markets for their greatly-increased output ; but the capitalist State endeavours to find as a cause for the war, not the real origins from which it arose, but some mere pretext.

Under pressure of public opinion, which is for the most part horrified by war and the ruin it entails, imperialists—among whom Governments may be included—are seldom willing to admit frankly the true aims of war. Those aims are concerned with economic competition ; and therefore economic competition is the true cause of war.

Governments refrain from presenting the question in all its naked brutality because they fear to shock the public, and because they wish to foment that frenzied nationalism which is indispensable if all the citizens of the belligerent country are to take part “ wholeheartedly ” in the war.

If we consider pacifism during the war, we may fairly say that it played the most lamentable part, and the most disastrous to mankind. Liberal pacifism allowed itself to be carried away by the most superficial and declamatory theories, which masked the true aspect of the war.

Liberal pacifism conscientiously said over and over the fatal words : “ This is the last war ; this is the war to end war. It will end in the extermination of the war-makers. It will lead to abolition of armaments. It will establish international peace.”

The enthusiasm with which pacifists diffused these catchwords helped to numb hundreds of thousands of consciences.

Was this just the most incredible credulity, or was it tacit consent? Or was it even a quite voluntary co-operation with the true authors and devisers of that monstrous destructive cataclysm of war which was let loose upon mankind?

However we may judge the war-makers, there are two things we must all recognise—facts and figures. Facts we must recognise, fatal as they were to the masses; figures we must recognise, making as they do a total of blood and tears. These facts and these figures are beyond all circumvention.

The U.S.S.R. Delegation thinks that this may be a good opportunity to cite figures impartially compiled to illustrate the ruin and disaster caused by the late imperialist war. These figures should be constantly before the eyes of our generation. Here they are:—

CASUALTIES

Country	Population (In millions)	Killed	Wounded (In thousands)	Prisoners
Germany . . .	65	1,887	4,248	773
Austria-Hungary . . .	51	1,200	3,200	443
Turkey . . .	23	437	408	104
Bulgaria . . .	5	101	1,159	11
France . . .	40	1,350	4,200	454
French Colonies . . .	55	67	—	—
Great Britain . . .	45	744	1,693	65
Dominions and Colonies . . .	376	202	420	
Italy . . .	36	507	950	1,359
Belgium . . .	7.5	267	140	10
Rumania . . .	7.2	339	—	116
Serbia . . .	3.	707	350	100
Greece . . .	4.6	15	40	48
United States of America . . .	91	107	246	5
Russia . . .	166	2,753	4,950	2,500

In France the total number of men at least 10 per cent disabled is 1,900,000.

When we consider that over a million and a half of men are left disabled for life, we shall see that out of 2,636,000 men between the ages of 20 and 40, French agriculture has lost 710,000 by disablement ; industry has lost 387,000 out of 2,226,000 ; trade and transport have lost 200,000 out of 1,230,000.

In addition to direct war casualties, we have also to consider losses through the fall in the birth-rate and the rise in the death-rate among the civil population. Here are the essential figures for the chief towns :—

Towns		1913		1918	
		Birth-rate	Death-rate	Birth-rate	Death-rate
London	. .	24.6	14.3	16.0	19.2
Paris	. .	17.2	15.7	10.5	17.3
Berlin	. .	19.4	13.5	9.3	20.7
Moscow	. .	33.2	23.1	14.8	24.3

The loss of man-power due to the fall in the birth-rate is 500,000 for Great Britain ; 633,000 for France ; 2,600,000 for Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The following table shows the material losses :—

Country	National wealth in millions of dollars	National income in millions of dollars	Cost of the War in millions of dollars
United States	. 200	33	23,159
England . .	. 70.5	11	33,481
France . .	. 58.5	6	31,324
Russia . .	. 60	6.5	23,522
Italy . .	. 22.8	4.5	15,636
Belgium . .	. 15	1.3	1,387
Japan . .	. 11.7	1.7	40,000
Germany . .	. 80.5	10.5	46,323
Austria-Hungary	. 40	3.6	24,858
Turkey . .	. 4	0.5	1,802
Bulgaria . .	. 4	0.5	0,732
British Dominions	. —	—	4,198

In addition to this direct war expenditure we must count indirect material damage.

Losses to private owners in Europe, 29,960 million dollars. Losses to tonnage, 15,398,000 tons, or one-third of the pre-war tonnage, representing a money value of 6,800,000,000 dollars.

The losses due to diminished output amount to 45,000,000,000 dollars, and the expenditure on relief and subsidies to 1,000,000,000 dollars.

The economic loss to neutral Powers of 1,750 million dollars, to which must be added the consequences of the destruction of an enormous working power, amounting to 67 milliard dollars, which represents future losses to production.

The total debts of European countries rose from 191,835 million gold marks in 1914 to 1,078,800 million gold marks in 1919.

Is it possible at this stage for anybody still to say "Notwithstanding the immense burden of the losses caused by the war, we can at least console ourselves with the certainty that there is no further danger of future war, that the imperialist war was the last in the history of mankind, and that we have now entered upon an era of peace"?

There is no need to point out that the present situation as expounded by certain far-seeing sociologists, economists and publicists, gives the lie direct to this assertion; nor need we refer to the disturbed state of the press and the public. One single fact is enough—the frenzied piling-up of armaments.

When we look at this fact, which proves at the very least the extreme apprehension felt by every Government for the future of its country (even if it is not the intention of some of them to take active steps to bring about a war in order to share out the earth again in a manner that suits them better), we are strongly reminded by the method which the League of Nations has so far followed in the matter of disarmament, of war-time pacifism, with its efforts to divert the public conscience from the terrible and inexorable reality by empty promises and chimerical hopes.

We may here give a few illustrations of the contemporary growth of armaments.

In 1913, at the zenith of pre-war militarism, the Great Powers had 5,759,000 men under arms. In 1925 5,232,000 men were under arms, exclusive of the armies of new States, such as Iraq, Syria, Arabia proper, Northern Morocco, etc., and exclusive of

1,000,000 soldiers in arms under the orders of the Tutchuns of various Chinese provinces, who did not recognise the Pekin Government.

If we remember that the figure of 5,759,000 men included 1,129,000 soldiers belonging to the countries which were defeated in the imperialist war (Germany, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria)—countries which have now 198,000 men under arms or 931,000 fewer than before the war—and if we also remember that instead of the 1,350,000 soldiers of the old Tsarist Russia we have now 562,000 men of the Soviet Union then we shall see that the victorious and neutral countries, having crushed German imperialism, have been induced by the pressure of fresh and constantly-growing competition to increase their armies by 1,183,000 men.

A comparison of the military budgets of the principal countries for the same period reveals the same state of affairs.

In 1912 the military budgets of the principal countries, including Russia, amounted to 4,744 million roubles. The expenditure of these same States in 1924-25 totals 5,300 million roubles, that is to say, an increase of 556 millions.

Taking into consideration the decrease in the military budgets of Germany and the Soviet Union, it will be seen that the expenditure of other countries has increased by 1,442 millions. These two facts suffice to prove the utter inconsistency of military expenditure in bourgeois countries after the defeat of Germany.

Let us consider the naval expenditure alone. In 1913 the naval budget of the five principal maritime Powers was £100,500,000. In 1925 it amounted to £230,600,000. The difference is striking. Meanwhile the naval budget of the U.S.S.R. has decreased from the £26,000,000 budget of Tsarist Russia in 1913 to £3,400,000.

The naval construction programmes of the principal bourgeois countries are quite in keeping with these figures. In spite of the 1922 Washington Convention for the limitation of naval armaments, we see the same, if not greater, frenzy of construction, the only difference being that instead of the forbidden capital ships there is a feverish construction of smaller craft (cruisers, torpedo-boats, submarines, etc., and seaplane flotillas).

The following information throws some light on the magnitude of armaments: This year the five most important naval Powers, (Great Britain, the United States, France, Japan, and Italy) are

constructing 87 different vessels ; they have also decided to construct 181 others, that is to say, 268 vessels in all.

As for us, we have not up to the present constructed, nor are we engaged in constructing, any new war vessel ; we have merely repaired existing vessels.

Air fleet figures tell the same tale. At the present time the following are the figures for the military air forces in the leading countries : France, 6,114 aeroplanes ; Great Britain, 3,460 ; Italy, 1,700 ; United States, 3,800 ; Poland, 498 ; Rumania, 257.

It is not superfluous to add a few details regarding the qualitative improvement of the means now being devised by the military powers for a new massacre of humanity which bids fair to eclipse completely the horrors of the last war. Let us quote a few very characteristic figures.

In France the number of machine-guns to one division of infantry in war-time was 24 at the beginning of the war. At present it is 483. In the United States the number of machine guns to one division of infantry in war-time was 24. At present it is 947. The artillery of the United States—like that of France—has increased in the same proportions simultaneously with an increased length of range.

It will be sufficient to quote the case of the American 8-inch gun, the range of which has increased from 11.5 km. to 17 km. ; or—an even more striking example—the successes of the French artillery whose 240 mm. gun had before the war a range of 16.5 km. whereas it now has a range of 53 km. Or again, the 340 mm. gun, which before the war had a range of 22 km. now 150 km.

The definite antipathy shown—clearly and forcibly shown—by public opinion towards the various forms of chemical and bacteriological warfare is compelling certain Governments to say that these forms of warfare must be renounced or limited. As a matter of fact, unceasing labour in the chemical laboratories on which the principal Powers are spending enormous sums of money has undoubtedly since the war produced “ positive results.”

As an example we may quote General Frey's statement that an aero-chemical bomb weighing 450 kilos and charged with Lewisite can render ten districts of New York uninhabitable ; 100 tons of Lewisite launched from 50 aeroplanes could render the whole of New York uninhabitable for at least a week.

Scorning the hypocrisy of European militarists, the Americans quite frankly defend the use of chemical weapons in the next war. In March, 1927, for instance, an American writer expressed the following views: "The Senate has wisely reserved our right to use poisons in warfare. I hope that the Senate will maintain this policy and give its support to every new method of warfare. I also hope that the Senate will reserve its right to utilise infectious bacteria in warfare." *A la guerre comme à la guerre* "for war is not a tiresome game played according to rules. . . ."

The American *Infantry Journal* writes: "There is no doubt the chemical methods of warfare will be much more frequently employed in the next war than in the last. The advantages of these arms are so great, so enormous that any leader who does not utilise them in future battles will have to bear the consequences. . . ."

"On every side offensive and defensive chemical warfare is being feverishly prepared and perfected. To refuse to employ gases in warfare would cause appreciable prejudice to our (*i.e.*, the American) combative power and would therefore be an act of incredible folly."

"Chemical warfare makes it possible for highly-developed peoples to employ an excellent arm, makes it possible for them to become a dominating world power."—(*Le Gaulois*, April, 1927).

We could give numerous examples of the increasing power of engines of destruction in air and naval warfare. We will, however, refrain from quoting any further instances, because no one can dare to deny the increase of armaments, both in quality and quantity.

We repeat that the enormous increase in armaments should in itself suffice to prove that the world is in imminent danger of becoming once again the victim of imperialist warfare.

Let us now consider the sensitive points of international politics which may lead to armed conflict. Let us merely consider Europe. The points are innumerable. Each is acutely sensitive and the cause of nearly all of them lies in the extremely irrational bases of the Treaty of Versailles.

Even the least important questions are dominated by a mistrust between the victors and the vanquished in the last imperialist war.

On the admission of such a statesman as Lord Robert Cecil, the

results of the last Disarmament Conference between the great naval Powers are fraught with danger.

This proves that the various countries either cannot or will not solve these most serious problems by negotiation ; it also proves that negotiations of this kind often result in strained relations between the participating countries. Under such circumstances the fear that a gigantic war may break out is amply justified. There is no doubt that the next war will be the cause of far, far greater disasters than any which suffering humanity has ever known.

The conclusion to be drawn from these facts is expressed in the declaration which the U.S.S.R. delegation submits for discussion to the Fourth Session of the Preparatory International Conference for Disarmament.

d. Report by M. Litvinov to Fifteenth Congress of Russian Communist Party, on Work of Soviet Delegation at League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

The Soviet Government, in its correspondence with the League of Nations concerning the invitation of the latter to attend the Disarmament Conference, emphasised in due measure the distrust evoked by the League of Nations in this regard. The Soviet Government, notwithstanding this distrust, however, set forth its reasons for accepting the invitation to the Preparatory Commission of the Disarmament Conference. You, comrades, are fully aware of these reasons and so I will not dwell on them here. And, comrades, I must inform you that what we have seen and heard in Geneva has not in the slightest measure shaken our distrust.

In our declaration to the Preparatory Commission, we enumerated facts and figures illustrating the approach of the League of Nations to the problem of the limitation of armaments, and its tempo. The participation of the Soviet Government in the so-called Preparatory Commission on Disarmament commenced only with the fourth session. Previous to our participation, the representatives of the other Powers had met three times in Geneva for preparatory work, selected a sub-commission, considered various drafts, etc.

The result of these labours is a document bearing the title " Project for an International Convention on Disarmament." This

document is extremely interesting. The most graphic description would not convey so clear a conception of the methods of work of the League of Nations as does an examination of this document. It contains several sections, with about fifty paragraphs, subparagraphs, clauses, notes, etc. ; the first introductory paragraph has already been presented in three parallel variations—French, English and German. This is followed by a series of paragraphs enumerating those arms and military institutions which are subject to limitation. But in vain will you seek in this document for a single figure or a scale of proportions for the limitation of armaments. There are no figures whatsoever in this document. It is a mere listing of paragraphs naming the ammunitions and arms which are subject to limitation, but how this curtailment is to be accomplished, to what extent, and by what standards the limitation is to be measured—all this the commission has not yet discussed. The compilation alone of the headings of these paragraphs has evoked much dissension and disagreement among the bourgeois countries, and there is hardly a single important paragraph in this document which has not been subject to several proposals and re-drafting, either by the French, English, Japanese, German, etc. In view of the fact that the Preparatory Commission failed to eliminate the manifest dissensions which arose, it was suggested that the commission resort to private, diplomatic conversations between the interested States and that only after satisfactory settlement had been reached in these negotiations should the commission meet again to consider the actual figures which are to take the place of the xx's and yy's scattered throughout this draft, *i.e.*, to commence on the transformation of the existing algebraic formulæ into a concrete draft. These quantities were to have signified the maximum of all arms, personnel, staffs, naval and air ships—and all this, mind you, for each country separately. No general measure for limitation or disarmament is given ; a special standard of armaments is to be set in each particular case for each particular state. This extent of armaments, according to the conjectures of the authors of the draft, are to be fixed in relation to the degree of security of each country to its international obligations, to its geographical situation, and as stated, to its "other peculiarities." It would follow that these conditions : the degree of security and the geographical situation, must in their

turn be subject to discussion as agreement and unity must be achieved in regard to these between the Powers. England and America, England and France, America and Japan, France and Italy, Italy and Jugo-Slavia, Poland and Lithuania, Rumania and Hungary must come to an agreement among themselves as to what degree of security each State may consider itself as enjoying, and after having attained this, they must again come to an agreement as to the number of troops each is to reserve—and this to be accomplished in the absence of any general standard whatsoever. But, comrades, you need not think that should such an agreement be reached, the proposed convention would then be definite and concrete, or would represent a guarantee against those horrors of war which we witnessed ten years ago. No, not in the least. At the end of this project is the following paragraph which I will read you verbatim :—

“ The present convention must not be an obstacle in the way of increasing the land, sea and air armaments beyond the limits of the figures set for any great contracting Power, firstly, in the case of the outbreak of war.” (In the case of war this convention is of no significance whatsoever—each State is then free to increase its armaments to the very maximum.) “ Secondly, should the country be threatened with rebellion ” (they have not overlooked this either), “ and thirdly, should this increase be effected with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations.”

Here we reach a deadlock on the question of so-called potentials, *i.e.*, of conceding to each country, in the case of war, the right to increase its armaments according to its judgment. Thus, highly industrially developed countries, able quickly to mobilise a war industry, are immediately placed in a highly advantageous position over those countries of lesser industrial development, generally speaking, over the small nations.

Further on is another, not less interesting paragraph which reads :—

“ If any contracting Power should consider that any change in circumstances will influence its demands for national security, it may receive permission to extend the limit of its armaments set by the present convention.”

This is followed by a space for the names of the judges who are to decide which countries are to be conceded an extension of armaments despite the convention. This, comrades, is called a " sane, realistic " approach to the question in contradistinction to the " utopian, idealistic " proposals presented by the Soviet Delegation.

It would seem, comrades, that the projected programme of the Preparatory Commission and its methods of work should fully insure an unlimited number of sessions and meetings for many years to come, and that the opponents of disarmament need have no fear of the outcome of the work of the League of Nations and its Preparatory Commission. But even this work of snail's pace tempo of the Preparatory Commission is alarming to some. And so, at the last session of the League of Nations supplementary measures were taken not only to prevent premature disarmament, but even the discussion of the problem of disarmament. For this purpose the so-called Security Committee was conceived and created. This new child of the League of Nations must occupy itself with the consideration of the supplementary guarantees of security for members of the League, in other words, guarantees of the secure digestion of the fruits of conquest of the world war and territorial plunders which were executed outside the Versailles, St. Germain and other treaties. With this aim in view, this committee must also examine the respective paragraphs in the statutes of the League of Nations with a view to strengthening them. Only after this committee has satisfactorily concluded its work, may the draft of the convention I have just mentioned come up for consideration.

This, comrades, was the sum total of work accomplished by the League of Nations when our delegation arrived at Geneva.

The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission, in which we participated, assigned itself a very meagre agenda. It consisted of two points : Fixing the date for the next session, and the creation of the Security Committee.

If we exclude the second point, the problem of creating a committee whose connection with the Preparatory Commission for disarmament was disputed not only by us, but by other delegations as well, we find representatives from 26 countries all over the world convened in Geneva for the single purpose of fixing a date

for the next meeting. It is, therefore, not to be wondered at that when the Soviet Delegation dealt directly and in substance with the question of disarmament in the Preparatory Commission, its declaration was received as a sacrilege, as an attack at the very foundations of the Commission of the League of Nations, as a breach of all proprieties.

Well, comrades, we have our own conception of political proprieties. We did not hesitate to present the question of disarmament in the light we saw fit. We introduced our project on disarmament. We not only introduced our project, but we also criticised the previous work of the League of Nations and the Preparatory Commission, and chiefly their methods of work. As against the lengthy, involved, thoroughly unsubstantial draft of the convention, useful only for precipitating endless disputes, dissensions and discussions, bearing no promise, at best, of any significant decrease in the burden of militarism, and offering absolutely no guarantee against new wars—as against this project, we offered our clear, concrete scheme for general and full disarmament, easily executed, if so desired, and resulting in no loss to any of the existing States.

We said that taking into consideration the difficulties in the way of the other members of the Commission towards the immediate acceptance of our project of immediate, complete disarmament, we were prepared to concede that disarmament be effected over a period of four years. We added, that we were ready to consider other proposals along our line, the line of actual disarmament.

The leaders of the Commission, however, spared no effort, on various pretences, to side-track our proposals and to pass on to the next point, without taking any decision on our proposal. They found this essential not only because our proposal would have put an end to their established plan for the Commission, which was to restrict itself to fixing the date for the next session, but chiefly because they were unable to advance any arguments against our proposal : this was proved irrefutably by the insignificant discussion which followed the presentation of our programme.

What were their objections to our programme ? It was, you see, too simple. Yes, it is simple, requiring a similarly simple answer, and not permitting those lengthy arguments and discussions and those methods of delaying decisions to which the

League of Nations is so accustomed ; from this point of view the simplicity of our programme does indeed, present, for some, a certain inconvenience.

Furthermore, it was stated that our programme is too good not to have been conceived by anyone else previously, and if our predecessors had not done so before, we had no business to do so now. We were also told that the Commission had already drafted a convention on which much labour had been expended, and it being impossible that this labour be wasted it was therefore necessary to continue working on the old draft and not commence on a new one. The members of the Commission frankly admitted that the discussion on the project had led the Commission into a deep forest, with no path in sight, but they had comforted themselves by remembering that some wise philosopher had once said : " If you have lost yourselves in the woods, continue walking straight ahead, without turning either to the right or to left, and you will eventually find yourself outside the forest." The Preparatory Commission, although it had lost its way, must continue its dark path paying no heed to any directions towards new and simple exits. It was also pointed out that some countries might, in spite of a convention regarding full disarmament, continue to arm themselves—an objection which may be proffered against any international convention. It seems to me, on the contrary, that it would be far simpler to control States who had once undertaken not to permit the existence of any armies, naval or air fleets, and to detect any attempt on their part, despite their undertaking, to organise new armies and new fleets—this would be far easier than if they had undertaken merely to limit their armaments, and yet had continued secretly to increase them. Such arguments cannot be taken seriously.

Paul Boncour, the Socialist, who took upon himself the ungrateful task, in this case, of speaking in the name of the whole throng of capitalist States opposed to us, endeavoured to raise the discussion to a higher plane. He attempted to prove that the fulfilment of our scheme for full disarmament would deal a heavy blow to the small nations, which, should disarmament take place, would find themselves in an unequal position . . . in comparison to the economically stronger States. As if it is not precisely this inequality which exists at the present time, and as if the unequal

division of armaments and military industries provided by any scheme for a mere limitation of armaments would in the slightest measure diminish this inequality! As if the small nations would be less insecure after their powerful neighbours had disarmed, than they are now when, in addition to the economic, financial, territorial and other superiority possessed by the great Powers, the latter also enjoy the immense advantage of greater armaments.

Some bourgeois newspapers, even those of liberal tendencies, rejected our programme with a philosophical disquisition on the bellicose nature of man, his pugnacity and the inevitability of his carrying on a fight in one form or another, and, they pointed out that, as a consequence of disarmament, man would have to resort to fisticuff fights. And this, they think, is a departure from civilisation. The accompaniments of civilisation are gunpowder, lead, tanks, dum-dum bullets, submarines, mines, destruction of cities, poisonous gases and other paraphernalia of contemporary warfare—without these civilisation is impossible. Our proposals provoked quite a good bit of literary activity abroad. Of course, each and every newspaper and journal wrote about them. I followed the Press very closely, and I can testify that no arguments outside of those mentioned above were to be found.

The predicament in which the representatives of capitalist countries found themselves was really tragic. They could not very well say outright that they did not desire full disarmament. Indeed, the whole idea of a disarmament conference and its Preparatory Commission was conceived because capitalist Governments, even the most refractory, must pay some heed to public opinion which is demanding guarantees against future wars, demanding the lifting of the burden of militarism. Therefore, they could not state frankly that they did not desire full disarmament, but neither could they disclose the real reasons for their reluctance, reasons of which we are very well aware, and neither could they put forth any substantial arguments against our programme, or prove that it would be ineffectual, were there actually a desire and will for disarmament. It is for this reason that attempts were made first to completely side-track the discussion and then to crush it.

One of the members of the Commission, the representative from Greece, M. Politis, attempted to propose that we pass on to

the next point on the agenda without taking any decision on the first, graciously permitting our delegation to present our proposal again at the next session of the Preparatory Commission. I was compelled to remind M. Politis that even bourgeois custom does not permit of such unceremonial procedure with resolutions and proposals presented by a member of the meeting, and that I had the right to demand—it being their affair of course to discuss our proposal or not—that they either accept our proposal or reject it, and that if they, for any reason were not in a position to take a decision on it now, without having perhaps the authorisation of their Governments—they might postpone it until the next session, but this must be done only by a decision of the Commission. Whereupon the chairman of the Commission stated that our proposals had already been entered into the files of the Commission and would automatically come up for discussion at the next session.

There is no doubt but that at the next session of the Commission efforts will be made to repeat the tactics of side-tracking our proposals, so as not to enter into too serious a discussion, and it will be the duty of our delegation to fight for a serious and fuller discussion of our programme, for the acceptance of this programme, or else that a proper explanation be given for its rejection, and above all to fight against the slow methods of work of the Preparatory Commission.

We also came into conflict with the other members of the Commission on the question of fixing the date for the next session. The Soviet delegation proposed the very earliest date possible. We pointed out that as far as we were concerned we were ready to continue work without any interval, and were ready to work, even during the holidays, but taking into consideration the contemplated recess for the meeting of the Council of the League of Nations, and also the certain unwillingness of the other members of the Commission to work during the holidays, the Soviet delegation proposed that the fifth session be called for January 10th, the earliest date after the holidays. Well, the Commission of course has its own method of work. Still adhering to its project of the convention, for the further consideration of which it is necessary to reach an agreement on the above-mentioned disputed questions, and to its obvious desire to link up the work of the

Preparatory Commission with that of the Security Committee, the Commission insisted on fixing a date as remote as possible for the next session.

We then presented a resolution expressing that once and for all the full independence of the Preparatory Commission from the Security Committee be put on record.

The German Delegation in general supported our resolution, proposing a few insignificant amendments. It also insisted on the earliest possible date for the next session, but was soon shaken, and surrendering its position, agreed on a compromise proposal that the Preparatory Commission meet on March 15th.

I must remark here that in this, as well as in other instances, the German Delegation to a certain extent agreed with us ; for reasons different from ours the German Delegation was also interested in an early settlement of the question of armaments. Disarmed by the Versailles Treaty, Germany bases its demands for the disarmament of the other countries on one of the paragraphs in the statutes of the League of Nations. In case of the non-execution of this paragraph, Germany may have the right to demand armaments for itself.

Together with us, the German Delegation endeavoured to hasten the work of the Preparatory Commission and to separate it from the Security Committee, but bound by the decisions of the League of Nations of which it is a member, it could not, of course, insist that its demands be considered with the same persistency as did the Soviet Delegation.

As a result, it may be said, that on all questions considered by the Commission, a clear sharp line was drawn between us and the other delegates. It was a case of *we* and *they*. And this is as it should be. We have no complaints to make on this score. And you, comrades, will understand that under such circumstances we were not always in a position to speak whenever we saw fit, and say what we desired.

Just a word about the Security Committee. We refused to enter this Committee as a member. We announced that we considered the creation of this Committee as an attempt to postpone the work of disarmament, and that we could not take upon ourselves the responsibility for such tactics. Apart from this, inasmuch as we were not members of the League of Nations, and did

not recognise its statutes, we naturally could not occupy ourselves with discussions, explanations and clarification of separate paragraphs of the statutes and general decisions previously accepted by the Council of the League of Nations, or by the League of Nations itself. In view of the fact, however, that a technical connection had been established, against our will, between the Preparatory Commission and Security Committee, we agreed to enter the Committee in the capacity of observer, *i.e.*, for the sake of information. I must add here, that the rights of these so-called observers in the League of Nations have not yet been defined, and are determined in each separate case.

I, as observer, attended the first session of the Security Committee, and should I have desired to speak on any question raised I would most probably have met with no difficulties. But I rejected this opportunity, especially in view of the fact that the questions under consideration in no way concerned us.

The Committee occupied itself with evolving a programme of work, and even here two tendencies immediately manifested themselves. On the one hand, efforts were made to revive the so-called Geneva Protocol regarding obligatory arbitration and mutual guarantees, that protocol which was in principle, but not in form, accepted by the MacDonald Government, and then rejected by the present Conservative Government in Great Britain. This attempt, of course, did not escape the British delegate who candidly stated that this protocol should be considered as buried once and for all, and that if the Committee wished to discuss this protocol that, of course, was its own affair, but he must warn the Committee that none of those present would ever survive the end of the discussion.

The first exchange of opinions in the Security Committee affords a clear conception of the future struggles that will take place within it, and at the same time definitely confirms our contention that the attempt to set up an interdependence between the Preparatory Commission and the Security Committee is the best means of dooming the work of the Preparatory Commission to complete unfruitfulness, or at best, to protraction until infinity.

The general balance of our participation in the work at Geneva consists of the fact that for the first time the problem of disarmament has been placed before the world in a serious and concrete

form. Let our opponents point, as did Benes, to the absence of novelty in our proposals. It is impossible, nevertheless, to deny the fact that for the first time in the history of humanity has a proposal been presented for full disarmament, and consequently the complete abolition of war, not in the form of resolutions or pious wishes of some pacifist society, but in the form of a carefully worked out and concrete programme in the name of a great Power occupying a sixth part of the world. It is impossible to disregard such a fact, and we will not permit it to be disregarded. Although we were isolated in Geneva, it is an undoubted fact, testified by the numerous telegrams, letters and resolutions received in Geneva and still arriving here, that we have a vast number of sympathisers and adherents all over the world.

Many resolutions have been passed, not only by pacifist societies but even by certain parties belonging to the Second International, forced to admit the greatness of our programme and to adhere to it, if only in words.

That the bourgeoisie is greatly disturbed by our proposals is evidenced by the measures it is adopting in its endeavour to disparage them. It is beginning to have recourse to the most "heroic" measures—it is again commencing a campaign similar to the so-called "Zinoviev letter." A few days ago, an unprincipled telegraph agency in America broadcast all over the world a forged article, alleged to have been written by Comrade Stalin in which he boasts of our accomplishments in aerial armaments, and even of our supremacy over England. The article is, of course, a fabrication—neither Comrade Stalin nor any other comrade has ever written anything of the kind. In spite of its obscure and unknown origin, serious bourgeois newspapers accepted this article, published it and commented upon it. These are the means to which the bourgeoisie have resorted in order to neutralise and destroy the enormous impression which the Soviet Government's proposal evoked throughout the world. But they will not succeed.

We are well aware of the fact that there are some who are not in favour of general disarmament but of the simple disarmament of the only Soviet State in the world, so as to conquer it bare-handed. But this will not go. We announced and still announce that we are ready to execute our programme to the full, providing other countries agree to do likewise. If the capitalist governments doubt

our sincerity, they have a simple means of proving it. This means is their adherence to our programme. Let them decide on this. If they do not do this, if they cannot do this, if they do not wish to do this, then, before the whole world, against their will, they testify to the fact that a proposal for full disarmament and abolition of war can emanate only from the Soviet Government ; that it can be accepted and executed only when the Soviet system has been adopted by all the countries of the world, when their policies and principles will, of course, be at one with those by which the U.S.S.R. is guided.

*e. Memorandum explaining the Draft Convention for General, Complete and Immediate Disarmament.*¹

1. The Draft Convention on General, Complete and Immediate Disarmament is based on the destruction of the principal elements which form the military power of a country, that is to say, the organised armed forces on land, on sea and in the air, their material, and the industries connected with the production of armaments.

The Draft Convention further provides that, at the close of a year after its coming into force, the land, naval, and air forces of all countries shall be reduced to an establishment which would be useless for warfare, thus limiting the possibility of armed conflict, even before disarmament has been completed.

2. The Draft Convention merely sets forth the general principles of disarmament applicable to the armed forces of all countries, without going into the details of each, on the supposition that, when the essential principles have been adopted, all these details will be dealt with in a subsequent discussion of the whole question of disarmament.

Thus in any case there is no need to work out the technical details, this being a matter for a special body to be set up after the Convention has come into force.

3. Chapter I of the Draft Convention embodies the principles of disarmament so far as they relate to effectives.

For the first year, it provides for the discharge of half the total

¹ The detailed draft convention for complete, immediate and general disarmament was made thoroughly clear at the time. The official text is here given of the explanatory note to this convention, for economy of space.

establishment of officers, officials, and other ranks, the closing down of military schools, Ministries of War, Marine and Military Aviation, military staffs, commands, institutions and establishments, and, at the same time, the destruction of mobilisation plans for the armed forces and rolls of trained reserves.

By these means, armies and fleets will be reduced to a condition in which they cannot easily be used for attacks by one country on another. What is left of them will be principally occupied in effecting disarmament as regards material, the destruction of which requires a certain amount of personnel for work of all kinds.

In this connection, questions concerning the organisation of armed forces for carrying out the first stage of disarmament are looked upon as domestic questions for each country.

As regards armies organised on the territorial system, with small cadres periodically supplemented by variable effectives, disarmament will be carried out on the same principle, namely, that at the end of the first year fifty per cent of the cadres and fifty per cent of the trained reserves included in the variable effectives will be discharged.

For the rest, Chapter I of the Draft Convention develops and explains in detail the proposals put forward by the U.S.S.R. delegation at the fourth session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference.

4. Chapter II contains the most important provisions regarding the destruction of material :

- (a) This chapter again contemplates the principal aspect of disarmament during the first stage—the destruction of all reserve stores intended for mobilisation, of which the first to be destroyed should be those that might be employed against the civil population.
- (b) After the first stage of disarmament, the army of each country will retain such arms and munitions as are strictly necessary for the establishment maintained during the succeeding years. Moreover, the proportion of technical war material will be limited by a special convention. The object of this limitation, as of all the measures contemplated in Chapter I, is to prevent the armaments maintained during those years from being used for purposes of war.

- (c) By the destruction of material is meant its reduction to a condition in which it cannot possibly be used for purposes of war.

The technique of the destruction of material will be worked out later in all its details, on the principle that the utmost possible use should be made of material which has value for purposes of other than military production, and for the increased welfare of peoples.

- (d) Article 15 of the Draft Convention provides that sporting guns of non-military pattern and revolvers for sporting purposes and for self-defence may be retained. In view of the general social situation, these measures are particularly necessary in countries where communications are undeveloped.

- (e) As regards naval armaments, the Draft Convention provides in the first place for the destruction of capital ships, cruisers, aircraft-carriers, etc., all of which are mostly used in the pursuit of imperialistic aims. The classes of warship enumerated above are removed from the effective battle fleet by the immediate discharge of the entire ship's company, which will limit the possibility of using them; thereafter, all the ship's artillery equipment will be put out of action and then removed and destroyed (the first to be removed will be the indispensable parts of the guns, gun-laying apparatus, fire-control apparatus, mine-laying and torpedo-firing apparatus, etc.). When the material is rendered useless, the munitions, mines and torpedoes will at the same time be destroyed. It will thus become impossible to use these warships for war purposes without lengthy preparation.

The Draft Convention allows of the use of disarmed warships as merchant vessels when necessary alterations have been made.

By dismantling warships is meant their disarmament by the removal of their armour plating, the destruction of special apparatus such as turrets, gun platforms, control positions (*roofs de guerre*), aircraft platforms, war signalling apparatus, and any other special devices for war purposes.

- (f) The disarmament of military air forces involves in the first place the destruction of heavy aircraft as engines of war. Taking into consideration the social importance of aircraft as a means of communication, the Draft Convention does not make the destruction of the material essential to disarmament, since some of the aircraft can be converted to social and economic uses ; but as there is no great difficulty in fitting aircraft for bomb-dropping, and as this can be done very quickly, the number of aircraft in the civil fleet must admittedly be proportionate to the country's genuine needs, and this is provided for in Article 28 of the Draft Convention.
- (g) Fortifications and bases must be destroyed, since they can be used as places of arms for purposes of attack.
- (h) The question of the destruction of military industries is particularly complicated because a highly-developed industry conceals great potential forces for the production of armaments. Here, again, however, there are a number of essential elements by the destruction of which the manufacture of armaments can be made very difficult. These include drawings, measuring instruments, models, frames, machines, tools, and appliances specially designed for the manufacture of armaments. Further, the actual demilitarisation of military factories, their use for the manufacture of non-military products, the employment in other factories of plant that is not specifically military, and the destruction of everything necessary for mobilisation preparations, will make it a very complicated matter to use these factories for war purposes.

5. Chapter III deals with the organisation of protection and, in this connection, in order to prevent any possibility of using the various forces for military purposes, or as a foundation for disguised military forces, the establishment of the police forces or militia, gendarmerie and other kinds of guards must be kept strictly within its present limits throughout the period of four years provided for the completion of general disarmament. Subsequently, the establishment of the Customs and fiscal guards and local police will be fixed by a special Convention.

Police forces of every kind must be armed with modern weapons, of the simplest pattern, because, if a more complicated armament were retained, it might be easier for these formations to be used as armed forces in attacks by stronger upon weaker countries.

Naval policing is regarded not as a matter to be dealt with separately by each country, but as providing for the needs of a whole group of countries, so that it cannot possibly be turned to imperialistic ends. Maritime police will only be provided with the armament strictly necessary for the performance of their duties.

6. Although complete and general disarmament is wholly conditional upon the goodwill of all countries, it seems necessary to make definite arrangements for its successive stages and for the maintenance of proportions, and to establish a special body to work out the technical details of disarmament and settle any disputes that may arise.

With this object, Chapter IV of the Draft Convention lays down the principles of the control which is based upon extensive reciprocity, full publicity, and participation in the work by those classes of the population which are most interested in the speedy completion of disarmament.

As there is at present in the world no authority whose decisions must be obeyed by all countries, this status might be conferred upon a Permanent International Commission of Control—which, of course, presupposes the goodwill and the consent of all countries. The composition of this Commission would be a guarantee of impartiality in its decisions and, as there would be a Committee of Experts attached to it, technical questions could be quickly settled.

7. Chapter V contains suggestions for the conclusion of supplementary conventions on various questions connected with disarmament, and indicates the procedure for ratifying conventions and settling any questions arising out of violations.

It is this group of questions that are the most complicated ; but the Draft Convention does not allow of any military pressure being brought to bear on anybody, because such measures are apt to give rise to serious international conflicts, and it is hoped that most countries are so genuinely anxious to effect complete and general disarmament that other means will always be found

to compel any country seeking to violate the obligations it has assumed to discharge them faithfully.

f. Speech by M. Litvinov on Report of Committee of Arbitration and Security. March 16th, 1928.

The Soviet Delegation has already expressed its opinion at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Commission as regards the bearing of the questions considered by the Security Committee upon the problem of disarmament. The findings of the Security Committee are before the Preparatory Commission in which the Soviet Delegation is taking an active part.

I should like to say a few words lest our silence should be construed as signifying agreement with the decisions and report of the Security Committee. Without entering into a detailed discussion of the Security Committee's proposals, I will confine myself to a very short summary of our previous statements on this subject.

We still believe that the problem of peace cannot be solved, nor its realisation brought any nearer, by solving the questions now before the Security Committee. We believe that the path which the Security Committee is following cannot result in general security, but would merely increase the security of individual countries or groups of countries, while involving a menace to the independent existence and territorial inviolability of other countries or groups of countries. Moreover, owing to the lack of exact criteria as to what constitutes an offensive and what a defensive war, the system of regional guarantee pacts based upon mutual assistance, as proposed by the Security Committee, may end in something perilously akin to the pre-war system of alliances and other military and political combinations.

That very system which was one of the causes of the great world war itself may be a menace to peace. Nourishing and supporting as it does the aggressive temper of bellicose and quarrelsome Governments, this system may turn any local war into an Armageddon. In the opinion of the Soviet Delegation the decisions of the Security Committee, without diminishing the likelihood of future wars, are calculated to extend the arena of future wars and aggravate their terrible consequences.

At the last session of the Preparatory Commission for Dis-

armament, the discussion on disarmament was adjourned in the expectation that the findings of the Security Committee would create some degree of security for individual countries and thus establish the preliminary conditions for disarmament. The Soviet Delegation at the time opposed the adjournment. If other delegations now consider the decisions of the Security Committee satisfactory and the questions of security of particular moment to them as more or less settled, we, for our part, while maintaining our former attitude towards the Security Committee, can only express our satisfaction at the removal of an illusory or artificial obstacle to the realisation of the chief work of the Disarmament Commission.

The Soviet Delegation regards complete and speedy disarmament as the most solid guarantee of security for all countries and all peoples, and the most effective means of preventing war. It therefore appeals to the Preparatory Commission to proceed as soon as possible with its main task, the discussion and adoption of resolutions on disarmament, without further delay.

g. Speech by M. Litvinov at Third Sitting of Preparatory Disarmament Commission with regard to Draft Convention for Complete Disarmament submitted by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics. March 19th, 1928.

The Soviet Draft Convention for general, complete and immediate disarmament, sent by the delegation of the U.S.S.R. to the Secretary-General of the League of Nations a month ago, is entirely based upon the main theses presented by the Soviet Delegation and the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in November last.

I have the honour to draw the attention of this Commission to the fact that the Draft Convention provides for land, naval and air forces in all States to be put into a condition, not later than one year from its coming into force, rendering it difficult to employ them for warlike purposes, thus considerably limiting the possibilities of armed conflicts even before the carrying out of complete disarmament.

I consider it unnecessary to dwell in detail on the separate points of our Draft Convention, since the latter was accompanied by a special explanatory note, sent to all members of the Commission.

I venture to remind the Commission that no attempts to give serious consideration to the Soviet proposals were made at its fourth session. During the extremely brief discussion of this question not a single serious argument against the Soviet proposal, nor any practical criticism of it was put forward. The Soviet Delegation is naturally unable to accept as criticism such remarks as have been heard, namely : that the Soviet draft Convention is " too simple," or that, even if complete disarmament were accomplished, the peoples would all the same fight among themselves in disarmed and disorganised masses, with sticks, penknives, fists, etc.

The cautious attitude and the refusal to discuss our proposals at the Fourth Session of the Commission displayed by the other delegations, may partly be explained by the novelty and unexpectedness of the Soviet proposals, although attempts were made to cast doubts even upon the novelty of our proposal. Mr. Benes, I seem to remember, referred to a Norwegian proposal similar to ours supposed to have been made to the League of Nations. Now I took the trouble to verify this statement, but was unable to find any traces whatsoever among the materials of the League of Nations, including those with which the Disarmament Section of the League was so kind as to furnish me at my special request, of any proposals for general and complete disarmament.

At the Third Commission of the League in 1924 the Norwegian Delegation mentioned wishes expressed by the Inter-Parliamentary Committee regarding the reduction of war budgets by one-half in the course of ten years. Even this was qualified by the stipulation that war expenditure incurred by individual States under the Covenant of the League of Nations should not be included in war budgets subject to reduction. There was not a word as to the abolition of the other half of war-budgets, nor anything whatsoever about the reduction of armed forces and materials for war. The Danish Delegation, referring to the same Inter-Parliamentary Committee, expressed a desire for the reduction of land armed forces in all countries in accordance with the resolutions of the Saint Germain Peace Treaty, *i.e.*, giving each State the right to keep an army of 5,000 per million inhabitants, and naval forces in accordance with the Versailles Treaty, *i.e.*, 2,000 or 4,000 metric tons per million inhabitants. According to

these calculations, the U.S.S.R., for example, would be entitled to an army of almost 735,000 which would be an increase of 175,000 to its present standing army, and 200,000 metric tons to its navy, while China would be entitled to a standing army of something like two million. Such have been the most drastic ideas with regard to disarmament so far expressed in the League of Nations. I say "ideas," for none of these have been crystallised in the form of proposals or resolutions, or made the object of serious discussion. Lord Esher's plan, aspiring only to the reduction of land and air armed forces, had also nothing in common with the idea of complete, general disarmament. It may therefore be considered irrefutable that the proposal for complete and general disarmament has been put in a definite form before the League of Nations, and indeed brought into the sphere of international relations, for the first time, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will always be proud to call this initiative its own. If, however, I dwell upon this point it is from no motives of mere sentiment, but because it seems to me that in certain League of Nations circles an erroneous conception exists that the Soviet Delegation is wasting the Preparatory Disarmament Commission's time on proposals already discussed and rejected by the League. Such an erroneous conception, unless corrected, might react unfavourably on the further procedure with regard to our proposal.

The Soviet Delegation, anxious as it was to speed up the consideration of its Draft Convention and thus bring nearer the beginning of real disarmament, nevertheless agreed to the postponement of the consideration of its proposals until the fifth (current) session, bearing in mind their novelty and desirous to give an opportunity for all members of the Commission and their Governments to make themselves ready for their practical consideration. With this aim the Soviet Delegation provided the Secretary-General of the League of Nations with the Draft Convention, accompanied by an explanatory note, a month before the beginning of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, for despatch to the respective Governments, and now considers itself entitled to ask for the practical consideration of its proposals without further delay.

The Soviet Delegation considers it essential once more to

emphasise the fact that nothing but the fulfilment of the Convention for general, simultaneous and complete disarmament, proposed by the U.S.S.R. Government is capable of solving in a satisfactory manner the problem of general security and peace. This would also in itself solve a series of other vexed international problems, such as the freedom of the seas, and so on. At the same time the execution of the Soviet scheme would not come up against the difficulties inevitably connected with partial disarmament. By way of example I would cite the matter of control, for it is perfectly obvious that it must be infinitely easier to control total, than partial, disarmament.

I would further emphasise the fact that the basis of disarmament as proposed by the Soviet Delegation, being uniform and applicable to all States, is therefore the most equitable and the least likely to arouse opposition from individual States. It is precisely this, in my opinion, which constitutes the obvious simplicity of our proposal, although, strange to say, some of its opponents have endeavoured to make an added objection of this very simplicity.

The scheme offered for the consideration of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission represents a single organic whole which cannot be split up into separate parts. It is wholly penetrated by a single idea and therefore requires, first and foremost, consideration and acceptance of its underlying principle.

The Soviet Delegation therefore considers it indispensable that general discussion should result in a reply—not merely theoretical but quite clear and definite—being given to the questions : does the Preparatory Disarmament Commission accept the principle of general disarmament during the period mentioned in the Convention ? And does it accept the proposal as to that rate of disarmament which would make war impossible in a year's time ? The Soviet Delegation considers that all other Delegations and their Governments have had time enough, if they cared to, to study both the underlying idea of the Soviet proposal and the draft Convention in its finished form.

During the three and a half months which have elapsed since the Fourth Session of the Preliminary Disarmament Commission, the Soviet Delegation has had ample opportunity to convince itself that the idea of complete disarmament has been met and accepted with enthusiasm by the broadest masses of both hemi-

spheres, and by all progressive and peace-loving elements in human society. The innumerable addresses and resolutions of sympathy from labour parties and multifarious organisations, groups and societies from all parts of the world which I am still receiving, testify, among other things, to this. I will not take up your time by enumerating all of them ; but will venture to read only one—a collective address I received here a few days ago, signed by representatives in thirteen countries of 124 organisations (chiefly women's) whose total membership runs into many millions. This document, showing as it does the lively response among women evoked by the Soviet proposals, derives special importance from the extension of women's political rights now proceeding in some countries. (The text of the declaration was here read by M. Litvinov.)

This document bears 163 signatures of the secretaries of the respective organisations.

The Soviet Delegation entertains not the slightest doubt as to the acceptability and desirability of its proposals for the broad masses of the population, who now look to the Governments and the bourgeois groups and classes supporting them to make the next move.

Mere theoretical discussions and arguments about disarmament no longer meet the case—it is time to take practical steps towards the realisation of disarmament. It seems to me there has been more than enough of discussion of disarmament. I shall venture to furnish members of the Commission with a few data, from which it will be seen that, as well as the General Assemblies of the League of Nations and the Council of the League, the 38 Sessions of which occupied themselves with the question of disarmament, not less than 14 different commissions and other League organs devoted over 120 SESSIONS—not sittings, mark you, but sessions—to this question of disarmament, on which 111 resolutions have been passed by General Assemblies of the League and the Council of the League alone. Turning to the results of this vast quantity of work, the documentation of which has taken reams of paper, we are forced to the conclusion that not a single step of real importance has been taken towards the realisation of disarmament. The Soviet Delegation considers that an end should be put to a situation which may discredit the very idea of disarmament.

It would be loth for its proposals to serve merely for the multiplication of commissions and sub-commissions or other organs, which would simply add to the existing resolutions with the same negligible results as those so far achieved. The Soviet Government has not sent its delegation to Geneva for this sort of work. Absorbed in the vast problem of re-building an enormous State with a population of 150 millions on entirely new principles, and in the creation of a new social-economic structure in the face of the open opposition of the whole of the rest of the world and in the most unfavourable circumstances, it would never have turned aside from this work if its attitude to the problem of peace were not everything that is serious, practical and sincere, and if this problem were not the keystone of its whole policy. In this connection I may be permitted to mention by way of illustration of the Soviet Government's serious attitude to the questions under discussion here, the fact that although it did not take part in the League of Nations Conference which passed the Protocol for the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare, only adhering to the latter at the last session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, it was one of the States (three in all) to ratify this Protocol, still unfortunately a dead letter owing to its non-ratification by other States, the majority of which are Members of the League.

We are aware that shallow persons and equally shallow press organs pretend to see inconsistency between the peace-loving proposals of the Soviet Government and the maintenance and improvement of the Red Army. As a matter of fact, the U.S.S.R. already has a smaller army, not to mention its navy, than any other State in proportion to its population and the extent of its frontiers, while if we consider individual security—the favourite theme of this Assembly—it must be admitted that the Soviet Union is in a less favourable position than any other State. It has almost the whole of the world against it in unconcealed hostility to the new State. A glance at the press of any country on any day, full of attacks, invectives and libels on the U.S.S.R., will serve to show the extent of this hostility. A number of countries have to this day not recognised the existence of the Soviet Government, already in its eleventh year, and non-recognition can only be construed as an act of hostility. But even

those countries recognising the Soviet State not infrequently indulge, with a few exceptions, in hostile manifestations which are often grave tests of the patience and peaceableness of the Soviet Government. The new Soviet State has seen its territory invaded by foreign troops which caused detriment to the State, from the results of which it has not yet recovered. A part of the territory of the former Russian Empire, the population of which unmistakably aspires towards the Soviet Union, is still occupied by foreign troops, preventing it from exercising its right of self-determination. All this notwithstanding, the Red Army has remained during the ten years of its existence, and will continue to remain, exclusively a weapon of defence. The U.S.S.R. does not require an army or a navy for any other purposes, all aggressive or imperialist aims or ambitions being completely foreign to it.

In any case, the Soviet Government has declared and still declares through its Delegation in Geneva that it is ready to abolish all the military forces of the Union in accordance with its Draft Convention as soon as a similar decision is passed and simultaneously carried out by the other States. The Soviet Government declares once more that it is ready for this, and asks the other Governments represented here if they also are ready.

The Soviet Government expects a reply to this question at the present session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission at which all the bigger States are represented. No sub-commissions or any other auxiliary organs, in fact no body of a lesser composition and authority than the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, can give an answer to this question. The Soviet Delegation hopes that this answer will be given quite openly, publicly, in the full light of day and under the control of public opinion. This reply should of course be brought up for final sanction by the International Disarmament Conference, an early date for the convocation of which is urged by the Soviet Delegation.

The proposals formulated by myself in two questions are so clear as neither to demand nor admit of preliminary diplomatic negotiations and conversations between different countries and groups of countries.

In conclusion I will venture once more to repeat the two main questions underlying our proposals :

1. Does the Commission agree to base its further labours on

the principle of complete disarmament during the periods proposed by us ? And,

2. Is it prepared so to carry out the first stage of disarmament so as to make the conduct of war, if not an absolute impossibility, of extreme difficulty in a year's time ?

Only when unequivocal and affirmative replies have been given to these questions will it be possible to enter upon the detailed consideration of the Soviet Draft Convention. . . .

The Soviet Delegation considers itself entitled to count upon special support from the Delegation of that Government which is now publicly making a proposal for the prohibition of war. The sincerity of this proposal could not be more convincingly confirmed than by the adherence of its authors to the Soviet Draft Convention for complete disarmament, pursuing the aim not merely of the moral prohibition, but also of the abolition of the possibility of war. Since armed forces have no other *raison d'être* but the conduct of war, and since the prohibition of war would make them quite superfluous, it would appear that consistency and logic must dictate to the Government concerned the support of our proposal.

The Soviet Delegation is convinced that all delegations here present realise the responsibility and importance of solving this great question, and realise also its vast consequences for the fate of humanity, and that, therefore, no delegation will refrain from publicly expounding the point of view of its Government.

h. Annex to M. Litvinov's Statement of March 19th, 1928.

A summary of the number of Sessions and meetings of the various organs of the League dealing with the problem of disarmament. (Disarmament proper and questions connected therewith : military budgets, naval armaments, the exchange of military information, trade in and production of arms, regulations for the control of armaments of the defeated countries and guarantees of security.)

Leaving out of account the various organs of the League which have played a minor part in the discussion of these questions (Advisory and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit, Economic Committee, Financial Committee, Committee on Intellectual Co-operation, and even the International Labour

Office) and the various less important committees and commissions, the following organs of the League, which have dealt with the problem of disarmament and questions connected with it must be mentioned.

1. *The League Assemblies*

have dealt with these questions every year since the League was established.

Total : 8 Sessions.

2. *Third Committee*

was formed to deal with disarmament questions at each Assembly of the League, and draws up the Assembly resolutions. Thus, the Third Committee has also held

8 Sessions.

3. *The Council.*

The Council has dealt with the problem of disarmament and the questions connected with it since its Fifth Session (May, 1920).

30 Sessions.

Note.—The discussions at the League Assemblies sometimes lasted for several days and, in the Third Committee, for several weeks. In the course of eight years the following resolutions were drawn up :

(a) For the Assembly	.	.	.	53 resolutions
(b) For the Council ¹	.	.	.	58 resolutions

Total 111 resolutions

The following organs of the League were specially created to deal with the problem of disarmament :

4. *Permanent Advisory Commission*

(Commission of Military Experts set up in virtue of Article 9 of the League Covenant) ; between 1920 and 1927 the Commission held 20 Sessions.

This figure does not include the meetings of its three Sub-Commissions dealing with

(1) Military, (2) naval, (3) air questions, such as, for instance, the second session of the Naval Sub-Commission held at Rome from February 14th to 25th, 1924, 12 meetings.

¹ Not counting the two last sessions (48th and 49th).

5. *Temporary Mixed Commission* for the Reduction of Armaments (replaced in 1925 by the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmaments Conference).

has held 10 Sessions.

- 7-8. *Committee of Enquiry* later *Special Commission*

concerning the production of arms have held together

8 Sessions.

8. *The Committee of the Council for Disarmament Questions*

has held

6 Sessions.

9. *Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*

has held, not including the fifth session now in progress

4 Sessions.

10. *Sub-Commission "A" (Military)*

has held

3 Sessions.

11. *The Military, Naval and Air Committees of Sub-Commission "A."*

have held

3 Sessions.

12. *Sub-Commission "B" (non-military)*

has held

4 Sessions.

13. *Joint Commission* with its three Committees

has held

6 Sessions

14. *Civil Aviation Committee*

has held

1 Session.

15. *The Committee on Budgetary Questions with the Attached Committee of Rapporteurs*

has held

6 Sessions.

16. *The Chemical Committee*

has held

1 Session.

17. *The Committee on Arbitration and Security with the Congress of Rapporteurs at Prague*

has held

3 Sessions.

Total: 17 international organisations have dealt with the problem of disarmament at 121 Sessions.

It should be noted that this number refers to sessions and not to meetings. The number of the latter is much higher since many sessions lasted over several days. For example, the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference has held :

First Session 9 meetings

Second „ 2 „

Third Session	39 meetings
Fourth „	3 „

Total (not including the Fifth Session) 53 „

Sub-Commission " A " held . . 86 meetings

Its Military Committee . . 25 „

Its Naval „ . . 44 „

Its Air „ . . 34 „

189 meetings

Results of the Work of Disarmament Carried out by the League of Nations

1. Convention on the Trade in Arms. (June 17th, 1925.) Ratified only by France. Accession of Liberia. The Convention has not come into force.
2. Protocol of Geneva regarding the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare. (June 17th, 1925.) Ratified only by Venezuela, France, and U.S.S.R.
3. Exchange of military information Publication of a Military Year-Book prepared from data supplied by Governments.
4. Complete and general disarmament No real result.
5. Reduction of military budgets No real result.
6. Reduction of naval armaments No real result.
7. Reduction in the production of arms No real result.

i. Reply of M. Litvinov to Attacks on Government of U.S.S.R. and Soviet Draft Convention for Complete Disarmament at Seventh Sitting of Preparatory Disarmament Commission. March 22nd, 1928.

Mr. President and Gentlemen, I should like to begin by express-

ing my gratitude to those delegates who have responded to my appeal and expressed their attitude to the proposals presented by the Soviet Delegation. I note with satisfaction that this was done by nineteen of the delegates present. Special gratitude is due from me to the hon. representative of Great Britain for giving the discussion such a wide scope and bringing forward a series of questions of the first importance in connection with our proposals. I welcome the frankness with which he spoke and shall endeavour, while observing the same courtesy and respect, to reply with equal frankness.

The hon. representative of Great Britain, however, introduced into the debate certain questions which I myself might have hesitated to bring up, fearing they might be regarded as irrelevant to the matter in hand. Since the initiative is his, however, I trust he will not take it ill if I express the point of view of the Soviet Delegation and my Government with regard to these questions. Lord Cushendun was not content to investigate the Draft Convention and our elucidation of it, but went out of his way to look for ulterior motives inspiring the Soviet Government to appear "with dramatic suddenness" before this Commission and present drastic proposals for disarmament. He also questioned the spirit in which the Delegation came here, and why the Soviet Government has up till now taken no interest in, or, as he preferred to put it, sabotaged the matter of disarmament. I will not ask the honourable delegate for Great Britain by what right he puts such questions to me, whether he recognises my own right to cross-examine him as to the sincerity of his Government, whether the British Government has sent its delegation here from sheer love of peace or for any other motives, what it has so far done for the cause of disarmament and whether he would stigmatise as sabotage the fact that his and other Governments have so far done nothing to solve a series of questions and dissensions arising in the sphere of the Commission, thus making it impossible for it to proceed to a second reading of its own Draft Convention and get on with its labours on the lines already laid down by the Commission itself. Such questions on my part would be perfectly in order by way of reciprocity, in view of the equal rights of the delegations represented here. I prefer, however, instead of indulging in idle questions, to satisfy his curiosity in reply to his questions.

The Soviet Government has interested itself in the problem of the establishment of peace, and the banishment from national life of that scourge of human society, war, ever since it came into power. It was the first Government among the belligerent States to bring to an end the participation of its citizens in the great massacre, appealing to the other belligerent States to follow their example. When the Soviet State underwent a fresh attack from the then Allies, of which Great Britain was one, while continually making proposals for peace, it responded immediately to the invitation to go to Prinkipo Island to conclude a truce, being ready to make vast sacrifices for the sake of bringing to an end the fresh bloodshed imposed upon it. Quite independent of the League of Nations, on its own initiative, the Soviet Government suggested, as long ago as 1922, at the first international conference at Genoa, in which it participated, that the first question discussed be that of general disarmament. Other States unfortunately considered it more important to spend time over the discussion of the question of restoring the private property of certain foreign firms suffering from the Russian Revolution. I do not intend to enumerate the other steps taken by the Soviet Government in regard to disarmament, as I have already mentioned them in this Commission at the November Session. During the more than ten years of its existence, the Soviet Government has never attacked any of its neighbours, has declared no war upon anybody and has taken no part in the warlike adventures of other States. On the first invitation of the League of Nations, it agreed to take part in the labours of the latter with regard to disarmament, despite its well-known attitude to the League itself. Had it been a Member of the League of Nations it would have been bound to do this by its own undertakings, whether it sincerely desired disarmament or not. The fact that the Soviet Government, having no obligations whatsoever towards the League, voluntarily co-operates with you in this Commission, seems to me additional testimony to its sincerity and good faith. As I already pointed out at the November Session, the responsibility for the non-participation of the Soviet Government in the first three sessions must be entirely laid at the door of the League of Nations. Arriving here, the Soviet Delegation made up its mind to take the most active part in the labours of the Commission, showing initiative wherever it considered the

initiative of others to be lacking or inadequate, and endeavouring, to the best of its ability, to speed up and stimulate work on disarmament and for the cause of general peace. The Soviet Government, in sending a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, was inspired by no other motives than the desire to contribute to the freeing of the peoples from the heavy burden of militarism and the curse of war. In any case, the record of the Soviet Government in the sphere of peace is one qualifying it more than any other Government to come forward with proposals for disarmament.

Having voluntarily submitted to the cross-examination of the honourable representative for Great Britain, I am ready to reply also to his question as to whether our attitude to the League of Nations, or, as he prefers to put it, our sabotage of the League of Nations, justifies our participation in the discussion of the questions before us here. Now the Soviet Government has never attempted to conceal its attitude to the League of Nations, even mentioning this in its replies to invitations to take part in this Commission. The Soviet Government has frequently and publicly given the reasons for such an attitude to the League of Nations, pointing out all that it considers inequitable, unacceptable and reprehensible, both in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the General Assemblies and the various decisions of the Council of the League with regard to international questions. I hardly think the prestige of the League of Nations, of which Lord Cushendun is so careful, would be added to were I to recapitulate all this here. Suffice it to say that the Soviet Government sees no obstacle to its own participation in this Commission and the coming Disarmament Conference in the fact that the Commission is served by the League of Nations. This does not, of course, imply that the Soviet Government has undertaken to submit to any instructions and rulings emanating from the League or the Council of the League. It will only consider itself bound by acts drawn up by the Commission, and the Convention which it may sign together with other Governments. As, however, Lord Cushendun can scarcely fail to be aware, ours is not the only delegation from a Government not belonging to the League of Nations. An excellent illustration of the attitude of such delegations to the jurisdiction of the League is afforded by the declaration made to the Third

Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission by the honourable representative for the Government of the United States at present among us, to the following effect : " The fact that my Government is not a Member (of the League) imposes certain very definite limits as to the undertakings which it is in a position to give in connection with a convention of this sort," and further : " Any convention, in order to be acceptable to my Government, must take full account of the fact that it cannot accept the jurisdiction of the League of Nations." I am unable to understand the exact purpose of Lord Cushendun's question about our sabotage of the League of Nations, for this question does not seem to imply that the Government of Great Britain would really like to see the U.S.S.R. a Member of the League of Nations. Indeed, such a desire would by no means be in accordance with the policy of the present Government of Great Britain with regard to the U.S.S.R. In any case, in inviting the U.S.S.R. to take part in the labours of this Commission, the Council of the League was perfectly aware that the Soviet Government was not a Member of the League and had no intention of joining it.

Lord Cushendun objected to an article quoted by himself from *Izvestia*, which he considered displayed a sceptical or ironical attitude to the work of Members of the League in the sphere of disarmament. This scepticism was expressed here by the Soviet Delegation also ; the writer in *Izvestia* has perhaps merely put it more bluntly. I am, however, unable to understand why this article should worry the honourable representative for Great Britain and the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. It depends upon the Commission itself, by the results of its work, to give the paper the lie. The Soviet Delegation would be the first to rejoice if this were done. But it is not only in Soviet circles that scepticism is shown with regard to the disarmament work of the League of Nations. I have before me a Paris paper, of an extremely reactionary tendency, for the 20th of this month. In it I read : " The League of Nations could only be harmless if it admitted itself to be what it really is, an academy of pacifism, and if its priests admitted that their anti-war lectures are about as effective as the incantations of negro necromancers against storm." In my opinion this scepticism and irony might serve as a stimulus

for the League and for our Commission, inciting them to do everything possible to show its undeservedness.

The honourable representative for Great Britain tried to imply that the complete or partial solution of the problem of disarmament outside the League of Nations is most reprehensible—indeed very little short of blasphemy. He went so far as to include among the achievements of the League of Nations the Washington Convention on the Reduction of Naval Armaments, appearing to forget that the League of Nations had nothing whatsoever to do with the Washington Convention. More, the so-called “Conference of Three” on naval disarmament held in Geneva itself, was also not connected with the League of Nations and did not even avail itself of the organs of the League of Nations. If I am not mistaken the negotiations still going on between the participants in this Conference are being held outside the orbit of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

The honourable representative for Great Britain, in passing under survey our draft convention, pointed indignantly to the lack in it of any reference whatsoever to the League of Nations, to the depositing of ratification papers in Geneva, or the registration of the Convention with the League of Nations. This, however, becomes quite comprehensible if it is borne in mind that the project emanates from a Government not formally recognising the League of Nations. Moreover, the reproaches of the honourable member for Great Britain will appear incomprehensible when I remind you that a series of international documents, in the drawing up of which Members of the League, including Great Britain, took part, have not been deposited with the League of Nations. To the best of my knowledge, the Straits Convention, for example, drawn up not far from Geneva—in Lausanne, to be exact—was deposited, not at Geneva, but at Paris. Similarly the acts of the Washington Naval Convention have not been deposited in Geneva. The Protocol on Poison Gases and Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, recently ratified by the Soviet Union and by Italy (but not as yet ratified by Great Britain) is also deposited, not in Geneva, but in Paris, despite the fact that the Protocol was passed at a Conference convened by the League of Nations. The same is true of the Conference on the question of the Trade in Arms, of which the League of Nations was the initiator. Moreover, with the

exception of one article, all mention of the League of Nations was omitted from this convention on the insistence of the United States, whose Government threatened to refrain from ratification unless this were done. In the note of this Government of September 12th, 1923, we find the words : "The articles of the Convention which relate to the League of Nations are so closely interwoven with the Convention as a whole as to make it impossible for my Government to ratify the Convention." I may also refer to Sir Austen Chamberlain's protest against the registration of the Anglo-Irish Treaty with the League of Nations, although both these States are Members of the League. If non-reference by the Soviet Government, not a member of this League, is, in the opinion of the honourable representative for Great Britain, an insult to and neglect of the League, how much more ought this reproach to be made by Lord Cushendun to his own Government, participating in the acts I have enumerated which ignore the League of Nations.

In his endeavour to discover specific features in the Soviet Government which might disqualify it from taking part in the work of disarmament, the honourable representative for Great Britain asks the Soviet Delegation what is its attitude to civil war—does it condemn it or admit it to be legitimate? If I were to follow the example of the honourable representative for Great Britain, and seek out the ulterior motive of this question, I might assume it to have been put with a view to provoking the Soviet Delegation to make an open defence here of civil war and revolution, in order the next day to accuse it of propaganda. I am, however, far from imputing such motives. It is nevertheless an entirely superfluous question, since the most cursory acquaintance with our draft convention (and Lord Cushendun has shown us that he has studied it) would convince anyone that it refers only to international war. It never occurred to us, and we had no grounds for believing, that the League of Nations intended to include under the questions of disarmament and security the prevention of civil war and the class struggle. I may say without the slightest hesitation that the Soviet Government would never have agreed to participate with the British or any other Government here represented in the working out of questions regarding the class war or the struggle against revolution. Indeed, it would be

naïve to expect such work from a Government which owes its being to one of the greatest revolutions in history and was called into being to protect the achievements of this revolution. The Governments represented here will apparently have to settle their internal social conflicts without our participation. I confess my entire inability to see the connection of this question with our project for total disarmament. Did Lord Cushendun wish to imply by this question that armies are required not only for national defence, but also for the putting down of possible revolutions? Such an argument against our project would be quite inconclusive from any point of view, since it has become common knowledge that both the March and November revolutions took place with the active participation of vast armies, brought up to war-time pitch. In any case, if the honourable representative for Great Britain and other delegates touching upon this point attribute great importance to the question of social security, they will probably, when the time comes, develop their point of view more fully. I apologise to the Commission for touching upon this theme, which it may consider irrelevant, but I would remind it that it was the honourable representative for Great Britain and not I who broached the subject.

The honourable representative for Great Britain not only faces us with questions, but also imposes us upon preliminary conditions and desires to get from us some sort of assurances before he agrees to consider our draft convention. The Soviet Government is called upon to assure him that it will refrain from provoking armed risings in other countries. The honourable representative for Great Britain appeared at the same time to imply that this was irrefutably the established practice and policy of the Soviet Government. The honourable representative for Great Britain saw fit to use the question of disarmament publicly to accuse the Soviet Government once more (as his own Government has already done, times without number), of so-called propaganda. Lord Cushendun apparently does not realise the unreasonableness of persisting in the use of a weapon long rendered innocuous by the exposure in so many countries of scores of offices and bureaux, largely staffed by Russian emigrés, for the specific purpose of drawing up forged documents for foreign Governments, proving alleged propaganda by the Soviet Government or its

agents in foreign countries. One of these documents has already received the historic nickname of the "Zinoviev Letter" and references have been made to it in the House of Commons even during the last few days. The fraudulency of this document has long ago been established, if only by the fact that the British Government at the time refused the demand of the Soviet Government to have it investigated by any arbitration Court. A demand for the investigation of this document, made a few days ago by 132 British Members of Parliament, has been rejected by their Government. A former Prime Minister of Great Britain referred in Parliament to this document on Monday last as follows : " This letter was the subject of what was generally admitted now to be a political fraud, a fraud perhaps unmatched in its cool calculation and preparation in our political history." Such are the documents on which the British Government bases its accusations of propaganda and internal interference. With regard to interference in internal affairs, I fear the Soviet and the British Governments have not yet found a common language to work out what precisely may be considered as interference. The British Government is inclined to consider a speech uttered or an article printed in Moscow regarding the policy of internal affairs of another country as interference, while not admitting as interference the arbitrary stationing of naval squadrons in foreign ports (Shanghai), the firing on foreign ports and towns with all the consequences entailed to the population (Nanking), the demand that the Government of an independent country cease operations against an insurgent subject, (Sir Percy Laurence, ultimatum to the Persian Government, November 24th) and the demand for his legal reinstatement (note to the Persian Government, November 27th), the limitation of the army of this country (note to the Persian Government, 1921), etc. The Soviet Government cannot, of course, agree to such a conception of what constitutes interference in the affairs of others. But, gentlemen, you will ask me what has this ancient Soviet-British dispute got to do with disarmament ? I am forced to reply that it has nothing to do with it. It was not I who brought it up, but the representative of the British Government, and I should consider it a mark of disrespect and discourtesy to him to ignore any of his questions.

The delegates of the British, Japanese, French, Dutch and

other Governments wondered if our project for complete disarmament was in conformity with the Covenant of the League of Nations, and if not, if they had the right or ought to spend the time on its consideration. To this question all these delegates apparently give a negative reply, corroborated by no less an authority than M. Politis. If this, however, is so indisputable, and if complete disarmament is contradictory to the principles and aspirations of the League of Nations, we are unable to understand why the Preparatory Disarmament Commission did not reject our proposals at the November Session, why it decided to investigate them and why it is now spending time over this question. Apparently, however, the delegates I have mentioned are far from sure of the correctness of their replies, from a political point of view if not juridically speaking. And, indeed, we have always been told that the League of Nations was created mainly, if not exclusively, for the purpose of ensuring general peace.

Although Article 8 of the League of Nations Covenant only mentions the limitation of armaments, it appears to us that merely minimum obligations were intended and this Article should by no means be allowed to serve as an obstacle to further and complete disarmament, should this be desired by members of the League. It seems to me that a better means for discrediting the League of Nations could scarcely be found than the assertion that it is a barrier to total disarmament. Man was not made for the Sabbath, but the Sabbath for man. You are rendering your League a poor service, gentlemen, if you make a fetish of it, and subject to it the entire will of your Governments. The Covenant of the League of Nations is not a law for all time. The League itself, by the way, has several times considered altering its Covenant. It will suffice to refer to the fact that, on the confirmation, by the Fifth Assembly of the League of Nations on October 2nd, 1924, of the Geneva Protocol, the Assembly decided to invite the Council to nominate without delay a Committee for the preparation of the revision of the alterations to the Covenant demanded by this protocol. If you agree to the principle of total disarmament, and appreciate, as they deserve, all the blessings it would entail, or, let us rather say, the sum total of the ills it would abolish, you will agree, of course, to sacrifice this or that article of the Covenant. Those who say that our project infringes the Covenant of the League inasmuch as,

by abolishing armaments, it deprives the League of the power to apply military sanctions, forget that these sanctions imply armed attacks by one State or another, which the abolition of armaments would make impossible, so that the article on sanctions would itself become an anachronism. I do not mention the fact that the obligation for individual members of the League to participate in military sanctions is disputed by members of the League themselves. The Soviet Delegation does not consider itself bound by the Covenants or any rulings of the League, and therefore did not consider it necessary to take them into consideration in their draft convention. If I venture to comment upon the Covenant of the League or any of its decisions, it is because I am anxious to understand your position and to prove the acceptability of our draft Convention, even from the point of view of Members of the League. As for the competence of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, we are here, not as technical experts, and not only as members of the Commission, but also as members and responsible representatives of our Governments. If the Commission is called upon to seek out methods of partial disarmament, and if its members appear before those whom they represent with a declaration that they have found a way for total disarmament, there will hardly be found anyone to censure them for this, the more so as the decisions of this Commission are mere recommendations to the Governments.

My opponents, with the possible exception of the honourable representative of Great Britain, criticised our disarmament project less for what it contained than for what it did not contain. Our scheme, we are told, affords neither economic nor social security ; it does not guarantee a just peace, does not destroy international distrust, does not point the way to the solution of international disputes, is in fact not a panacea. These reproaches would be just if we had undertaken to provide a universal remedy against all the ills and defects of human society, and to turn this vale of tears into an earthly paradise. We cannot recommend you any such panacea, for we know you would not entertain it for a moment. We are trying to find a means of abolishing one evil, one of the greatest it is true—the Moloch of war—and we want to try and find a common language with yourselves in so far as you say that you also are endeavouring to rid humanity of this ill.

Within these limits—broad, but not infinite—our proposals, in our opinion, meet the purpose for which they were framed.

The gist of the arguments repeated here against the general idea of our project is that either the peoples will “rage furiously together,” both without arms or with primitive weapons, or that the more industrially developed countries will be able very rapidly to substitute for the destroyed armaments new ones, and, in infringement of the Convention, enslave the weaker countries. It seems to me, by the way, that our opponents have already dropped the first of these arguments. I should like to call attention to the fact that the country which I represent has at its frontiers States numerically stronger than itself, such as China and India, with their hundreds of millions of inhabitants, and yet we have no fear of invasion by the organised masses of these countries. Other nations have still less reason than we for this fear. The second argument will also not hold water, for as it is, the weaker States, while obliged to maintain armed forces and resist possible attack by stronger States, are at the same time in complete dependence on the latter for their military supplies, besides being weak both technically and as regards their human resources. Articles 30 to 36 of the Soviet Draft Convention propose the abolition of military industry and all elements of military production. The experience of the world war has shown that even in countries with a powerful industry like the U.S.A., it required from twelve to twenty months to organise war-industry (declaration of the U.S.A. delegation to the sub-Commission on Disarmament). Fresh equipment for the armies cannot be created at a moment's notice. Granted the time taken, this cannot go unnoticed, especially if the international and local control provided for in our draft convention functions well. We know, for example, that the limitation of war industry was carried out as a result of the Versailles Treaty, and that fairly thoroughly, even in the case of a highly developed industrial country such as Germany, while in this instance what was aimed at was rendering innocuous a conquered country. How much easier it would be to control war industry, given the complete abolition of the corresponding means of production.

The last-named objections seems to be rooted in profound international distrust, distrust of the mutual readiness to observe

international conventions. It can be employed, and with even greater force, against the reduction of armaments, for what would be the good of an international disarmament commission, even along the lines of a draft convention worked out by a preliminary commission, establishing limits for armed forces and war supplies in every country, if we suspect that this convention will not be observed and the equilibrium established arbitrarily upset? Here would be real grounds for your fears for the security of individual countries.

The honourable representative for Italy spoke, among other things, of the necessity not only of peace, but of a just peace. I must admit I do not quite understand what he means by this. Does he mean that the present peace is not just and should be altered? But peace can only be altered by one of the two ways: by war, or by revising the existing peace and other international treaties. As I am quite sure he did not intend to point to the necessity of a violent alteration of the present peace, I should like to tell him that our project by no means excludes the revision of the peace treaties, and that he could raise this question in the League of Nations, of which Italy is a member, or at another international conference equally well after the realisation of our project. If he is not thinking of the violent alteration of the peace, he obviously does not require the preservation of armaments for the revision of the treaties.

I will now turn to the remarks with regard to individual articles of our draft Convention, returning for a moment to the speech of the honourable representative for Great Britain. He found a multiplicity of technical and other defects in our draft convention; he found that several articles do not even answer the purposes of its authors, that it is not written in language suitable to a legislative act, and that many of its articles, which he was good enough to enumerate, are open to serious criticism. He asked with astonishment how I could think of imposing such a faulty draft on the Disarmament Commission, stipulating at the same time for its acceptance wholesale without consideration, or its rejection. Lord Cushendun would have saved himself much time and labour and considerably shortened his speech if he had not built up all his arguments on false premises. I do not know why he made up his mind that the Soviet delegation had decided to present the

Commission with something like an ultimatum. The Soviet Government has itself received ultimatums, but so far has not sent any to anyone else, and it never entered our heads to do so here. Lord Cushendun himself justly mentioned my covering letter to the League of Nations' Secretariat, in which I proposed that our Draft Convention be accepted as a basis for discussion. In the speech introducing the Draft Convention I referred not less than three times to the conditions in which I considered its study and consideration expedient. It follows that I did not exclude for a moment the consideration of the draft as a whole and in detail. I simply insisted that the Draft Convention should not be examined until and if the Commission accepted the principles underlying it. After all, what would be the good of discussing the question as to the type of ships to be preserved for coast defence if we had not decided the question of the destruction of other military vessels? What would be the good of our discussing the question of the international defence of marine zones before we had decided what individual naval forces in the various countries were to be destroyed? The examination and consideration of the draft convention without having established any ruling principles would indeed be an unworthy waste of our time. Valuing the time of the Commission, and anxious to save it from the discredit of fruitless work that could not lead to anything, I warned it against wasting time over the draft Convention before we had agreed upon a working basis. Furthermore, as the hon. representative for Italy remarked, all the articles of our Draft Convention were subordinated by us to the basic idea of the complete destruction of armaments. Take away this fundamental idea and the individual articles of the Draft Convention lose all value for us. This is why I call the Draft a single whole incapable of disintegration. We, of course, claim no copyright for the draft, and any of its articles may be adopted by anybody for any scheme of disarmament, but this will not be the Soviet scheme, and the Soviet Delegation and Government cannot undertake responsibility for any such. The draft may be found to contain articles answering to the interest of this or that State. Great Britain may consider, for instance, that the article on the destruction of submarines accords with her interests; other States may find articles suitable for themselves, and as a result disputes may arise with which, Gentlemen, you are

already familiar, from the history of the first reading of your own Draft Convention. Once, however, we all agree to use complete disarmament as a basic principle, disputes about individual points can have no serious significance. I am quite ready to admit that our draft convention is not perfect and that, pursuing the common aim of complete disarmament, we might collectively considerably amend and improve it. All those articles which evoked the astonishment and criticism (shall I say derision ?) of the honourable representative for Great Britain are not essential and allow of disputation and compromise.

Lord Cushendun aimed most of the slings and arrows of his criticism at Chapter III of the draft entitled " The Organisation of Protection." I can assure you, Mr. President, that in drawing up this chapter the specific interests of our own country were the last things to influence us. On the contrary, we should rather have ignored entirely the question of police defence. It is not however, in vain that I am already participating for the second time at a session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and I am sufficiently imbued with your practical spirit and what you call a sense of reality. I knew the enormous significance attached by the countries you represent to the question of internal safety, the protection of property, etc., and therefore, it was with a view to the interests of your countries and their possible desires that I ordered the drawing up of a special article on protection. I have no doubt whatsoever that if I had omitted to do this, I should have been still more severely criticised, perhaps by none other than the honourable representative for Great Britain himself, for forgetting such an important body as the police. Lord Cushendun concentrated on the question of the arming of the police. He implied that our draft convention was specially adapted to the conditions of life in the U.S.S.R., where the police would appear to be better armed than in other countries. As a matter of fact, the militia in the Soviet Union are armed with revolvers precisely as are the police in most European countries. I have an idea that the police in the country in which we are at present are also provided with firearms. Lord Cushendun assures us, and I do not for a moment doubt him, that the police in his country are armed only with truncheons, but I do not doubt either that in cases of necessity the troops might be called to their assistance.

Moreover, in the *Manchester Guardian* for the 19th of this month, I read for instance the following communication from Belfast : " In connection with the demonstration at Moy a large force of police was concentrated in the district to prevent a repetition of an outrage perpetrated in August last. . . . The principal roads were lined with police while Crossley tenders full of armed constables were always on the move." Thus we see that in Ulster, which is a part of the British Empire, the police constabulary are armed. Further, the following information was communicated by Reuter's Agency on February 3rd last from Bombay : " The armed police suffered an attack by the demonstrators and were obliged to open fire," and I have before me a telegram from Madras to the effect that, " as a result of the firing by the police upon the insurgents. . ." etc., Lord Cushendun will thus see that the police are armed not only in the U.S.S.R. and that at least in parts of the Empire represented by him the police are actually forced, not only to carry, but to employ firearms. I trust he will agree that my precautions regarding the police were not superfluous from his own point of view. Lord Cushendun was also amused at the point concerning the protection of means of communication. The British Delegate, of course, has no doubt of the necessity to protect sea communications and even control by his Government of countries situated on marine routes. I venture, however, to inform him that while protection of means of communication may not be required where the railway system is highly developed, in countries with no towns or even large villages within a distance of 100 miles from each other, the presence at railway stations of, if only a single police officer, if only in case of crimes being committed in trains, would scarcely be considered by him superfluous. The objects requiring protection mentioned in the draft are intended to cover such institutions as State Banks, Treasuries and Mints, requiring, of course, special protection. If, in examining our Draft Convention, the honourable representative for Great Britain would like to propose still more drastic reduction of armaments for protection and for the police, the Soviet Delegation will do its utmost to meet him on this point.

In this connection a very legitimate question was put by the honourable representative for the Netherlands, expressing the fear that in arming the police in proportion to the population, the

bigger countries might be in possession of a considerably greater armed force than the smaller, which might be used for warlike purposes. The Soviet Government intends to defend the interests of weaker States in the most energetic manner, and the Soviet Delegation is therefore ready to change the proportion in the interests of the weakest States. If the Soviet Delegation were to present any scheme for partial disarmament whatsoever, it would propose this very principle of a higher degree of disarmament for the bigger countries, including the U.S.S.R., than for weaker States. I should add that the provision in our draft convention for forms of protection should not bear the character of military organisation and that, as far as the police are concerned, they should be subjected to local authorities and not concentrated under a central administration, still less command. With regard to the types of weapons for protective forces, this is a technical question to be decided by the experts, since in some cases such as combating contrabandism, rifles might be required, in others revolvers, and yet others sidearms, as the honourable representative for Cuba points out. The honourable representative for Great Britain did not ignore the question of personal defence of citizens, but implied that only those in my own country, where the State safeguards their lives inadequately, stand in need of such defence. I make so bold as to declare that the citizen of the Soviet Union does not carry arms on his person, and does not need them, for crime statistics there are no higher, if not lower, than in other countries. Lord Cushendun must, however, be well aware that shops trading in arms exist in all countries, and that these arms are bought for some purpose or other by private citizens also. The honourable representative for Japan has told us that it was dangerous to go out unarmed in certain tropical countries. Other dangers exist in other countries. Representatives of the Soviet Government have been attacked and killed in extremely civilised countries. A Soviet courier has been called upon to defend the diplomatic mail, arms in hand, outside the frontiers of our Union in European countries some of which were members of the League of Nations. If, however, the representative for Great Britain proposes total prohibition of the carrying of arms by private citizens, including even sporting rifles, the Soviet Delegation will not quarrel with him on this point. Our draft Convention pro-

vides for a series of legislative measures on the part of every State. Lord Cushendun asked how free legislative assemblies could be forced to submit to the rulings of the Convention. It is now my turn to express astonishment. It cannot be that the hon. representative for Great Britain is not aware that an international convention ratified by the corresponding legislative assembly is law for the given country and that the legislative assembly ratifying the convention by so doing undertakes to carry out the necessary legislative acts provided in such a convention.

All these questions could have been given tranquil and all-round consideration and our delegation would naturally have been happy to have given all the explanations necessary, but, since Lord Cushendun has already broached all the questions and made critical remarks on them, I was unable to leave them unanswered.

I would once more point out that the question of the types of vessels provided under Articles 43 and 44 present no obstacle whatsoever for agreement. I would mention by the way that I am informed by my naval experts that the vessels of the tonnage mentioned in the Draft Convention are fully capable of coping with their tasks in the various countries. For example, I have a list of some vessels belonging to Great Britain :

Mersey type trawlers, 665 tons, 11 knots. Rated as Fishery Protection Gunboats.

Arleux, Arras, Givenchy, 136 tons net, 10 knots. Fishery Protection ; Atlantic and Pacific Canadian Government.

In the U.S.A. there are :—

Eagle boats, 500 tons, 18 knots. Some of them transferred to Coastguard.

1st Class Cruising Cutters (new construction), 2075 tons, 16 knots.

Cruising Cutters (*Haida, Modoc* and others), 1780 tons, 16 knots.

25 Coastguard destroyers, 1090–1110 tons, 29.5 knots.

Ex-submarine chasers, 75 tons, 11 knots.

All these vessels function in the same as way provided by our Draft Convention.

I cannot refrain from pointing out one remark on the part of the honourable representative for Great Britain with regard to Article 10, of which he himself would doubtless admit the unfairness. In mentioning the proposed prohibition of scientific research and theoretical treatises, he did not think it necessary to

mention that the reference was to specifically military publications and not to general scientific ones. He found the article concerning military school books extremely humorous. I do not know if he is equally derisive of the proposal brought before the Assembly of the League on September 16th, 1925, to the effect that, "The League of Nations would propose that its members take measures with a view to moral disarmament for the revision of school histories in such a way as gradually to diminish the number of pages devoted to military events, especially in the case of those pages in which wars of conquest, etc., are glorified."

The other articles attracting the attention of the honourable representative for Great Britain, such as those concerning the number of copies of ratification papers, the place for their preservation, the place for the meeting of this International Control Commission, etc., are scarcely likely to provoke serious dissension. On detailed consideration of our draft plan, Lord Cushendun would have the opportunity also of suggesting other wishes and offering proposals with regard to such questions as how to deal with those troublesome neighbours to whom he referred with such feeling. Before, however, going into these comparatively unimportant articles, I should like to know if he accepts in principle the first 36 which embody the principle of complete disarmament. On this point he was unfortunately a little evasive. He spoke of complete disarmament as the ideal to which the whole of humanity aspires, and for which it has longed since the very dawn of history. We have not, however, met together here to discuss our remote ideals, but to decide which of these ideals, to which humanity has apparently been aspiring for several thousand years, can now be put into practice, and which must be given another thousand years to mature.

The honourable representative for the Netherlands asks if I consider the further discussion of our proposal of any use. Of course, if the majority or a considerable number of the delegations present consider the principle of complete disarmament unacceptable for their Governments, then all further discussion is superfluous. Unfortunately not all the speakers gave a quite clear answer to this question, and while criticising our disarmament scheme severely, many speakers nevertheless qualified this by remarks as to the usefulness of its further discussion. Our delega-

tion attributes such vast importance to the idea of general disarmament that it will always be ready to give further elucidation and participate in further discussion of our proposals, but, I repeat, such discussion is desirable and expedient only if the Commission declares its acceptance of the principles of total disarmament. In that case I shall propose proceeding to the point-by-point reading of our draft convention. In the case of the rejection of this fundamental principle I shall not only not insist upon consideration of the Draft, but myself oppose it as a complete waste of time. It is now for the Commission to let me have its decision.

Mr. President, I am aware that in asking for a decision I am making a request which, while it is essential, is purely formal, and I cherish no illusions whatsoever as to its outcome. The speeches which have been pronounced here on the subject of disarmament have done nothing to increase our optimism. This time we really did begin our work in the Commission with some degree of optimism. We know that one of the biggest States had come forward with a proposal for the prohibition of war, and having our own conception of logic and consistency, considered ourselves entitled to reckon on the support of this Government for our proposal, but the representative of this Government did not consider it necessary to lay his point of view before us, unless we are to count his convincing declaration here that he believed in one scheme and not in another. On the one hand, the criticism of our Draft Convention was based on profound international distrust, on the assumption that a solemnly accepted international convention is bound to be infringed, while on the other we are assured that when two neighbours, armed to the teeth, give a solemn promise not to attack each other, only then can the preservation of peace be hoped for. But when these neighbours supplement their solemn promise by undertaking to disarm and by actually disarming we are told that not only will this not increase for them both the existing security, but it will actually decrease it. Thus, we learn, disarmed nations are still more dangerous to each other than armed ! *Credo quia absurdum ?* Of course, this can be believed, since nothing is too strange to be true, but it is a little difficult to grasp.

I was a little surprised to hear the honourable representative for Poland say that our idea could only be seductive for the

average man, the man in the street. But it is this very man in the street, the average man, of whom the honourable representative for Poland spoke so contemptuously, on whom the burden of militarism lies and who is called upon to offer sacrifices to the Moloch of war. We, the Soviet Delegation, do not claim to represent the so-called upper circles of society, we are here to represent the workers and peasants, whose interests we understand and value. No manner of doubt exists for our Government that these interests demand the radical solution of the question of disarmament and war. I think I can assure the honourable representative for Poland that the fears he expressed of the advocate of peace placing exaggerated hopes in the present session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission are, to say the least, exaggerated.

Whatever may be the fate of our Draft Convention in the present session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, we still believe that general and immediate disarmament is the only effective guarantee of peace, corresponding not only to the remote ideals but to the urgent daily needs of humanity.

If at the present moment the indubitable fact that the sympathy of the broad popular masses is entirely on the side of the idea of total disarmament is questioned, we are nevertheless profoundly convinced that the time is not far distant when this sympathy will penetrate to the consciousness of all the Governments represented here and cause them to take up a very different attitude to our proposals.

k. Speech by M. Litvinov on Soviet Draft Convention for Partial Reduction of Armaments at Ninth Sitting of Preparatory Disarmament Commission. March 23rd, 1928.

I pointed out in my speech yesterday that the opinion expressed by most of the delegates here with regard to our draft convention leave no room for doubt as to the fate awaiting it at the hands of the Preparatory Commission. If the slightest doubts could have remained, these would have been immediately dissipated by the wording of the resolution drawn up to-day, the clarity of which left nothing to be desired.

The Soviet Delegation notes with profound regret—which I am sure will be shared by the broad mass of the people in all countries whose aspirations have been so little understood by

many of the speakers here—that the Preparatory Commission and most of the delegates represented here, completely and resolutely reject on behalf of their Governments, not only our Draft Convention for total general disarmament but the very idea of total general disarmament itself. I say the idea because the resolution drawn up to-day refutes the principle of total and general disarmament even as a basis for the further work of the Preparatory Commission. The Resolution does not even speak of transmitting our proposals to the Governments or the Disarmament Conference, as the honourable representative of Turkey proposed to-day but merely mentions the possible extracting from our draft Convention of individual articles which may serve as material for other schemes quite foreign to the spirit of our proposal. As I remarked yesterday, we claim no copyright for our Draft Convention, and anyone is welcome to make any use he cares of any articles for any purpose. I must insist however that the Soviet Government will take no responsibility for, nor give its name to, any partial use of its schemes. Moreover, the Soviet Delegation and the Soviet Government will not consider themselves bound, either formally or politically, by isolated articles torn from their context, should these not tend to serve the ultimate end for which the draft was drawn up—total general disarmament. The Soviet Delegation therefore reserves to itself the right to oppose or vote against individual articles from its own draft convention should these be included in any other schemes foreign to its spirit and ultimate aim.

In its note of January 16th, 1926, in reply to the invitation from the Council of the League of Nations to send a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs stated the the Soviet Government attributed great importance to all endeavours to reduce the dangers of war and lighten the burden of militarism weighing down the shoulders of the popular masses. I said in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in my declaration on November 30th last, that, while insisting in every way on the necessity for total disarmament, "the Soviet Delegation was ready to take part in every consideration of the question of reducing armaments in so far as practical measures really aimed towards general disarmament were under consideration." In accordance with these declarations,

the Soviet Delegation is now forced to ask itself, faced with the *fait accompli* of the rejection by the Preparatory Disarmament Commission of the draft convention for total disarmament, what ought to be its next step towards the achievement of the aim it has set itself, which still remains, and always will remain—total general disarmament. Since most of the delegates here countered our proposals for general total disarmament with the idea of a partial gradual disarmament—that is to say the reduction of existing armaments by easy stages—the Soviet Delegation has decided to look for common ground with the other Delegates, if only in the sphere of such partial disarmament. Let the other Delegates regard such disarmament as an end in itself, beyond which they consider it impossible or inexpedient to go—the Soviet Delegation will regard it as the first stage on the way to total disarmament. The lack of an ultimate aim in common with the other delegations ought not to be allowed to prevent us from working together for the achievement of the immediate aim—the *reduction* of armaments, if we can only hit upon a common *idiom*, if only in this limited field.

The Soviet Delegation considers that the substitution of the principle of total, by that of partial, disarmament by no means tends to the *abolition* of armed conflicts, although it is ready to admit that it is possible that it might tend to the diminution of their frequency, inasmuch as the increase of armaments is in itself one of the causes of the incidence of war.

The reduction of armaments may, moreover, have extremely desirable effects in easing the burden of militarism and relaxing the screw of taxation for the people of all countries, as well as freeing human forces for more productive labour and budgetary means for more useful ends. The reduction of disarmament, if it proceeds along the channels which will be suggested by the Soviet Delegation, might also result in minimising the horrors of war.

The Soviet Delegation notes that the Preparatory Disarmament Commission has not at its disposal any scheme for partial disarmament which might serve as the object of immediate consideration.

While refraining from any criticism of those schemes which got so far as a first reading (although the Soviet Delegation could say a great deal about them if it had the opportunity), we regard it

as established that they evoked among the Commission itself dissensions to this day impossible to reconcile, despite the fact that twelve months have elapsed since their first reading. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission has met twice during these months, but the dissensions mentioned have made it impossible for it even to consider with the projects. I am perhaps anticipating your decision with regard to the third point on the agenda that is being considered by us, but it is quite clear from the proposed resolution that there is scarcely any hope of proceeding to the second reading of these projects during the present session. Nay, more, some of the delegates, including a member of the Bureau of our Commission, Mr. Politis, acting upon their knowledge of the matter and the proposals of their Governments, suggested adjourning the present session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission without fixing a date for the next. This shows that they have very little hope of ever getting the existing differences settled, within any period of time that can be fixed. If these differences could not be settled in the course of twelve months and as we have received no information as to a single difference having been reconciled during this period, what guarantee have we that they will be settled during the next twelve months or at any time whatsoever? This actually means that we are face to face with the liquidation of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission either provisionally or finally, since its further convening appears to depend, not on its own wish, or on its President's, to whom its convocation is entrusted, but on external factors, over which neither the Commission nor its President has any control. This makes it all the more appropriate and timely to present a fresh convention. I therefore have the honour to inform the Preparatory Disarmament Commission that such a draft will be presented by the Soviet Delegation and distributed to the delegates through the Secretariat of the League of Nations to-morrow morning or, if it is convenient, even to-day. After this has been done I will venture to offer some explanation of the principles of which its individual parts have been constructed. The Soviet Delegation will ask the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to proceed at the present session to the first reading of this Draft Convention, first expressing their preliminary opinion on its fundamental principles. To avoid misunderstandings I hasten to

add that I offer this draft convention by way of a base for consideration, attributing enormous importance to the acceptance of its fundamental principles and leaving its less essential articles open for possible correction, alteration and supplement, or even substitution by others.

In conclusion, I consider it necessary once more to declare that we regard our proposal merely as a first step to the carrying out of total disarmament and that the Soviet Delegation reserves to itself the right to present a fresh proposal for further reduction of armaments not later than two years after the acceptance of this new draft convention. The Delegation also reserves to itself the right, independently of acceptance or non-acceptance of its draft convention, to return to its original draft convention for total and general disarmament at the coming International Disarmament Conference.

1. Speech by M. Litvinov on Refusal by Preparatory Disarmament Commission to Consider Soviet Draft Convention for Disarmament at Ninth Sitting of Preparatory Disarmament Commission. March 23rd, 1928.

I am in a very difficult position. The President has told us that the proposals which have just been introduced by the Soviet Delegation, and which are not yet really known to the delegations, are not to be considered during the present Session. He gave no arguments, he did not explain why they were not to be considered. Therefore I am not in a position to argue. There is no argument, no reason is given ; therefore it is impossible for me to argue at all or to tell you anything to the contrary. Why should not they be considered at this Session ? What did we come here for ? Only to decide that nothing can be decided, that we must go home without having done anything ; or have we come here to discuss the question of disarmament ? I have put in a proposal for disarmament and nothing else. Why should not the Preparatory Commission for Disarmament occupy itself with it now ? I should like to have an answer to this question. I have no doubt that what the Honourable President has proposed is not any arbitrary proposal, that there are certain reasons for proposing what he has done, but I would humbly ask him to be good enough to take the Commission into his confidence and to tell them what are his

reasons. Why must we go home without having achieved anything? There is one principle in which the common labour, the common work of the Soviet Delegation with other Delegations would be possible, but if that were rejected common labour would be absolutely impossible.

That principle is the principle of equal rights for all delegations. To place any delegation in an inferior position would mean stopping the work of that delegation. Equal rights for all delegations means that each delegation has the right to put proposals to the Commission and is entitled to have those proposals considered.

What are the schemes or projects with regard to the second reading of which so much has been said? They are projects introduced, as far as I remember, by individual delegations, I think by the British and by the French delegations. As far as I know, the procedure which was followed when they were introduced was that they were given a first reading immediately. The President did not propose to brush these proposals aside and keep them somewhere in the drawers of the Secretariat of the League to mature. They were considered immediately. Why cannot the same procedure be applied in the case of proposals of the Soviet Delegation?

Count Clauzel has complained of some confusion which has arisen. I leave him to judge how that confusion has been brought about. He tells us the Soviet Delegation is endeavouring to make the Commission go backwards. As far as I understand it, there are two proposals before the Commission; one is the Soviet proposal to continue our work and take some steps forward. The other proposal, which Count Clauzel favours, is to go home. If to continue the preparatory work for disarmament means going backwards and to go home without doing anything means going forwards, I confess I shall probably never be able to understand the language used in the League of Nations!

I shall reserve my further remarks until the President has explained to us the reasons why our proposals cannot be considered now at this Session. In the meantime there is only one remark I wish to make.

I take it the members of this Commission are not merely functionaries, mere servants of their Governments, but that they are responsible representatives of their countries and Governments,

who have devoted themselves to the task of disarmament. I venture to express the hope that those who have undertaken this task are doing so because they have the cause of disarmament at heart. I would further hope that they will regard the question of disarmament with rather more warmth than their own Governments. The Preparatory Commission should push the Governments represented here in the direction of disarmament. They should not merely wait for hints from their Governments ; they should push their Governments forward. By going home without fixing any date for the next session, they are not doing anything in the way of inducing their Governments to take steps even for the elimination of the differences that exist between themselves. The Governments will not be in a hurry unless you tell them they must do this by a certain date. If you say you will meet in a month's time, you could induce the Governments to accelerate a settlement of the differences between them, but by fixing no date you do not do anything of the kind.

If, contrary to our view, and contrary to our understanding, the Preparatory Commission decided not to proceed to the consideration of our new proposals, I certainly should be inclined to support the proposal made by the honourable representative of Germany to declare that the Preparatory Commission finds itself unable to prepare anything and therefore passes on its work to the International Conference to see what can be done—or whether anything can be done—in the cause of disarmament.

m. M. Litvinov's Final Declaration at the Closing Session on March 24th, 1928.

Mr. President, I consider myself bound, before the Commission finally disperses, to make a short declaration expounding the point of view of the Soviet Delegation and of the Soviet Government with regard to the results of that part of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in which the Soviet Delegation has participated.

You are aware, Mr. President, that the *Soviet Government responded immediately to the invitation of the Council of the League of Nations to take part in the labours of the Preparatory Commission, and that it was not its fault that the Soviet Delegation could not take part in the first three sessions. As soon as the Soviet Delegation*

arrived to take part in the work of the Fourth Session it presented, without wasting a moment of time, its proposal for the immediate consideration of the principle of general, immediate, and total disarmament.

The proposal of the Soviet Delegation was rejected by the Preparatory Commission, which only agreed to undertake its consideration at the next session. The fifth session, taking place three months after the fourth, considered the Soviet proposal in order to reject it. I am therefore unable to affirm that the Commission during the course of its fourth and fifth sessions has done anything positive by way of fulfilling those tasks for which it was created. In the course of the discussion of the Soviet Draft Convention for total disarmament we were told that the principle of total disarmament itself runs counter to the Covenant of the League of Nations and contradicts the mandate given to the Preparatory Commission, so that this principle cannot be made the basis of its further labours. We have been assured that the Commission can only do fruitful work by accepting as a basis the principle of the reduction of armaments.

True to the sincere desire of its Government to do everything possible to bring about even the partial diminution of the burden of militarism, the Soviet Delegation, without wasting time on formalities, and firmly desirous somehow or another to achieve the tasks it had set itself for the reduction of armaments, immediately brought in its project for partial disarmament, based on the same principle as has been declared by all the speakers here to underlie the work of the Preparatory Commission.

The Soviet Delegation is still unable to see any serious justification for any postponement of the consideration of a scheme capable in any way of lightening the burden of militarism and thus in itself diminishing the danger of war.

Despite the aspirations and insistence of the Soviet Delegation for the most rapid possible achievement of that aim, the realisation of which humanity is awaiting, the Preparatory Commission has found it possible to postpone indefinitely the consideration of the Soviet Draft Convention for partial disarmament.

Most of those coming to such a decision apparently consider that the realisation as speedily as possible of the problem of disarmament, if only partial, can wait. They consider apparently

that humanity can wait indefinitely for the Preparatory Commission to find a convenient time for the resumption of work capable of causing some relief from the burden of incessant armament and diminishing the possibility of the repetition of a new massacre still more monstrous than the last.

Voices have been heard—I recall the words of M. Politis—comparing the work of the Preparatory Commission to that of a scientist in his laboratory. It has been ironically remarked that the ignorant do not understand the necessity for slowness in such scientific research.

I feel myself bound to declare that the Soviet Delegation does not regard the work of the Preparatory Commission as similar to the research work of an astronomer endeavouring to find a new star or planet. Great as are the services of astronomy, humanity can wait for the discovery of new stars.

To agree to a similar slowness of work with regard to a question of such urgent practical politics as that of disarmament or reduction of armaments would be to ignore the true interests of humanity and the danger with which it is continually faced.

May those who believe that they have indefinite time at their disposal for work in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission not receive a rude shock one day. We, for our part, knowing something of international relations, see these dangers, and have tried to warn the Preparatory Commission to work speedily with a view to avoiding them.

n. Draft Convention for the Reduction of Armaments Submitted on March 23rd, 1928, to the Disarmament Commission by the Delegation of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics.¹

CONVENTION

Considering that the immense growth in armaments and in militarism imposes a general and heavy burden on the peoples of the entire world and lowers the level of their culture and their material well being ;

And considering that the atrocious struggle between the various States for predominance in armaments and the tendency to

¹ To save space we are giving here only the prefatory part of the Draft Convention.

increase the number of weapons for murderous and destructive military purposes is one of the factors which increases the possibility and the likelihood of armed outbreaks ; and desiring to protect to the fullest possible extent the peaceful population of workers against the immediate dangers which threaten their lives and property in the event of the outbreak of an armed struggle, the Contracting States have decided, with the object of taking a first serious and genuine step towards general and complete disarmament, to conclude the present Convention by appointing as their representatives

.....
 who, having communicated to each other their full powers found in good and due form, have agreed as follows :—

GENERAL PROVISIONS

Whereas a comparatively small number of the most powerful States, which aspire to a rôle of world domination, which expend on land, naval and air armaments a large portion of the national budget, and which possess the power at any moment to increase unduly the military resources of their policy of aggression by making use of a highly developed industry, have at their disposal the major part of land, naval and air armaments.

The Contracting States recognise that the only just method is that of the progressive reduction as regards the composition and number of all kinds of armaments, this method being the least injurious to the interests of the weakest States which are economically dependent on the stronger, and it is desirable to take this principle as a basis for the reduction of armaments.

o. Report to Third Session of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. by M. Litvinov, Chairman of Soviet Delegation to Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

Comrades, in reporting to you on the work of the Soviet Delegation at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and summing up the work done at its last two sessions, in which the Soviet Delegation took part, it seems to me not out of place to give a short summary of the history of the problem of disarmament during the last twelve years or so.

There is no need for me to plunge into the remote epochs of history—the dawn of humanity—when, as certain delegates at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission quite erroneously seemed to believe, aspirations towards general disarmament already existed. It will suffice for me to remark that the problem of disarmament never became an actual problem in international politics before the Great War. There is, of course, no need to make serious mention of the peace appeals of the Tsarist Government, whose hypocrisy was even then obvious to all and sundry. It was only shortly before the war that negotiations on the so-called “naval holidays,” to consist in the contracting parties (Great Britain and Germany) refraining for several years from further expansion of their naval forces, or rather, further construction of certain types of warships, began to be held between Great Britain and Germany. This attempt was, however, an absolute failure for the simple reason that, when war and military preparations are in question all parleys and negotiations, if only on partial reduction of armaments, become absurd, and as we are aware at that time preparations for war were going on by both sides at a feverish rate.

Veritable odes to peace began to be composed during the war itself. The louder the thunder of the guns, the more violent the explosion of shells and bombs, the louder grew the pæans to the glory of peace and general disarmament in those very circles then directing the war. For the encouragement of men being sent to certain death in the trenches, in submarines, and in aeroplanes, a legend of the “war to end war” was created, it was maintained that the world war was being waged simply and solely to put an end, once for all, to militarism and to wars between peoples. The outcries for a fight to a glorious finish were merged in hymns to pacifism.

This peculiar form of pacifism vaunted by the creators and apologists of the World War received its most striking embodiment in the famous Fourteen Points of President Wilson, which were afterwards made the foundation of the Armistice between the Allies and Germany. One of these points mentioned General Disarmament. Words and declarations bring with them certain obligations—if only to new words and declarations. And thus a reminder of the necessity for general disarmament found its way

into the Versailles Treaty, a beginning (and a fairly solid beginning at that) to be made by conquered Germany, the victorious countries promising to follow suit.

A special international organ, known to us as the League of Nations, was, on the proposal of Wilson, set up for the carrying out of that pacifism which went hand in hand with the carrying out of the World War and the conclusion of the Versailles and other Peace Treaties.

This League of Nations was intended by its creators to serve as a model for a peaceful family of nations.

After many vacillations and considerable delay the League of Nations took up the question of disarmament. I took the trouble at Geneva to count up and relate the number of meetings, commissions, sub-commissions and resolutions, devoted in the League of Nations itself to the question of disarmament. I found that enormous labour—only verbal and written, it is true—*quite disproportionate to the material results achieved*, has been expended on this matter. I called upon the Commission to ponder over the inadequacy of the results of the sum of their labours. Had all these meetings proceeded with the participation of the Soviet Delegation, nothing would have been easier than to attribute their fruitlessness to the “destructive activities and sabotage” of the Soviet Delegation. But we took no part in the first five or six years of the disarmament work of the League and the Commission had therefore to look for other causes, and, having found them, remove them and carry on their work along new lines, and this was what the Soviet Delegation called upon the Commission to do at its Fourth and Fifth Sessions.

At the very first steps towards considering the problem of disarmament taken by the League of Nations the bourgeois press began to express fears of the League's disarmament energies being paralysed by the fact that a great State—the U.S.S.R.—maintaining a great army and alleged to be unwilling to disarm, should remain outside the League. The credulous, reading the press of that time, might have believed that the members of the League and other bourgeois States found no obstacles whatsoever among themselves to disarmament and that nothing was required but the adherence of the Soviet Union to the idea of disarmament, no other military dangers existing but the “imperialistically-

inclined " Red Army. It was, however, impossible to keep on repeating these statements *ad infinitum*, without making any attempts to invite the Soviet State to take part in the League's disarmament work. And thus, the corresponding invitation to the Soviet Government was sent. There is no need, for me to relate to you the circumstances which gave these invitations at the beginning an almost derisive character. This invitation was somewhat reminiscent of that to take part in the Pacific Congress, recently sent to our Academy of Science by Dutch scientists. The Dutch scientists apparently not being without a sense of humour, invited our Academy of Science to the Congress, warning it at the same time that its delegates would scarcely be likely to be admitted to the territory on which the Congress would be held. In the same way we were invited to the first sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission in a country to which, as the League of Nations well knew, the Soviet Government was at that time unable to send delegates. The Soviet Government, however, at once accepted this invitation in principle and, as soon as external obstacles were removed, sent its delegation for active participation in the labours of the sub-commission.

The Soviet Government could not have done otherwise, for from the very first days of its existence it had appealed to all nations for disarmament.

Receiving such proposals from bourgeois Governments, the Soviet Government could not have rejected them merely because of its views on the capitalist structure, and the imperialism inseparable from it, merely because of its personal opinion of the sincerity of these proposals, the character of League of Nations pacifism, and so on. Sincerity or insincerity are best of all tested by action. By rejecting the proposal we should have made it possible for the League of Nations to place the responsibility for its own failures on the absent Soviet Government. Finally, if the bourgeois Governments, forced by public opinion in their own countries and pressure from the masses, declare themselves, if only in words, for disarmament and peace, why should we not take them at their word and demand the public transformation of these words into deeds? By setting up a commission or conference for disarmament, the League of Nations, whether it likes it or not, is setting up and legalising an international tribunal

for propaganda of the idea of peace and disarmament. Was it for us to let such an opportunity slip?

At the November Session of the Preparatory Commission I immediately made a frank declaration that I considered this Commission to be the most suitable tribune for the propaganda of peace and disarmament, and that the Soviet Delegation intended to make the most of this opportunity. The Soviet Government and its official agents are frequently falsely suspected and accused of propaganda, precisely where they themselves consider propaganda impermissible and contradictory to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other States. Where, however, we really do make propaganda without infringing international standards and customs, and even for the furtherance of international tasks, on the invitation of a bourgeois international organisation, there is no reason for us to deny publicly this propaganda—propaganda for peace. *What we witnessed at Geneva at the two last Sessions of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission convinced us that without the most energetic and intensive peace propaganda Disarmament will not move forward one step. We, of course, make propaganda in the Bolshevik way : when we advocate peace we do not mean qualified peace, but real, complete, unconditional, immediate peace. When we say disarmament, we mean complete thorough immediate disarmament.* If this is rejected, we want an explanation of the obstacles to it and then we can consider how to get rid of them. If other States are unable to prove the existence of insuperable obstacles and yet reject our proposals, this only confirms that they don't want disarmament because it conflicts with their policy, but let them not try and make out that the Soviet Government, the Red Army, alleged Red Imperialism, are the only obstacles to the establishment of peace on earth.

At the November Session of the Preparatory Commission we got the idea of disarmament discussed on principle. The Commission was at that time not courageous enough to reject our proposition finally, either formally or actually. In November the delegations of the bourgeois countries were still shaky in their knowledge of the Covenant of the League of Nations and therefore did not point out to us the incompatibility of complete disarmament with the rules of the League of Nations. Moreover, no real arguments against the practicability of complete dis-

armament were put forward. It is true our proposals were stigmatised as utopian, but utopianism is always a controversial matter. After all, comrades, we ourselves exist thanks to the realisation of that which was considered by many utopian. The Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, taken unawares and thus unable to get up any objections, formal or otherwise, to our propositions, contented itself with postponing their consideration till the Fifth Session, when they hoped to be in a position to counter our "radical" proposal for complete disarmament with their own evolutionary conception of partial disarmament. The Soviet Delegation, having wrung a formal consent from the Commission to the inclusion in the agenda of the Fifth Session of a proposal for complete disarmament, drew up a draft for an international convention and sent it out for the consideration of all Governments a month before the opening of the Fifth Session. Thus delegations to Geneva were able not only to acquaint themselves in detail beforehand with our Draft Convention, but even to receive instructions from their Governments. Knowing as we do the outcome of the discussions, we can easily guess at the character of these instructions.

The overwhelming majority of Governments represented in the Commission decided to reject *in toto* our proposal for general and complete disarmament. But it would have been politically speaking not quite the thing to reject it simply because the Governments considered complete disarmament undesirable and unacceptable, and therefore they were forced to consent to preliminary consideration of our Draft Convention—a consideration which they hoped would expose it to the utmost possible criticism and derision. Some of the Delegations considered the public consideration of our Draft Convention impolitic from their personal point of view, and therefore diffident attempts were made to get up some sort of a sub-commission for its consideration. This would also have satisfied another aim—some further protraction of the labours of the Preparatory Commission which, as has become plain to all, finds itself in a blind alley from which it is helplessly endeavouring to find a way out. The creation of a new sub-commission with its appearance of continued disarmament activities, would undoubtedly have afforded a temporary relief. A sub-commission for the "serious and thorough study"

of our proposal would have demanded no little time and such a procedure would have been fully compatible with the rate and methods of previous labours of the League of Nations with regard to disarmament. This would have been, however, to reckon without their host, at the moment indubitably the Soviet Delegation, which declared that it could only agree to absolutely public and open consideration of its Draft Convention by the Commission itself, and which stuck firmly to this declaration.

Comrades, the fact that, whatever the results of the discussion, the Soviet Government managed to get the idea of full and general disarmament brought forward for discussion in an international arena, despite serious obstacles, for the first time in international history, must be considered an enormous achievement and a historic fact of the first importance.

This idea may be temporarily rejected, but the whole world has had now the opportunity of knowing every objection that can be raised against general disarmament, and everybody can now form his personal opinion as to the plausibility or otherwise of the criticism with which a proposal for full disarmament has to meet.

It seems to me that every impartial person is forced to admit, on acquaintance with the debates at the Fifth Session, that the idea of general disarmament passed the test of all-round criticism with flying colours.

The debates were participated in by nineteen delegations. Of these, if I am not mistaken, seventeen brought forward arguments against general disarmament, while one—the representative for Great Britain—delivered a two-hour speech. He even somewhat overstepped the limits of the theme under discussion, but we have not the least objection to this. Nay, we are ready in the future if we should attend another session of the Preparatory Commission, to debate with him on any theme of international politics. What then did the seventeen delegations find unacceptable in our proposal and in the idea of general disarmament? What proofs did they produce of the impracticability of this idea. You are probably aware of all the replies made by me at the Commission to these criticisms, my speech having been published in the Soviet press almost in full. I will only dwell upon a few of the arguments produced. Not each speaker, of course, had any new or original arguments to produce. In fact, they frequently repeated each

other and not all their arguments were of equal value. Several speakers, for example, pointed out in reproachful terms that the Preparatory Disarmament Commission had already worked out at its first three sessions methods for the solution of the question of disarmament (of course, partial disarmament), and that by our new Draft Convention we were annulling all this work and destroying all the labour already expended. The very chairman of the Commission felt himself entitled in his closing speech to stigmatise the work of the Soviet Delegation as destructive, on the grounds that it proposed cancelling work already done and introducing new projects instead of continuing with those already begun upon. This can, of course, not be considered a serious argument worthy of serious reply. If the foundations of a building are found to be rotten or their materials faulty in course of its construction, creative work will consist, not in the continuation of building operations, but in the speediest possible laying of new foundations, or the substitution of faulty materials by new. And that all is not well with the work begun at the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission is shown by the fact that neither the Fourth nor the Fifth Session were able to go on with their constructive work and that not even a date for the Sixth Session could be fixed. Moreover, before we appeared upon the scene the Commission busied itself exclusively with the question of partial disarmament; we proposed something else—complete disarmament.

Others objected that armaments are not the only cause of war and that consequently other causes giving rise to war would remain even after disarmament. Perfectly true. It is, however, equally true that armaments are the only means of warfare, and that war cannot be waged without armaments. By the way, this contention was also disputed in the Commission, some speakers maintaining that even after disarmament and the abolition of all armed forces and the dissolution of all armies and navies, war will still be possible and can be carried on with the help of police, militias, night-watchmen, prison-warders, forest-guards, and so on. We are asked to imagine that capitalist Governments will one fine day leave exposed all police posts, abandon towns and villages to be plundered by criminals, leave that private property so dear to them defenceless, forget even their fear of internal disorders and

risings, and drive all the guardians of law and order to the field of battle. When we pointed out that according to our Draft Convention, police forces would not bear the character of military organisations, that they would not be under a national command but subordinated to local authorities and municipalities, we were then asked to give a guarantee that municipalities and towns would not use their police forces to make war on each other within the limits of their own State. It is a pity no one thought of pointing out the possibility of waging war with the help of fire brigades. This would have been quite worthy of the argument produced.

More serious, indeed on the surface, the most serious argument, must be considered the contention that the richest and most industrially developed countries would, in the case of complete disarmament, find it easier to achieve rapid re-armament than the smaller and poorer countries. Following up this idea some speakers reminded the Commission that just as human society includes criminal elements inclined to infringe the law, which make the maintenance of police forces essential, there are also criminal nations capable of infringing international conventions and consequently an international convention for complete disarmament, and that since our Draft Convention admits of no military sanctions, the poorer and less industrially developed countries would be in danger. Since the U.S.S.R. is at present scarcely in a position to boast of great riches and industrial development, it would appear that this suspicion does not attach to it. *Consciously or unconsciously the speakers undoubtedly hinted that such criminal nations were likely to be found among the Great Powers, infringing the Convention and taking advantage of their industry and financial superiority to attack poorer agricultural countries. You will see from this that during the nine years of its existence the League of Nations, despite almost unintermittent joint meetings between representatives of various countries and constant meetings between their ministers, has been powerless to disperse in the slightest degree their mutual suspicions, even to get a solemn public act such as a Convention for complete disarmament considered inviolable.* After this it is scarcely to be wondered at that moral disarmament and the building up of an international morale are the chief subject of discussion in the League of Nations. It looks

as if the morals of capitalist States were greatly in need of reinforcement.

The sincerity of the argument I have just quoted against complete disarmament, may, however, evoke certain doubts if we remember that it was brought forward not by delegates from small agricultural countries, but by representatives of great States such as Great Britain and Italy. Great Britain is entitled to consider itself among the richest, most industrially developed countries of the world, and, unless a hint was intended at the possibility of the infringement of the Convention by the still richer United States of America, Lord Cushendun apparently assumed the rôle here of an impartial advocate for the poorer countries, defending them against his own nation. In terms of every-day language his argument amounts to this : if all countries disarm under an international convention, England, as one of the richest and most industrially developed nations, will be unable to resist the temptation hurriedly and secretly to re-arm and attack the disarmed nations.

I mentioned in Geneva that such a secret re-creation of armies and navies and absolutely secret preparations for war was a practical impossibility, and I will therefore not repeat here my counter-blasts to this argument. I should like merely to remark that it is our own Soviet State that has the greatest grounds for lack of faith in the participators of the proposed convention, owing to existing relations and bitter experience. I recall the precise words said to me by Lenin during the consideration of the proposals made by us in 1919 to President Wilson through Bullitt. You will remember perhaps that we received at that time a proposal for an armistice on all fronts in the civil war on the basis of the cessation of military action, and the cessation of all transport of military materials and effectives. Lenin said to me : " We will observe all these conditions. But is there any guarantee that our enemies will ? " We were faced at that time by one of the most criminal of international adventures—military intervention, by white bandits—and the suspicions of Lenin were more than justified. Despite this, however, our desire for the speediest possible cessation of bloodshed was so great that even our lack of confidence did not prevent us from drawing up the conditions I have just mentioned and transmitting them to

Bullitt. To-day also, *great and legitimate as are our suspicions of the bourgeois countries, great as would be for us the danger of infringement by them of an international convention, we nevertheless shall not refrain from further endeavours and from the intensification of these endeavours for the realisation of the great idea of complete disarmament and the ending of warfare by international agreements.*

The delegations, feeling the weakness of their arguments, were forced to come into the open. While Lord Cushendun, a finished politician, referred only in the most veiled indirect way to the relations between the reduction of armaments and the possibilities of civil war, other delegates were not so subtle. The Dutch delegate, for example, said that disarmament was impossible owing to the "extremely serious danger of internal disorder, insurrections, risings, and revolutions." Such movements are, he said, at this moment on foot and systematically and scientifically being prepared.

I could not, of course, deny that in capitalist countries troops might be intended also for the suppression of revolutionary risings, and there was nothing left for me but to point to the rôle played by the Tsarist army during the March and November Revolutions. *In any case, it emerges that one of the arguments against complete disarmaments is the necessity of suppressing internal risings and that the present powerful armies with their super-dreadnoughts, aeroplanes, zeppelins, bombers, tanks, etc., are required for this purpose.*

The delegates, no doubt themselves feeling such arguments to be a little ticklish, did not dwell upon them long. Most of all they clung to arguments of a formal nature. The Covenant of the League, it was alleged, forbids its members to carry out total disarmament since its Article 8 imposes upon members of the League disarming only in accordance with the requirements of security, and other articles demand military sanctions against countries attacking any members of the League, which sanctions require troops. We pointed out in vain that in the first place Article 8, while compelling States to carry out partial disarmament, by no means forbids total disarmament; in the second place, that it would be cheaper and more advantageous for the nations to change this or that Article of the Covenant of the League of

Nations than to pay vast sums for the maintenance of armies and navies ; and, thirdly, that given total disarmament, attacks would be impossible and military sanctions against attackers therefore unnecessary. The delegates, however, would not budge an inch, declaring the Covenant of the League to be a limit not to be overstepped and total disarmament incompatible with the membership of the League of Nations. They ought to know. If any of us had ever dared to say that the League of Nations, supposed to have been brought into being for the establishment of peace on earth and, according, if I am not mistaken, to the Polish delegation, the *only* guardian of peace, is an obstacle to the disarmament of nations, we should have been accused of slandering the League. But here we have *the members of the League themselves solemnly declaring that their hands are tied with regard to disarmament precisely because they belong to the League of Nations.*

To what then did their arguments against our Draft Convention amount ? I have already told you that the delegations at first refrained from saying outright that our draft convention was only rejected because total disarmament is not desired by the majority of capitalist countries, and endeavoured to produce external arguments against our proposals. When these arguments were confounded one after another and the speakers themselves felt they were unconvincing, the delegations were forced to resort at last to references to the unwillingness of their Governments to disarm, for what is the Eighth Article of the Covenant of the League but the formal registration and precise formulation of the undesirability for members of the League of total disarmament and the cessation of warfare ?

It is with satisfaction that we are able to make the statement that the first discussion between States in an international arena of total disarmament has shown the absence of any real external obstacles whatsoever to the realisation of this idea and that the proposals of the Soviet Government in this regard met only with obstacles arising from the present policy of capitalist countries, continuing to regard the conduct of war as an inseparable element of this policy, and moreover, requiring to maintain their armaments for the defence of the capitalist regime.

Extremely significant was the declaration of one of the most cynical of the delegates—the representative for Belgium—stating

that our proposals for total disarmament "were imbued with the spirit of enmity towards civilisation and all that is dear" to capitalist States. There can be only one interpretation of this: by proposing to abolish armed forces we are endeavouring to deprive the capitalist regime and all that it chooses to consider civilisation of its only support.

Among the delegations at the Commission quite a special place was occupied by the German Delegation, acting parallel with the Soviet Delegation throughout the session, and frankly supporting our project for total disarmament as a base for the work of the Commission and the immediate consideration of our second disarmament project.

It is also satisfactory to note that the Soviet Delegation received considerable support from the Turkish Delegation, taking part in the work of the Preparatory Commission for the first time, and, together with us and the German Delegation, energetically opposing all attempts to shelve our Draft Convention in any sub-commissions, to silence it or secretly strangle it. The Turkish Delegation spoke in favour of our Draft Convention for total disarmament being transmitted to the coming International Disarmament Conference, even if not approved by the Preparatory Commission.

As was to have been expected after the debates with which several meetings were taken up, a resolution for the rejection of our Draft Convention and the very idea of general disarmament was brought. The authors of this resolution, allowing to our project apparent popularity among the masses, endeavoured at first to sweeten the pill by saying that the idea of total disarmament, although corresponding to the ideals of humanity, was impracticable in present conditions.

A more outspoken delegate was, however, found to point out the unsuitability of referring to human ideals in this resolution, obviously considering total disarmament impossible and undesirable, not only in present, but in any conditions. This service was rendered by the representative of the Polish Republic, who proposed a short resolution stating that the Commission considered our project unacceptable, without giving any motives. We don't like it, and that's that. This was, of course, much more in line with the lack of arguments displayed in the course of the

debates. The Delegate for the Finnish Republic, the former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Holsti, at one time desirous of making an alliance between his country and Poland, but prevented in this by the resistance of his Government and his own party, hastened to give emphatic support to the Polish proposal. Leaving aside the German and Turkish delegations, it must be admitted that the unanimity in the decisions of the Commission was largely due to the fact that the proposals emanated from the Soviet Delegation, and that the desire to demonstrate a united front against it frequently prevailed over all other considerations. Otherwise it would be difficult to understand why the representatives of the smaller States, who can have no imperialistic dreams, and even the representative of a country like Bulgaria, disarmed under terms of the Peace Treaty, together with Germany, and having everything to gain from the disarmament of other countries should be against the idea of total disarmament.

You will see that the Soviet Delegation in Geneva was placed in a position of anything but equality, and this will give you some idea of the conditions in which Soviet Delegations have to work at international conferences. This remarkable inequality was more vividly demonstrated somewhat later, but I will refer to this further.

Having rejected our draft convention for total disarmament the Commission proceeded to the third point on the agenda, described as "the state of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission." This state was a sorry one, and the chairman reported on it in dismal tones. To a question of the German Delegation the Chairman replied at the very beginning of the Session that during the discussion of this point of the agenda any proposals whatsoever having any sort of relation to disarmament, could be made. Profiting by this, the German Delegation made a very modest proposal for the compulsory publication in the League of Nations Annual of full statistics of their armed forces by all States. The Commission, however, decided that this proposal should be discussed during the second reading of the Preparatory Commission's Draft Convention for the reduction of armaments, which underwent its first reading at the third sitting. When the German delegation proposed that this second reading should be made, it appeared that this was also impossible since the dissensions arising at the first reading between the Great

Powers have so far not been harmonised. It might have been thought that the Preparatory Commission had been set up precisely for joint consideration of proposals and joint settling of any dissensions arising. How often have we heard that it is the greatest merit of the League of Nations that it affords the possibility of frequent meetings between the representatives of the various States for the solution of all conflicts and dissensions between them? It appears, however, that this merit is of extremely limited significance, and that even the dissensions arising in the process of the work of the League itself and its organs, must be solved by way of secret diplomatic parleys. By way of consoling the Commission the French delegate stated that the dissensions which arose in the Commission were already under consideration and that hopes existed of an agreement being arrived at some time or other. To this, the Delegate for Great Britain, a member of the British Cabinet, added that he also had heard something of such conversations, although he knew nothing about them. The Italian Delegate hastened to state that he and his Government not only knew nothing of such conversations but had even heard nothing of them, and added the warning that the Italian Government also had its disagreements with the Commission, which would in no way be affected by any agreement arrived at behind the scenes between other States and without its participation. On the basis of all this the Commission decided that the second reading of its own Draft Convention should be postponed to the next session, the date of which could not be fixed, as no one knew when the expected agreement between the States mentioned would take place. Such a decision practically amounted to the cessation of the activities of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, at least for an indefinite period. The German delegate therefore proposed that the Commission admit its powerlessness to deal with the difficulties arising and recommend the Council of the League of Nations to call immediately an International Disarmament Conference, capable, thanks to its greater authority, to deal with those difficulties out of which the Preparatory Commission was unable to extricate itself.

This proposal which, of course, had not the ghost of a chance, was rejected.

The Soviet Delegation now stated that its project for total

disarmament having been rejected on the declaration of the majority of the delegations on behalf of their Governments that they could only consider schemes for partial disarmament, it would place a completely worked out new project for partial disarmament for the immediate consideration of the Commission. The Soviet Delegation was simple enough to imagine that by this project they were helping the Commission out of a very tight corner, and saving it from discredit. To our astonishment, however, most of the Delegations were almost more bitter in their opposition to our new project than they had been to the first, this time insisting on the immediate closing of the Session. We were once again accused of demanding that the Commission go back on its tracks in proposing to it the immediate consideration of the disarmament project, and our proposal was found to run counter to the more progressive proposal of the French delegation to close the session and go home.

The stir evoked by our second project was so considerable that the Chairman of the Commission even found it necessary to reassure the meeting at once by an exceedingly determined declaration that our new project would in no case be submitted to the consideration of the present Session. Three times I tried vainly to get the Chairman to give his reasons for this declaration, but could get no satisfactory replies or explanations. All that could be elucidated was that the Delegates had not been prepared for our project, had not studied it, and had no instructions from their Governments. I was forced to remind the Chairman and the Commission itself that when draft conventions for disarmament had been offered by other delegations they have been immediately discussed, the American Delegation requesting its Government for telegraphic instructions and the Commission actually postponing the sittings for several days pending a reply from America. I demanded equal rights for the Soviet Delegation and its proposals, but here also no satisfactory reply was forthcoming. By now a state of mind prevailed in the Commission making it useless to expect reasonable logical and well-grounded discussion. A general resolution for the rejection of our first project for total disarmament and the postponement of the discussion of our second project, the German Delegation's proposal, and the second reading of the Commission's own project until the next Session,

the date for which was left to the discretion of the Chairman, was hurriedly passed.

The clause in the original draft of the resolution as to the obligation of the Chairman to summon the Commission not later than the next General Assembly of the League, *i.e.*, not later than September next, was, on the proposal of the American Delegation, withdrawn, or rather substituted by an amendment stipulating that the Session be called "*if possible* not later than the next General Assembly of the League."

What are the prospects for the further work of the League of Nations on Disarmament? It is quite obvious that the majority of the delegates have already made up their minds, if not completely to ignore our Second Draft Convention (for partial disarmament) at least not to consider it separately, but merely along with the second reading of their own project. This second reading will, however, only be possible when and if the present diplomatic negotiations lead to the removal of existing dissensions. If such an agreement is not arrived at the Preparatory Commission will probably never be called again.

My report on the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission made to the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party was published at the time in our press. In this report I gave a detailed summary of the so-called Draft Conventions produced by the Preparatory Commission itself, the second reading of which we have just spoken about. These projects, I would remind you, contain not a single figure, not a single formula, for the reduction of armaments. They merely enumerate the types of weapons, military supplies, different categories of war materials, naval and air armaments to be reduced. The extent to which this reduction must be made is, however, not mentioned in the Draft Convention. The dissensions between the Great Powers which they are trying to solve by diplomatic means were evoked by the mere nomenclature and enumeration of what was to be reduced. Even so these dissensions could not be settled in the course of twelve months. Only when the long-awaited agreement as to nomenclature is at last arrived at, and adhered to by those States taking no part in the secret negotiations, and if no new dissensions as to nomenclature arise after the second reading, will the actual numerical determination of standards for armed

forces, separately for every object of nomenclature and for every country, begin. It will then be necessary to establish precisely how many rifles, cannon, aeroplanes, etc., each country is to be allowed. But this project provides for no general co-efficients or criteria for the carrying out of this highly complicated, delicate, and controversial work. The Preparatory Commission and the hypothetical Disarmament Conference are to be ruled by the 8th Article of the Covenant of the League of Nations, providing for every State to reduce its armaments according to its own security, geographical position, etc. No incontrovertible criteria for this security, of course, exist. It is legitimate to ask ourselves if dissensions as to nomenclature between a few States cannot be settled in the course of twelve months, how many years or decades will be needed for fifty or sixty States to agree upon the relative degree of security required for each of them and the relative quantity of armaments to correspond with this debatable degree of security?

The speech of the Japanese representative at the Preparatory Commission, in which he said in so many words that each State must first of all individually feel assured of its security before laying down arms, will give some idea of the dissensions which inevitably will be evoked at the Disarmament Conference by such methods of work. The security of a State then is a matter for its own individual feeling and decision and no one has the right to lay down the degree of security enjoyed by each State. Only the State itself can know whether it is secure or not, and since the establishment of standards of armament are to depend on security, in the last resort the State itself will have to decide what armaments it requires. Why then, one is tempted to ask, international agreements, Conventions, and Conferences.

Those, however, who believe that if at the expiration of so many years or decades complete agreement as to the reduction of armaments be arrived at, such reduction will be immediately carried out, are doomed to disappointment. Some idea of the rate of this work is given by the following speech of Professor Politis, member of the Presidium of the Preparatory Commission and extremely influential and well versed in the spirit of the League of Nations. The following are his actual words :

“ The realisation of the programme laid down in Article 8,

modest as it may seem to the impatient, involves the fulfilment of a whole series of conditions. It involves the extension of peaceful procedures, the strengthening of the moral and material guarantees of security, the development of good understanding and mutual confidence between peoples ; it involves also economic stabilisation ; it involves further the settlement of those grave problems to which my distinguished friend General de Marinis alluded yesterday—problems which seem for the present insoluble owing to the imperfections and deficiencies of international law. Yet again—and this is not the end of the list—there is another condition to be fulfilled : it is essential that within each country there should be brought about that pacification of opinion, that domestic peace, that cessation of systematic class warfare to which Lord Cushendun referred yesterday. Only when all these conditions are fulfilled can the programme of Article 8 be completely and effectively realised.”

Comment is unnecessary, since it is quite clear what results are to be expected in the matter of disarmament from such methods of work, insisted upon by the Preparatory Commission, ready to reject, for the sake of such methods, the Soviet delegation’s clear and precise proposals, with their impartial, general co-efficients for proportional disarmament, with certain exceptions in favour of the smaller States.

Such were the methods which the Preparatory Commission and the Chairman of the Commission himself in his closing speech accused us of infringing. After this is it possible for anybody with the slightest claims to impartiality to be in doubt as to what elements in the Preparatory Commission really wanted to push forward the matter of disarmament, and who was doing the sabotaging of that matter ?

If the aim of the Soviet Delegation at Geneva had been simply to discredit the League of Nations, to expose the capitalist States represented in it, and, as Lord Cushendun expressed it, to tear from it the mask of pacifism, we might be highly satisfied with the results of the Fifth Session. There would be no need for us to speak or write about this, since the bourgeois press itself, openly writing of the fiasco of the League of Nations, of its falling into disrepute and of its almost catastrophical condition, has done this most effectively.

Inasmuch, however, as we aspire to urge all nations towards real immediate and maximum disarmament, we are bound to express our sincere disappointment and extreme regret over the outcome of the work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission and the melancholy conditions of the matter of disarmament made manifest to us at the session.

That pacifism which I described in the beginning of my speech is looking for new paths and forms of expression. Almost simultaneously with the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission we heard of the proposal of the United States Government addressed to certain chosen States for the prohibition of war as a means of national policy. The majority of the delegations, as I have already shown, rejected the idea of total disarmament, because in their opinion war was still likely to be inevitable and necessary for the guarantee of the security of individual States and the removal of existing international injustices. As the Dutch representative told us, we cannot expect the realisation of the ideal of peace to-day from men, nations and Governments making up the human community, whose imperfections, errors, mistakes, cupidities and rivalries, not to mention their hatreds, recur on every page of history and are experienced daily. The moment has not arrived when countries can lay down the arms they carry in the defence of justice. And yet here we have a State proposing to refrain for ever from the conduct of war and the solution of international dissensions by armed conflicts. It might have been thought that this State at least would support our proposal for total disarmament, since armies and navies are merely instruments for war or the threat of war. If we have no intention of making or threatening war, why expend millions of national money on the maintenance of such armies and navies. I put this question to the American delegate at Geneva, without, however, getting a very convincing reply. He said that he had never believed that "suppression of armaments would alone and by itself have the effect of creating the confidence which is so necessary to the successful conclusion of our tasks." I was not quite clear as to which of "our" tasks he meant. If he meant peace in general, it might be supposed that it would be easier to place confidence in a neighbouring State which showed its devotion to peace by destroying all warlike equipment, than when it

stood before us armed to the teeth and increasing its armaments, while promising not to attack us. Had the United States demanded as a supplement to disarmament the moral prohibition of war, we should have been the first to support such a proposal. But how are we to understand the logic of our opponents if, on the one hand they reject total disarmament, on the grounds that, while disarming and pledging themselves by an international convention not to arm in the future, *i.e.*, giving also a moral pledge not to attack or make war, the nations would secretly arm and attack their neighbours, and on the other hand, they state that full confidence may be placed in States remaining fully armed and merely signing a paper prohibiting war in the future? Or is it that a mutual pledge not to make war requires no confidence inasmuch as no one will disarm and in case of infringement of the pledge that good old method of war can always be resorted to? But would such an international pledge be much good? Would the nations feel any relief from such a pledge if they have to go on as usual paying taxes at the previous or increased rates for the preservation and development of armed forces, if they are still to remain under the threat of war? Since the American delegation in Geneva did not see its way to explain away its own paradox, we ourselves must seek replies to our own questions. I would therefore draw your attention to the formulation of the American proposal. It does not speak of the prohibition of war in general, but merely of the prohibition of war "as a means of national policy." Such a qualification leads us to suppose that certain aspects of war will retain their legality. If we had made any such proposal our lynx-eyed opponents would no doubt have hastened to draw the conclusion that we were leaving a loophole for civil war. No one, however, would dare to make such an implication with regard to the Government of the United States, and yet it is obvious that some aspect of war is to remain legalised. What can this be? Is it perhaps intended to preserve war for the solution of international equity as understood by the ruling States, or for the (of course, disinterested), solution of other people's conflicts, or war in the name of Humanity, as Humanity is understood by the capitalist States, or, finally, war for the defence of that civilisation for which the representative of Belgium pleaded, against those barbarians he was thinking of?

If we are right in our surmise it becomes clear why the American delegation rejected the idea of total disarmament.

I think we have sufficiently described and determined the pacifism of capitalist Governments, originating from the advocates of a fight to a finish, to enable us to distinguish it from that sincere desire for peace consistently shown by the Soviet Government. We have no need to appeal to the impartial historian, since among our own contemporaries there must be not a few, perhaps even millions, capable of drawing this distinction and already doing so.

Our opponents could find no better means of slurring over this distinction and endeavouring to discredit the peace-loving activities of the Soviet Delegation, the character of which became especially clear to the broad masses after the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission, than once more to spread ridiculous rumours through the accommodating French press as to an attack in preparation by the Soviet Union on its nearest neighbours—Latvia, Esthonia, Rumania, and Poland. The Soviet Government, they would have you know, is undergoing such difficulties and crises as can only be solved by some sort of military adventure. We know some of the sources of these rumours ; we know the diplomats and military attaches who are especially zealous in the circulation of these rumours, which they themselves, of course, do not believe. But it is just because we do know the sources of these rumours that we understand their danger : is there not an analogous purpose behind these rumours ? Are they not intended to form a smoke-screen to obscure preparations for direct or indirect attack on the Soviet Union ? However this may be, what are these absurd rumours worth (by the way, they are nowhere so ridiculed as in the neighbouring Baltic countries) when brought face to face with our systematically peaceful policy ? Are these rumours capable of annulling facts such as our frequent appeals, first and foremost to our next-door neighbours, and then to all nations, for disarmament ? Can they do away with our public declaration on an international arena of our readiness to disband our Red Army, Navy and all armed forces, on such measures being taken by other States ? Did we not, long before the initiative of the United States, propose to all States to conclude non-aggression and neutrality pacts ? The pledge not to attack and to

observe neutrality (*i.e.* to take no part in wars between third parties) is in itself to refrain from the conduct of war, in itself a prohibition of war, and this was absolutely unconditional on our part. *Not a single act of the Soviet Government in the sphere of foreign policy can be interpreted as an attack on the interests of another nation.* We, on the other hand, could enumerate a whole series of facts from the foreign policy of other countries which a sophist himself could not interpret as manifestations of a peace policy. One example may be given in referring to the latest declaration of Mr. Kellogg in regard to the Soviet Union, which is anything but on the lines of establishing the peaceful co-existence of nations. The policy pursued by him with regard to the U.S.S.R. cannot be said to be in furtherance of the peaceful settlement of international controversies. Again, can the action of the Bank of France, actively supported by the French Government, be regarded as peace-loving? I refer to the hunting of the French bank, to the amusement of the whole world, after Soviet gold for the satisfaction of some mythical claims, not even known to our Government. I myself, more than anybody else, was astonished at this affair, for in 1921 I was Chief Representative of the Council of People's Commissars for Currency Operations and the realisation of our gold abroad. I was then in Reval and gold worth several hundred million roubles passed through my hands. Much of this gold was sold by me directly or through various agents for big French firms, who sent it either to France or Switzerland, whence it found its last home in the safes of the American Federal Reserve Bank. This was no secret and the Bank of France and other banks were informed of it. At the time tense relations existed between us and France and France was still taking active part, direct or indirect, in armed attacks on us, diplomatic relations not existing between the two countries. At that time the French Bank never thought of laying hands on our gold arriving in France; it decided on this hostile act seven years later, after normal relations between ourselves and France had been established and a conference for the regulation of mutual claims of the two countries had been set up. What was this but an attempt to undermine the patient persevering work of the Soviet and French delegations, and the agreement drawn up by them which was the only possible base for the regulation of mutual

claims? Could the rupture of this work in any way assist the peaceful settlement of international disagreements? Must it not, on the contrary, increase the breach and hostility between the two nations?

Even if we leave out of the question the continual hostile sallies against us by other countries, we must record an intensification all over the world of late of those very diplomatic and militarist tendencies which led in 1914 to a world war. The events which marked the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission implied nothing more or less than the triumph of that very militarism which preceded and accompanied this war. Under the mask of pacifist phraseology as to security guarantees and pacts of non-aggression, the same sort of political combinations, which were the fruit of pre-war diplomacy, are being manœuvred. Innocent-seeming treaties of non-aggression and arbitration, or, rather, supplementary secret agreements to them are now being worked out not only in foreign offices, but even in some countries in the general staffs of their armies and navies. This is no mere surmise on my part, but a fact as to which the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has the most reliable information. The only Soviet State at present in existence is as yet too weak to influence the threatening course of international events. It can only warn the peoples against the danger threatening them, and the louder its warning voice and its appeals for peace and disarmament, the greater will be the efforts of other Governments to silence this voice at all costs and to discredit it with insinuations, scurrilous slander, provocative rumours, etc. Our activities at the Fourth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission evoked the famous forged Stalin article. Immediately after our speeches at the Fifth Session rumours were spread of our alleged aggressive intentions towards the Baltic countries, and a few days ago a malicious insinuation was made by Sir William Joynson Hicks, the British Minister for Home Affairs, the instigator of the Arcos raid and the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations. I am convinced that faith in such rumours and information is on the wane, especially when they come from sources allied to the "Zinoviev letter factory," and thus this weapon against us will lose its edge.

The peaceful policy of the Soviet Government is not to be

changed by such attacks. So long as other Governments keep up such an irreconcilable position with regard to disarmament, we shall, of course, not weaken the defensive powers of our State, but will keep a watchful eye on all the movements of our innumerable foes. At the same time we declare as we have always declared that the underlying aim of Soviet policy and Soviet diplomacy is the desire to guarantee peaceful conditions for our internal creative work, without infringing on the national interests of any other States. The Soviet Government will not allow itself to be deflected from the path of that peaceful policy of which its proposal to all nations for complete, immediate, general disarmament is a striking demonstration. The Preparatory Disarmament Commission may have removed this question from its agenda, the League of Nations may consider total disarmament an unattainable ideal, or one to be achieved by humanity during the course of centuries at a snail's pace ; other delegates, like the representative for Poland, may endeavour even to strike disarmament from the list of the ideals of humanity, but the *Soviet Government will continue to strive for the inclusion of this ideal in the agenda of present-day problems and current policy and to get it realised, just as it endeavours to realise and is realising the other ideals of toiling humanity.*

p. Resolution of U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee on Report of Chairman of Soviet Delegation to Fifth Session of Preparatory Disarmament Commission. April 21st, 1928.

The U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee, having heard the report of Comrade M. Litvinov, Chairman of the Soviet Delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, expresses its approval of the activities of the Soviet Delegation, which, continuing to insist on its programme of complete disarmament, as the only thing capable of preventing the danger of armed conflicts between nations, and expressing the fundamental principles of the peace policy of the Soviet Government, nevertheless, in view of the utter impossibility of executing this programme in the face of the absolutely irreconcilable and hostile attitude to it of the majority of capitalist powers, introduced a draft for partial disarmament, which, while not entirely reflecting the aspirations of the Soviet Government towards the consolidation of peaceful relations between nations, would to a certain extent diminish the danger of

armed conflicts and the burden of armaments imposed upon the toiling masses.

The U.S.S.R. Central Executive Committee, pronouncing once more before the whole world the unalterable aspirations of the people of the Soviet Union towards peaceful co-existence with all other nations, and the determination of the Soviet Government to exert all efforts for the complete and final displacement of war as a method of solving conflicts between States, proposed to the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. to continue to adhere to the programme of full disarmament, not neglecting the least opportunity of achieving if only partial and temporary positive results in this sphere.

q. Litvinov's Declaration at the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. April 19th, 1929.

The passing of a resolution to-day by the Preparatory Commission, bringing to an end the discussion—only just begun—of the Soviet draft convention for partial reduction of armaments, and depriving the delegations of the opportunity to express themselves conclusively on the fundamental questions of disarmament, induces the Soviet delegation to make the following declarations :

1. The Soviet delegation first took part in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission about eighteen months ago, beginning with the Fourth Session. Although this session had no other questions directly regarding disarmament to consider, discussion of the draft convention for general and complete disarmament, presented by the Soviet delegation, was postponed until the next, the Fifth Session.

2. At the Fifth Session the above-mentioned draft convention was discussed and the opinion of a considerable number of delegations expressed, but it was rejected as soon as the fundamental question of the disability of carrying out complete disarmament was raised. No substantial arguments against the draft convention were put forward, with the exception of reminders of the necessity for maintaining troops for the suppression of civil wars and national risings, and references to statutes and instructions of the League of Nations, said to prevent the Preparatory Commission from dealing with the question of general disarmament.

3. A new draft convention was then presented by the Soviet delegation, this time for partial disarmament. The Soviet delegation's proposal for the immediate consideration of its draft was rejected, although proposals presented to the Preparatory Commission in similar circumstances by other delegations received immediate consideration. Without giving any motives the Fifth Session decided to postpone discussion of the Soviet draft until the Sixth Session, although there were no other points concerning disarmament on the agenda of the Fifth Session.

4. Despite the demand of the Soviet Delegation, no definite date was fixed for the next session and its convocation was left to the discretion of the President, and made to depend upon the issue of certain negotiations then going on between two States. After the lapse of five months, I sent an enquiry to the President of the Preparatory Commission as to the causes of the non-convocation of the Sixth Session. The same enquiry was repeated by me four months later, owing to the fact that the Commission had not been called, although the above-mentioned negotiations, on which the convocation of the session was supposed to depend, had already been completed.

5. The Sixth Session was not convoked by the President until thirteen months after the Fifth. The Soviet draft convention for partial reduction of armaments was submitted to discussion at three sittings, only seven delegates taking part in the debates on it, some of whom expressed themselves for its further consideration, while others, who expressed themselves against this, were unable to produce any substantial arguments either against the fundamental principles of the draft convention, or against the convention itself. The Soviet Delegation invited the other delegations to define their attitude towards such questions without the solution of which no plan for the reduction of armaments can be drawn up. Attempts were made by certain delegates to make League of Nations statutes and the limited competence of the Commission an excuse for evading a vote on these questions. Although, at the demand of these very delegates, the Bureau of the Commission gave as its considered opinion that the questions set by the Soviet Delegation are fully within the competence of the Commission and correspond to the nature of its work, the vote, which would have reflected the opinion of the delegates

and their Governments, was not taken, and in consequence the sittings devoted to the consideration of the Soviet draft convention proved mere wasted time. Indeed the whole of the Fourth, the Fifth, and part of the Sixth Session were completely fruitless, not taking a single definite decision which could have brought the Commission if only one step closer to the solution of the problem of disarmament. This was inevitable, for although the Commission had before it no other conventions whatsoever on which work could be continued with the slightest benefit, it rejected both Soviet Draft Conventions and all proposals made by the Soviet Delegation. The Draft Convention drawn up at the Third Session of the Commission, evoked by its vagueness and lack of any objective criteria for disarmament, controversies that the Governments concerned have been unable to reconcile in the course of over two years and that offer no hopes of disappearing in the near future.

6. In its declarations of November 30th, 1927, at the Fourth Session, and March 19th, 1928, at the Fifth Session, the Soviet Delegation gave an exhaustive appraisal of the work of the Commission up to those dates. The whole work of the Commission up to the present moment falls under this same appraisal, which fully confirms the scepticism with which the Soviet Government accepted the invitation of the League of Nations to take part in the Preparatory Commission. The Soviet Delegation is regretfully forced to state that its experience of co-operating in the Preparatory Commission leads it to extend this scepticism to the future work of the Commission also. The Soviet Delegation is now more than ever convinced that the ways and methods laid down by the Preparatory Commission cannot lead it to the solution of the problem before it.

The Commission has made no progress for two years and cannot even proceed along the path mapped out by itself, owing to obstacles, which, even if overcome, must inevitably give place to others. The Soviet Delegation is convinced that by the methods adopted so far it will be impossible for the Commission to prepare the necessary material for the Disarmament Conference, or material enabling the Disarmament Conference to pass any useful decisions. The only result of such activities by the Preparatory Commission can be the indefinite protraction of the question of

disarmament, or the preparation of the failure of the Disarmament Conference. These activities are, moreover, to be deprecated in that they conceal from the peoples in all countries, demanding disarmament, the policy of the Governments represented in the Preparatory Commission, which is chiefly directed in the majority of cases against any reduction of armaments whatsoever. Thus the Preparatory Commission acts as a sort of screen for the reluctance of the Governments to reduce their armaments, relieving them of responsibility in the matter of disarmament.

7. The consciousness of these facts might justify the Soviet Delegation in withdrawing from the Preparatory Commission. Its decision to remain, nevertheless, in the Commission is chiefly due to those same considerations which induced the Soviet Government, despite its negative attitude to the League of Nations and its organs, to send a delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, namely, to give no excuse for attributing the failure and lack of results of the Preparatory Commission and Disarmament Conference to the non-participation in them of representatives of the Soviet Government. Public opinion the world over must be informed that the Soviet Delegation from the first day of its work in the Preparatory Commission has taken the most active part in that work, presenting definite and perfectly practicable proposals in the direction of the utmost possible disarmament, exposing all arguments tending against disarmament, and all who, under various excuses, or with specious arguments, impede the matter of disarmament. The Soviet Delegation intends to go on fulfilling this, its task, thoroughly realising the utter lack of seriousness and the uselessness of the work to be done by the Commission in its sessions and sittings, so long as the concrete proposals made by the Soviet Delegation are ignored. The Soviet Delegation remains in the Preparatory Commission in the hope that the other Governments there represented will find themselves forced, by the pressure of public opinion, and especially by the demands of workers' organisations, to agree, if not to complete disarmament, at least to substantial reduction of armaments, when their representatives in the Preparatory Commission must inevitably be forced to turn again to those very Soviet proposals which the present instructions of their Governments have so far caused them to reject.

r. Litvinov's Speech at the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. May 6th, 1929.

M. Litvinov (U.S.S.R.) : The Soviet Delegation, in its declaration of April 19th last, which was distributed to all the delegations, gave a summary of the previous work of the Preparatory Commission, and made certain prophecies as to the further activities of the Commission. I should be very glad to be able, in summing up to-day the work of the Sixth Session, to acknowledge that the prophecies of the Soviet Delegation have not been fulfilled. I must, however, to my own great regret, assert that the results of the Sixth Session have justified the most gloomy prophecies which could possibly have been made beforehand. We were only wrong on one point ; it seemed to us that, following a path blocked by many and unavoidable obstacles, the Commission would either be unable to overcome those obstacles and would simply mark time, or would only surmount them to come up against fresh ones. It is true that not one of the obstacles in the way has been overcome, but it would nevertheless be incorrect to accuse the Commission of having merely marked time during the Sixth Session. We did not foresee a third issue out of the situation—namely, the possibility of that backward movement which has marked the work of the Sixth Session. Previous sessions, merely marking time, may have produced neutral results ; this session, which has at last made a move, but a move backwards, can claim results which are actually negative.

Indeed, the Commission, following the line of least resistance, has simply removed from the draft convention all those more important clauses which formerly evoked controversy among the delegations. A list of disarmament proposals rejected and withdrawn would undoubtedly be longer than a list of the positive decisions taken by the Sixth Session. To show that I am not speaking without my book, I will enumerate the chief proposals rejected by the Commission without reference to the most serious event of this session—the rejection of the Soviet Draft Convention, with all the advantages it indubitably has over the Draft Convention considered by the Commission. Within the limits of this last-named convention, the Commission, rejected one after another the amendments of the Soviet Delegation on the prohibition of the preparation for chemical warfare, and aerial bombarding.

The Commission excluded from the Convention the clause on the limitation of military reserves, and the whole section on war material for land armaments. It rejected proposals with regard to limitation of stocks of aerial armaments. It refused to draw up a detailed list of war-like weapons to be limited, thus complicating the passing of a decision on the complete withdrawal from armies of those weapons which are particularly aggressive and fraught with special danger for the civil population. The Commission refused to draw up a detailed list of the various grades of land effectives and aviation specialists, failing which effective limitation of the potential employment of military forces will be practically impossible. It rejected the proposal for the obligatory limitation of land and air forces separately in home countries and colonies. It turned down the Soviet proposals for the prohibition of employing newly-invented weapons of destruction. Finally, it did not consider the proposal of the Chinese Delegation for the abolition of compulsory military service even worthy of consideration. This is, of course, by no means an exhaustive list of the negative decisions passed by the Commission. I consider, however, the refusal to adopt the principle of the reduction of any elements of armed forces whatsoever—the principle of disarmament—to be the turning point in the history, not only of the Sixth Session, but of the Preparatory Commission itself.

I would venture once more to remind you that, when the Soviet Delegation, at the beginning of the Sixth Session, placed before the Commission three fundamental points which are too well known for me to enumerate, it was answered with a resolution which plainly acknowledged the task of the Commission to be the drawing up of a scheme for the reduction—even the substantial reduction—of armaments. The significance of this decision was, however, finally annulled when, during the consideration of separate chapters of the Draft Convention, the Commission turned down the Soviet proposal for the application to these chapters of the word “reduction” instead of “limitation.” More, when the Soviet Delegation, in a spirit of concession and conciliation, agreed to the use of both these words, the Commission nevertheless decided to insist upon the original terminology of the Draft Convention and to stick to the word “limitation” alone, thus

emphasising its desire to confine the tasks of the coming Disarmament Conference merely to the limitation of armaments. If I were a stickler for the Covenant of the League of Nations I should be entitled to accuse the Commission of a flagrant infringement of Article 8 of the Covenant so frequently appealed to by delegations, which mentions reduction of armaments, while the Commission has completely eliminated the use of the word "reduction." The reiterated rejection of the Soviet proposal for the drawing up of a scheme of reduction ; and mere limitation of armaments, has been the most important feature of the Session, which every sincere supporter and friend of disarmament cannot fail to notice.

What is then the positive balance of the work of the Session ? A few Articles enumerating effectives for land armaments survived the second reading ; many of these, however, and the schedule themselves, have suffered considerable damage in their new revision. But does the Commission, however, really intend the reduction even of the elements of armed forces enumerated in these Articles ? I think an unequivocal reply to this question has been given by the determined refusal of the Commission to employ the words "reduction of armaments." Moreover, some delegates have given us to understand at this very Session, that the countries they represent do not see their way to reducing their armies, some because they claim already to have reduced their armies voluntarily, others because they are in exceptional circumstances, and yet others because they consider themselves entitled to increase their armies.

In these circumstances I may be pardoned for asking what is the point of the Preparatory Commission meeting yet again before the Conference ? What questions will further sessions of the Preparatory Commission find to deal with ? Naval armaments ? But it was admitted at the Third, Fourth and Fifth Sessions and confirmed at the present Session, that the Preparatory Commission can do nothing at all with regard to this problem, which has been handed over to certain sea Powers for settlement, and is to be left to their discretion, and moreover, is quite outside the Preparatory Commission. Even if these diplomatic negotiations between Powers give any results, the Preparatory Commission will confine itself to their mere registration. Could not the Conference carry

out this registration equally well ? The limitation of budgetary expenditure ? But have not several delegates here told us that such limitation would be unacceptable to them ? Publicity ? But this is a mere side issue and of importance only in case of the actual reduction of armaments, which has not yet been decided upon. Perhaps the Commission intends to revise the chapters on the organisation of control ? But have not delegates here told us that they cannot accept the principle of international control ? There remain sundry questions of expiration of the Convention, its ratification, of depositing the instruments of ratification, etc. Is it really worth while to meet to consider questions of such secondary importance when nothing has yet been achieved on the fundamental questions ? If the Conference is able to arrive at important results of any sort on the fundamental questions it will then be much easier to decide questions of ratification, etc.

All the above considerations force me to the conclusion that there is no necessity to call the Commission again, and that it would be quite practicable to proceed direct to the convocation of the Disarmament Conference, in which case the document known as the Draft Convention for Disarmament could be handed over to it in its present state, by way of material.

We must, of course, ask ourselves whether the Conference will be in a position to justify those hopes placed so far with but little grounds upon the Preparatory Commission. Far be it from me to lay the blame for the failure of the work of the Commission upon my colleagues. I am willing to concede that they have spoken here against proposals for disarmament, with reluctance—against their own will, I would even say sometimes against their personal convictions. In so doing, they have but carried out the instructions of their Governments. They themselves would probably be glad to carry out instructions of an opposite nature. It may be asked whether we may expect these or any other representatives of these same Governments to take up a different stand at the Conference with regard to the reduction of armaments. Emphatically, no. If, nevertheless, we still urge a speedy convocation of the Conference, it is because we hope that the peoples of all countries, who are the principal motive power in the international campaign for disarmament and peace, learning of the fruitlessness of the work of the Preparatory Commission, will so increase their pressure on

their Governments that the latter will be forced to take up at the Conference itself a position much more in correspondence with their desires and demands. In this case the Conference will be forced to reject the work of the Preparatory Commission, and begin again from the beginning, perhaps setting up a new Commission under definite instructions quite different from those on which the work of our Preparatory Commission has been based. If, on the other hand, delegates come to the Conference with the same instructions which guided the Preparatory Commission, the Conference will of course come to grief. Even this would have the advantage of forcing the popular movement for peace and disarmament to strike out into new paths, to dig fresh channels, leading more surely to the aims it has at heart. In either case the causes of peace and disarmament can only gain by speeding up the convocation of the Conference.

There is no need for me to declare, like Count Bernstorff, that my delegation cannot share the responsibility with the majority of the Commission for the results, or, to be precise, the non-results of its work. The Soviet Delegation has more than once, and long ago, declared this. The German Delegation for a long time placed certain hopes on the second reading of the Commission's Draft Convention, energetically insisting upon this. The Soviet Delegation never nourished any such hopes and for that reason expressed itself all along against this second reading, proposing its own draft, based upon other principles, more difficult for the Governments to reject than are those proposals which have arisen out of the former work of the Commission. The Soviet Delegation feels, therefore, no disappointment whatsoever. It does not regret its participation in the Commission, nor the time which it would seem to have spent in vain. By its presence in the Commission and its proposals in the sphere of the utmost disarmament, it has nipped in the bud the legend which it has been attempted to circulate here of the Soviet Union as an obstacle in the path of general disarmament. Of all the countries here represented the Soviet Union lies under the greatest menace. It is the object of the hostility and unfriendliness of the whole bourgeois world. Its foes are legion and its friends are few. In case of attack it could count only upon its own armed forces, the Red Army and the Red Navy. Despite this, the Soviet Delegation has not seen fit to

refer here to the insufficient security of its country or the special conditions of its situation, has not demanded any exceptions, but has agreed to the most radical forms of disarmament, nay, has itself proposed them. We are forced to record that this example has found no imitators, even among States which are infinitely better placed as regards national security. Every time proposals for more effective means of disarmament, greater contraction of the scope of future wars, and the utmost mitigation of their horrors, were voted upon, the Soviet Delegation has found itself in a minority, often a minority of one. The Soviet Delegation is no whit abashed by this isolation—it is proud of it. It is willing, in the same spirit of readiness for sacrifices and real concessions for the sake of disarmament, and in the same spirit of peace, to come to the Disarmament Conference, the speediest convocation of which I now propose.

7. *Letter from M. Litvinov, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs for the U.S.S.R., to Mr. Loudoun, President of Preparatory Disarmament Commission. December 5th, 1928.*

Mr. President,

In my letter of August 20th, referring to the resolution of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission to convoke the commission to a new session "if possible before the next General Assembly," I took the liberty of asking you, Mr. President, what were the reasons preventing the convocation of the Preparatory Commission in the term mentioned, and, finally, when it was intended to call the next session.

In your reply of September 5th, you, Mr. President, briefly informed me that, in your opinion, the convocation of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission before the League of Nations General Assembly would not produce desirable results. With regard to my question as to the prospects of the convocation of the next session, you replied that you were following events developing at the League of Nations General Assembly, at the conclusion of which you would be in a position to take a decision.

I do not know if the course of events to which you referred in your letter satisfied you, Mr. President, and made it easier for you

to take a decision. All I know is that the League of Nations General Assembly passed an extremely vague resolution on disarmament, charging the president of the Preparatory Commission to "keep in touch with the interested Governments in order to find out the state of their negotiations and be able to convoke a commission at the end of the present year and in any case in the beginning of 1929."

Thus the convocation of the next session of the Preparatory Commission has again been placed in dependence on the course of diplomatic negotiations between several States, which negotiations were in their turn the cause of the premature break-up of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission.

At the last session of the Preparatory Commission the Soviet Delegation resolutely objected to the postponement by the Preparatory Commission itself of open and public discussion of the questions of disarmament, and also to the transference of the centre of gravity in such discussion to secret diplomatic negotiations of a small group of powers. The Soviet Delegation at the time expressed doubts of the possibility of working out in this way a generally acceptable basis for agreement on disarmament. It was not difficult to foresee that the powers participating in such negotiations would endeavour to come to such an agreement as, while not limiting at all, or scarcely limiting the number and calibre of the armaments in which they themselves were interested, would cause the greatest possible limitation of the armaments of other States, not participating in the negotiations, or drawn into them subsequently. Such an agreement would serve anything but the cause of disarmament. By making the position in the preparatory commission or disarmament conference and their opposition to the reduction of any special form of armaments interesting them easier for the participators in the negotiations, such an agreement could only create fresh difficulties in the way of a general agreement on disarmament.

I am now forced to state that these fears of the Soviet Delegation have been unfortunately, completely justified. As far as may be judged by the publication recently of official documents, the negotiations which have been going on with regard to the reduction of armaments between Great Britain and France have been a failure, not only not assisting, but rather impeding the further

work of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. The significance of the negotiation so far has merely been the failure of the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Commission, the non-convocation of the Sixth, and the complete inactivity of the Commission for at least nine months.

Now, when the negotiations, while unsuccessful, are at least over for the time, there would seem to be no other events the course of which would require delay in the decision of the question of the convocation of the Preparatory Commission. Little encouraging as may be the prospects of the work of the Commission, obscured as they have been by the divergencies ever becoming more acute as a result of the negotiations between certain powers on individual questions of disarmament, the Preparatory Commission, in the opinion of the Soviet delegation, ought to meet immediately, if only to analyse the causes of the failure of its work and draw the proper conclusions from the existing state of affairs, seeking out new paths for the solution of the problems confronting the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

The unfortunate results of the disarmament negotiations between several powers which must now be recorded are explicable, in my opinion, however, not only by the circumstance that the negotiations went on secretly and were limited to the minimum number of participants. The failure of the negotiations must be attributed also to those principles which it is desired to make the basis of the agreement, namely : the principle of the individual establishment of armament rates for each country separately, without any common criterion fair and acceptable for all. Unfortunately this principle arises from the draft disarmament convention to which the Preparatory Commission has already devoted several fruitless sessions. The Soviet Delegation steadily pointed out the necessity for applying to the reduction of armaments such a common criterion, from the very beginning of its participation in the preparatory commission, in accordance with which it brought before the Fifth Session of the commission its draft disarmament convention, based on proportional reduction of armaments (by fifty per cent), compulsory for all, with certain concessions in favour of the weakest states. I am profoundly convinced that if the preparatory commission does not wish to continue merely to mark time, or finally to admit its utter powerlessness

to stimulate disarmament, it will have to proceed to the speediest and most serious consideration of the Soviet delegations' draft convention for the reduction of armaments. I would therefore request you, Mr. President, to propose to all the participants of the Preparatory Commission that they endeavour without loss of time to get instructions from their Governments, with a view to the placing of this draft convention on the agenda of the next session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

Thus, Mr. President, my proposal amounts to the speediest convocation of the Sixth Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and the taking of the necessary measures for the placing of the Soviet draft convention for the reduction of armaments before this session.

Requesting you, Mr. Chairman, to be so kind as to communicate this letter to the members of the Preparatory Commission, I have the honour to be, etc.,

Litvinov, U.S.S.R. Delegation to
Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

PART IV
THE U.S.S.R. AND THE KELLOGG PACT

PART IV

The U.S.S.R. and the Kellogg Pact

1. INTERVIEW WITH G. CHICHERIN, PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS. AUGUST 7TH, 1928.
2. REPLY OF GOVERNMENT OF U.S.S.R. TO PROPOSAL TO ADHERE TO KELLOGG PACT. (FROM PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.)
3. NOTE FROM ACTING PEOPLE'S COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, M. LITVINOV, TO MR. PATEK, POLISH MINISTER TO THE U.S.S.R. DECEMBER 29TH, 1928.
4. PROTOCOL.
5. REPLY OF U.S.S.R. GOVERNMENT TO POLISH NOTE. JANUARY 11TH, 1929. (HANDED TO MR. ZELINSKI, CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES FOR THE POLISH GOVERNMENT TO THE U.S.S.R., BY M. KARSKI, ON BEHALF OF M. LITVINOV.)
6. PROPOSAL BY SOVIET GOVERNMENT FOR PROCEDURE FOR SIGNING SOVIET POLISH PROTOCOL. JANUARY 21ST, 1929.
7. SPEECH BY M. LITVINOV, ACTING COMMISSAR FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AT SIGNING OF PROTOCOL ON FEBRUARY 9TH, 1929.

1. *Interview with G. Chicherin, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs. August 7th, 1928.*

"THE so-called Kellogg Pact, or, to be more precise, the multi-lateral agreement on the prohibition of war as a weapon of national policy has held the centre of attention in diplomatic circles in all countries, since December last. During the whole of this period a lively exchange of opinions between the powers has gone on with regard to the working out of this pact, but the powers have not thought of inviting the U.S.S.R. to take part in these negotiations. The leading Governments conducting these negotiations could scarcely have failed to consider whether or not to invite the U.S.S.R. to take part in them, and if they have not done so, they must have had reasons which appeared to them perfectly adequate.

This fact cannot but emphasise the real purpose of the so-called Kellogg Pact.

The exclusion of the Soviet Government from the number of participants in these negotiations leads us first of all to the idea that it is apparently part of the real aims of this pact to make of it an instrument for the isolation of and struggle with the U.S.S.R. The negotiations on the conclusion of the so-called Kellogg Pact are apparently an organic part of a policy which is at present the nucleus of international relations, of surrounding the U.S.S.R. I would remind you that, on returning from the December Session of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, our delegate, Comrade Litvinov, gave in his report a short analysis of the Kellogg proposal to make a pact, and proved brilliantly that the prohibition of war, as a weapon of national policy is merely another way of expressing the preparation of war as an instrument of world counter-revolution. The real task of the Kellogg pact is made still clearer in the light of those French reservations, introduced by the American Government in a note of June 23rd, when sending the Powers initiating the pact a revised text. The American Government emphasised the fact that this second edition was made with a view to giving expression to the French demands. In its reply to this note the French Government still more frankly emphasised the fact that the Kellogg Pact aims at preserving existing international treaty relations, but the same idea was expressed in the note of the American Government rather less blatantly. The French Government would substitute war for the conduct of national policy by war for the perpetuation of existing treaty relations between interested nations. The former, in the opinion of the French Government, consists in a given Government acting for itself, independent of existing relations with other States, while the latter consists in war by a given State for the preservation of existing treaty relations. This is precisely why the treaties between France and Poland, and France and Rumania are such as to form part of the general system of present treaty relations, in which case war arising from them is not considered as war, since it is not a weapon of national policy, but a war for the perpetuation of existing peaceful and friendly relations between the parties to the pact. When the American Government, sending on June 23rd a revised text of the pact to the initiatory

powers, pointed out that this revised text fulfilled the French demands, it was not mistaken ; it is true the pact states that the contracting parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy in order to perpetuate existing peaceful and friendly relations between their peoples. The American Government in a covering note explained in detail that both the constitution of the League of Nations and the Locarno Agreement, as well as the French treaties with various powers fall under the relations referred to in the Kellogg Pact. This shows clearly that the Kellogg Pact is an organic part of the preparation for war against the U.S.S.R. The same is true of the English reservations as to the defence of various territories in various parts of the globe, necessary for the safety of the British Empire, the British only adhering to the Kellogg Pact on condition of the precise establishment of the fact that they preserve freedom of action in regard to the defence of these territories.

In its note of June 23rd the American Government refers to the replies of the British and other Governments and points out that no reservations made by any Government run counter to the revised text of the pact. More, the American Government asserts that the pact fully guarantees the legitimate interests of all its contracting parties. The American Government goes still further and declares that any nation at any moment, regardless of existing treaties, is entitled to decide whether circumstances demand recourse to war for defence, and if a nation struggles for a good cause the whole world will applaud it.

Not a single one of the powers who initiated the pact protested against this interpretation of the pact. Not one of them argued the point. In my opinion it ought to be clear to all that the sting of all this diplomatic manipulation by the leading western powers is directed against the U.S.S.R.

Certain new factors have entered into international relations with regard to the Kellogg Pact of late. A considerable portion of the German press has led a campaign for the invitation of the U.S.S.R. to take part in the Pact. Certain Liberal papers in England, such as *The Daily News* and certain Left French newspapers, as well as a faction of the American press began to express the same ideas. That part of public opinion which found reflection in these newspapers began to put the question of the possibility of inviting

the U.S.S.R. to join in the Kellogg Pact and whether the U.S.S.R. would agree to this.

My reply to this is that it is not yet too late. The Pact has not yet been signed. Negotiations with the U.S.S.R. with regard to its contents could still take place. Although the so-called initiatory powers have already arranged the Pact among themselves, if they really wanted to make it anything but an instrument for the preparation of war against the U.S.S.R., they could easily join in negotiations with the Soviet Government. Their desire or reluctance to carry on negotiations on this point with the U.S.S.R. will serve as a proof of what their real aims are—peace or the preparation of war. I can declare to you that our Government is ready to take part in these negotiations. Their course will depend on their contents, but the Soviet Government considers that the possibility of its subscribing to the Kellogg Pact is by no means excluded. Up to the present our Government has received no invitation to take part in such negotiations, nor the text itself of the multi-lateral treaty, nor the proposals and reservations introduced into this draft by other powers. We can only take part in these negotiations after we have received all the official documents, and, should the negotiations go well, join also in subscribing to the Pact.

To make an end to wars is one of the chief aims of the Soviet Union's policy. Our Government aims in its policy to remove the possibility of any war whatsoever. Whatever may be the actual results of war in the future, the fundamental purpose of the policy of our Government will consist in the aversion of all wars. Among others we also desire to prevent those which serve as a weapon of national policy. Our Government is there in complete agreement with the theory that everything possible must be done to prevent the incidence of war serving as a weapon of national or imperialist policy, but it finds this proposed prohibition inadequate. Our press has done much to elucidate the true meaning of the Kellogg Pact. We consider criticism of the Pact essential and, should we participate in these negotiations we should propose certain changes in the Pact which are, from our point of view, essential. Our Government considers that the Pact, in itself inadequate, is made still more so by the reservations made by France and England and giving the right to all its contracting parties to interpret it in the

spirit of its own national or imperialist policy. Our Government in particular, emphasises that the Kellogg Pact is specially weakened by the circumstances that it is not accompanied by any obligation in the matter of disarmament. Our delegate to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, Comrade Litvinov, pointed this out at the last session of that commission.

The principal aim of the international policy of the Soviet Union is the preservation of Peace. Our Government's proposal of disarmament is a vivid demonstration of this policy. Our Government cannot refrain from endeavouring to take advantage of the American pact also for the sake of progressing along the path of the struggle for the preservation of general peace. We do not conceal from ourselves that the stand maintained by the more influential part of the press in England, France and the U.S.S.R. with regard to this question, leaves us with but slight hopes of the possibility of taking part in these negotiations. Our Government considers the circumstance of these negotiations going on without its participation to be profoundly unnatural. If it is drawn into them I repeat : the possibility of the participation of our Government in subscribing to the Kellogg Pact is not excluded.

2. *Reply of Government of U.S.S.R. to Proposal to adhere to Kellogg Pact. (From People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs.)*

Yesterday, August 31st, Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, received M. Jean Herbet, French Ambassador in Moscow, and handed him the following Note :
Mr. Ambassador,

On August 27th you were kind enough, at the instigation of your Government, to draw my attention officially to the fact that on that day the Governments of the German Republic, the United States of America, Belgium, France, Great Britain and its dominions, Italy, Japan, Poland, and Czecho-Slovakia had signed a multi-lateral pact, under which they bound themselves not to resort in their mutual relations to war as a weapon of national policy, and to settle any differences arising between them exclusively by peaceful means. While handing me a copy of the afore-named Pact, and giving me a brief summary of its history, you were kind enough, Mr. Ambassador, to inform me : (a) that the limitation of the number of original participants in the Pact

corresponded, in the opinion of the Government of the United States of America, merely to practical considerations, with a view to facilitating the speediest possible realisation of the Pact, but that nevertheless it had always been intended, when finally formulated, to guarantee the immediate co-operation of all nations on the same conditions and with the same advantages as enjoyed by the original participants to the Pact ; (b) that in accordance with this the Government of the United States was empowered to accept declarations from all States wishing to subscribe to the Pact ; (c) that the representatives of the Government of the United States in all foreign States excepting those whose representatives had already signed the Pact had received instructions to communicate to the Governments to which they are accredited the text of the Pact signed in Paris ; (d) that the United States Government states its readiness to receive now any declarations of adherence from these States ; (e) that the Government of the French republic has accepted the mission to communicate to the U.S.S.R. Government, through your mediation, Mr. Ambassador, the text of the above-mentioned Pact and to ask it if it consented to subscribe to the Pact, and, (f) that in this case you, Mr. Ambassador, are empowered to accept the declaration of adherence for transmission to Washington.

I have the honour, Mr. Ambassador, to request you to transmit the answer of the Soviet Government to your Government as hereunder given, asking them to send it to the Government of the United States of America :

(1) The Soviet Government, whose foreign policy since the very first days of its existence has been founded upon the preservation and guarantee of general peace, has always and everywhere acted as the energetic supporter of peace and met half-way every step in that direction. At the same time the Soviet Government has always considered and still considers the carrying out of a plan for general and complete disarmament as the only real means of averting armed conflicts, since in an atmosphere of general feverish armament any rivalry between powers inevitably leads to war, and the more perfect the system of armament, the more destructive such war will be. A fully-worked out draft for complete disarmament was proposed by the Soviet Delegation to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission under the League of

Nations, but unfortunately this found no support from the majority at the aforementioned commission, including representatives of those same powers who have been the original participators in subscribing to the Paris pact. Our draft was rejected despite the fact that its acceptance and realisation would have signified a true guarantee of peace.

(2) Not desiring to let slip a single opportunity for facilitating the diminution of the heavy burden of armaments on the toiling masses, the Soviet Government, after the rejection of its proposal for full disarmament, not only did not refuse to discuss the question of the partial reduction of armaments, but, through its delegation at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, came forward itself with a fully worked-out draft for partial, but nevertheless very appreciable disarmament. The Soviet Government is, however, unfortunately forced to record that this draft also failed to meet with sympathy at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, thus once more demonstrating the utter powerlessness of the League of Nations in the matter of disarmament, the most solid guarantee of peace and the most powerful means of destroying war, almost all the States who have been the first to subscribe to a pact for the prohibition of war opposing the Soviet proposal.

(3) As well as systematically championing the cause of peace the Soviet Government, for the realisation of its peace policy, also appealed, long before the idea arose for the signing of the Paris Pact, to other powers, with a proposal to renounce, by means of mutual pacts, not only such wars as are provided for under the Paris Pact, but all attacks on each other and all armed conflicts whatsoever. Certain States, such as Germany, Turkey, Afghanistan, Persia and Lithuania, accepted this proposal and concluded corresponding pacts with the Soviet Government ; others passed it over in silence and avoided giving a reply ; while yet others rejected it on the strange grounds that unconditional renunciation from attack was not in accordance with their obligations towards the League of Nations. This, by the way, did not prevent these same powers from subscribing to the Paris Pact, despite the fact that there was no mention whatever in the text of the pact of the inviolability of these obligations.

(4) The above facts bear incontrovertible testimony to the fact that the idea of the removal of war and armed conflicts from

international politics was the fundamental ruling idea of Soviet foreign policy. Despite this the initiators of the Paris Pact did not consider it necessary to invite the Soviet Government to take part in the negotiations preceding this pact, and the working out of its text. Moreover, powers really interested in the guarantee of peace, inasmuch as they have been the objects of attack themselves (Turkey, Afghanistan), or are so at the present time (the republic of the great Chinese nation), have also not been invited to participate in the Pact. The invitation transmitted through the French Government to join the Pact does not contain conditions which would make it possible for the Soviet Government to have any influence on the text of the document signed in Paris. The Soviet Government, however, on the presumption that it cannot be deprived of the right which the Governments signing the Pact have realised or could realise and, taking up its stand on that right, feels bound to make certain preliminary remarks with regard to its attitude to the Pact itself.

(5) The Soviet Government cannot, in the first place, refrain from expressing its profound regret at the absence from the Paris Pact of any obligations whatever in the sphere of disarmament. The Soviet Delegation has already had the opportunity, at the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, of declaring that only the combination of a pact prohibiting war with the execution of full and general disarmament would be capable of a real effect in the guaranteeing of general peace and that, on the contrary, an international treaty "prohibiting war" and not accompanied by even such an elementary guarantee as the limitation of perpetually increasing armaments, must remain a dead letter, without any real significance. The recent public utterances of certain participants in the Paris Pact, on the inevitability of further armaments even after the conclusion of the pact, is confirmation of this. The formation during this time of new international-political groupings, especially in connection with the question of naval armaments has still more emphasised the situation. The present state of affairs therefore makes the taking of decisive measures in the sphere of disarmament more essential than ever.

(6) Turning to the text of the Pact, the Soviet Government considers it essential to point out the insufficiently clear definition in the first clause of the formulation itself of the prohibition of war,

which remains open to various and arbitrary interpretations. The Soviet Government for its part considers that any international war, both as a weapon of so-called "national policy" and as serving other ends (such as the suppression of emancipatory national movements, etc.) should be prohibited. In the opinion of the Soviet Government not only wars in the formal-legal sense of the word (*i.e.*, assuming "declaration of War," etc.), but also military activities, such as intervention, blockade, military occupation of foreign territory or ports, etc., should be prohibited. The history of the last few years knows not a few of such kinds of military activity, carrying with them terrible disasters for the people. The Soviet Republics have themselves been the objects of such attacks and the four hundred million people of China are at present suffering from them. Moreover, such military activities are often transformed into great wars, which cannot then be prevented. And yet these—the most important of all questions from the point of view of the preservation of peace—are passed over in silence in the Pact. Further, in the same first clause, the Pact speaks of the necessity for solving all international controversies and conflicts exclusively by peaceful means. The Soviet Government in this connection considers that to the list of non-peaceful means forbidden by the Pact, should be added also the refusal to revive normal peaceful relations, or the disruption of such relations between nations, since such acts, implying the removal of peaceful means for reconciling disputes, injure relations and facilitate the creation of an atmosphere favourable to the arising of war.

(7) Among the reservations made during diplomatic correspondence between the original participators in the Pact, the Soviet Government attributes special importance to that of the British Government, in clause 10 of its note of May 19th last. By this reservation the British Government reserves to itself freedom of action in regard to various territories not even specially mentioned. If reference is intended to territory forming a part of the British Empire or its dominions, these are already included in the Pact, and the case of attack on them provided for, so that the reservations of the British Government in their regard would seem to be, to say the least of it, superfluous. If reference is intended to other territory, the participants in the Pact are entitled to know where the freedom of action of the British Empire begins

and where it ends. But the British Government does not only reserve to itself freedom of action in case of military attack on these territories, but even with regard to any "unfriendly" act or so-called "interference," while it apparently reserves to itself the right of arbitrary definition of what constitutes an "unfriendly" act, or "interference," justifying open military action on the part of the British Empire.

To acknowledge such rights for the British Empire would be to justify war and might serve as an infectious example for other participants of the Pact also, who would be entitled by their equal rights to adopt similar privileges in relation to other territories, so that in the end there would perhaps be no spot on the globe to which the Pact would apply. Indeed, the reservations of the British Empire imply an invitation to another participant of the Pact to withdraw from the latter's field of influence other territories. The Soviet Government can only regard these reservations as an attempt to take advantage of the Pact itself as a weapon of imperialist policy. The above-mentioned Note of the British Government, however, was not communicated to the Soviet Government as integral or supplement to the Pact, and it cannot therefore be considered as binding on the Soviet Government, just as other reservations contained in the diplomatic correspondence with regard to the Pact between its original participants will not be binding for it. The Soviet Government is also unable to agree with any other reservations capable of serving as a justification of war, especially such made in the correspondence referred to for the withdrawal from the influence of the Pact of decisions arising out of the League of Nations statute and the Locarno agreement.

(8) To sum up I must point out the lack in the Pact of obligations for disarmament, the only real element that can guarantee peace, the inadequacy and indefiniteness of the formulation of the prohibition of war itself and the existence of a series of reservations aimed at removing in advance even what obligations with regard to peace do exist in the Pact. Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Paris Pact imposes on the Powers some external obligations before public opinion and gives the Soviet Government another opportunity to place before all participants in the Pact the most important question for peace—the question of disarmament, the solution of

which is the only guarantee of the aversion of war—the Soviet Government declares its consent to subscribe to the Paris Pact.

In accordance with the above I shall have the honour to transmit you, Mr. Ambassador, the corresponding declaration of the Soviet Government's adherence to the Kellogg Pact as soon as the necessary formalities have been completed.

Accept, etc.,

Litvinov, Acting People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs.

3. *Note from Acting People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, to Mr. Patek, Polish Minister to the U.S.S.R. December 29th, 1928.*

Mr. Minister,

On August 24th, 1926, the Soviet Government communicated to the Government of the Polish Republic, through its plenipotentiary representative in Warsaw, a draft agreement for non-aggression. This step of the Soviet Government was the result of previous negotiations between the two Governments held on the initiative of the Soviet Government and is the expression of the line which the Soviet Government has unremittingly pursued in its foreign policy and relations with other States and in accordance with which it has come forward with proposals for disarmament, first at the Moscow Conference called by it as early as 1922, and later at the League of Nations Preparatory Disarmament Commission.

While regarding general disarmament as the most effective guarantee of the preservation of peace, the Soviet Government at the same time regards non-aggression treaties as serious factors, capable of facilitating the aversion of armed conflicts between States.

The Soviet Government is forced to place on record that, although negotiations with the Polish Government for the conclusion of such a treaty were begun several years ago, they have not advanced, despite the most serious endeavours of the Soviet Government to arrive at an agreement.

Fully appreciating the importance of the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty for the reinforcement and development of Soviet-Polish relations, and for the consolidation of general peace, the

Soviet Government regrets the fruitlessness of its efforts, and once more declares its unalterable readiness to sign a non-aggression treaty with the Government of the Polish Republic.

At the same time that the negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of non-aggression between Poland and the Soviet Union have been fruitless, the Polish Government, invited to take part in the Kellogg Pact, a multi-lateral treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed this treaty, together with certain other States, on August 27th, 1928, in Paris, the Government of the Soviet Union signing it subsequently.

On receiving the invitation to adhere to the Paris Treaty (Kellogg Pact), the Soviet Government, in a note to the French Government, pointed out the absence in the pact of obligations to disarmament, the only effective element of guarantee for peace, the inadequacy and vagueness of the formula of the prohibition of war itself, and the existence of other features weakening the significance of the Pact. The Soviet Government still considers that this Pact affords no such guarantee of the inviolability of peace as arose from the pacts for non-aggression and non-formation of hostile groupings proposed by itself.

Inasmuch, however, as the Soviet Government notes that the Paris Treaty (Kellogg Pact) imposes upon its participators certain obligations of a peaceful nature, it immediately adhered to it, and, with its customary seriousness in all acts regarding the cause of peace, is desirous of seeing the Pact come into force as soon as possible, especially with regard to the Soviet Union and its neighbouring States.

Unfortunately the coming into force of the Paris Pact depends according to its third clause, on the ratification of the treaty by fourteen designated states. During the four months that have elapsed since the signing of the treaty not one of these fourteen States has ratified it, which circumstance gives rise to fears that the treaty may remain a dead letter for a long time to come, and not binding for any State. Apparently an earlier coming into force for the treaty between individual States can only be brought about by the signing by them of a special supplementary agreement.

The Soviet Government, recognising that the guarantee of peace in Eastern Europe is a matter of the first importance and

that, of the Soviet Union's Western neighbours, Poland has signed the Paris Pact, has decided to appeal to the Polish Government with a proposal to sign the appended protocol, according to which the Paris Pact for the prohibition of war should come into force between the Soviet Union and Poland immediately after the ratification of it by the two States, irrespective of the conditions provided for in Clause III of the Treaty. In signing such a protocol the Polish Government would be, of course, undertaking the moral obligation for the speediest possible official ratification both of the Paris Treaty and the protocol itself. With regard to the U.S.S.R. its adherence to the Paris Treaty has already been ratified by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the Soviet Union.

In drawing your attention, Mr. Minister, to Clause IV of the Protocol, which provides for the subscription to the protocol of any other States adhering to the Paris Treaty, or according to their adherence to it, the Soviet Government expresses the firm conviction that the realisation of its proposal at the present time within the limits of the relations between the Soviet Union and Poland, would considerably facilitate the consolidation of peace in Eastern Europe.

I have to state that the present proposal does not affect the Soviet Government's previous proposal to the Polish Government of a non-aggression treaty the conclusion of which would, in the long run, be of still greater service to the reinforcement of neighbourly relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic.

The Soviet Government hopes to meet with support of its present proposal from the Polish Government, in view of the fact that the latter, already having signed the multi-lateral Paris treaty, of which the Soviet Union is also a signatory, can have no objection to its speediest possible coming into force between the two States.

The Soviet Government at the same time informs the Polish Government that it is making analogous proposals simultaneously to the Lithuanian Republic, as the only Baltic country already having signed the Paris Treaty. It is at present not making the same proposals to the Governments of Finland, Esthonia and Latvia, only because these States have not yet formally subscribed to the Paris Treaty. The Soviet Union Government, however, reserves

to itself the right to appeal to these Governments after their adherence to the Paris Treaty.

I would ask you, Mr. Minister, to communicate the above to your Government and accept my assurances of sincere respect, etc. . . .

Litvinov, Acting-People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs.

Moscow, December 29th, 1928.

4. *Protocol.*

The Government of the Esthonian Republic, The President of the Latvian Republic, The President of the Polish Republic, His Majesty The King of Rumania, The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, moved by the desire to contribute to the consolidation of peace which exists between their countries and to bring into force as speedily as possible between the peoples of these countries the treaty for the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928, have decided to realise the above intentions by means of this Protocol, and have appointed as mandatories :

The Government of the Esthonian Republic :

M. Julius Seliamaa, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Esthonia in Moscow,

The President of the Latvian Republic :

M. Carl Ozols, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Latvia in Moscow,

The President of the Polish Republic :

M. Stanislaus Pateka, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Poland in Moscow,

His Majesty the King of Rumania :

M. Carl A. Davila, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in Warsaw, and

The Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics :

M. Maxim Litvinov, Member of the Central Executive Committee of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics, Deputy *pro tem* of the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs,

who, after an exchange of credentials drawn up in the recognised form, have agreed as follows.

Clause I

The Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy, signed in Paris on August 27th, 1928, a copy of which is hereby appended as an organic part of this Protocol, to come into force between the Contracting Parties after the ratification of the afore-mentioned 1928 Paris Treaty by the proper legal authorities of the respective Contracting Parties.

Clause II

The coming into force of the 1928 Paris Treaty, provided for by this Protocol, in the relations between the participants of this Protocol will be valid regardless of the coming into force of the 1928 Paris Treaty, as stated in Clause III of the latter.

Clause III

1. This Protocol to be ratified by the proper legal authorities of the Contracting Parties, according to their respective constitutions.
2. The Ratification Charters to be handed over by each of the Contracting Parties for safe keeping to the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics within a week from the day of the ratification of this Protocol, by the respective Contracting Party.
3. From the day of the handing over for safe keeping of the Ratification Charters by two of the Contracting Parties, this Protocol comes into force between these two Parties. In the relations between the remaining Contracting Parties and States for which the Protocol has already come into force, it will come into force as they hand over their Ratification Charters for safe keeping.
4. The Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics will immediately inform all the signatories of this Protocol about every handing over of Ratification Charters for safe keeping.

Clause IV

To make valid Clause I of this Protocol, each Contracting Party immediately after the ratification of the 1928 Paris Treaty by its legislative organs informs of this the Union of Socialist Soviet

Republics and the other participants of this Protocol through diplomatic channels.

Clause V

The Governments of all countries are at liberty to adhere to this Protocol. Notification of final adherence must be made to the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics which will inform all the other participants of this Protocol about this adherence. From the moment of the receipt of the said information *re* adherence, this Protocol will come into force in the relations between the newly adhering State and all the other participants of this Protocol.

Clause VI

The coming into force on the basis of this Protocol of the 1928 Paris Treaty in the relations between the newly adhering State and all the other participants of this Protocol must take place in the order indicated in Clause IV of this Protocol.

Clause VII

This Protocol is drawn up in one copy an authentic specimen of which has been communicated by the Government of the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics to every signatory or adhering State.

In confirmation of this, the above-mentioned Mandatories have signed this Protocol, affixing to it their seals.

Executed, Moscow, on February 9th, 1929.

5. *Reply of U.S.S.R. Government to Polish Note. January 11th, 1929. (Handed to Mr. Zelinski, Chargé d'Affaires for the Polish Government to the U.S.S.R., by M. Karski, on behalf of M. Litvinov.)*

Mr. Chargé d'Affaires,

1. In replying to your Note of January 10th, 1929, giving the provisional reply of your Government to my Note of December 29th, 1928, I have the honour to request you to communicate the following to your Government :

The Government of the U.S.S.R. notes with satisfaction the declaration of the Polish Government of its theoretical readiness to accept the proposal for the speedy putting into force between the U.S.S.R. and Poland of the Paris Treaty for the Prohibition of

War. The Soviet Government expresses, however, regret at the absence in the aforementioned Note of the Polish Government, of its agreement to the immediate realisation of the Soviet Government's proposal, which imposes no new obligations on either party, beyond those already imposed by the Paris Treaty. This proposal appeared to the Soviet Government so clear and simple as to demand an equally clear and simple reply.

2. The Polish Government was courteous enough to describe various circumstances which, in its opinion, would prevent the signing by Poland of the protocol proposed by the Soviet Government. I will take the liberty of dwelling on separate points in your Note for the purpose of fully elucidating the position of the Soviet Government :

3. The Polish Government expressed surprise at the brief reference contained in the Note of the Soviet Government of December 29th to previous negotiations between the Soviet and Polish Governments for a pact of non-aggression, and the Polish Government saw fit to state that the allusions to these negotiations were not precise. In this connection it will suffice if I mention that the Soviet Government at one time suggested to the Polish and Baltic Republics simultaneous proportional reduction of armed forces, but this proposal was rejected by them. The Soviet Government then proposed to the same Governments to sign pacts of non-aggression and abstention from hostile groupings, not stipulating any conditions, nor the solution of any other questions whatsoever which might interest the Soviet Union. By advancing a series of conditions the Polish Government actually rejected the proposal of the Soviet Government for unconditional mutual abstention from attack. Such was uncontroversially the gist of the aforementioned negotiations. There is no point here in entering into discussion of the causes moving the Polish Government to connect non-aggression with any other conditions making the conclusion of the pact impossible. I consider, however, it not superfluous to add that the Polish Government did not allow these conditions to prevent it signing the Paris Treaty for the Prohibition of War.

4. It was precisely this last circumstance, *i.e.*, the unconditional signing by the Polish Government of the Paris Treaty to which the Soviet Union has also subscribed, which caused the Soviet

Government to send to Poland its proposal of December 29th. It assumed that, since Poland saw fit, without imposing any conditions, to undertake to abstain from war in its relations with the Soviet Union, it would scarcely advance conditions for the speedy application of the formal powers of this obligation. At the same time the last paragraph of your Note, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, might be understood to mean that the Polish Government makes the signing of the protocol depend upon the participation in it of other States. This is the more incomprehensible that, in case of ratification of the Paris Treaty by the fifteen States subscribing to it comes automatically into force between Poland and Soviet Russia, irrespective of the adherence to the Treaty of all the Baltic States. It is a little difficult to understand why Poland cannot undertake unconditionally to abstain from war against the U.S.S.R. at once, before the ratification of the Pact by the other fourteen States.

5. The Soviet Government is firmly convinced that the signature of the proposed protocol, if only by the U.S.S.R. and Poland, would not only serve as a consolidation of peaceful relations between the two States but would be an important factor of peace all over Eastern Europe. If, however, the Polish Government does not hold the same opinion as to the importance of a solid peace between the U.S.S.R. and Poland and considers the participation in the protocol of other States in Eastern Europe to be desirable, its objections would be founded and comprehensible if the Soviet Government put any obstacles in the way of the participation of these countries in the protocol. As a matter of fact, however, the Soviet Government declared in its Note of December 29th, with entire clearness and in a form not allowing of any controversial interpretation, that any State that wishes to do so can join the protocol. Moreover, in the same Note, itself expressed the desire that its other neighbouring States would adhere to the protocol. In the same Note it is stated that a similar proposal had been made to Lithuania alone, only because the other Baltic States, to the knowledge of the Soviet Government, had not yet formulated their adherence to the Paris Treaty. The Polish Government ought to understand the impossibility of the proposal to speed up the coming into force of the Treaty by States not having signed it or adhered to it.

6. The Polish Government expresses indignation in its Note of January 10th, that the Soviet Government should propose participation to Lithuania in the Protocol, which, under the Riga Treaty is not a direct neighbour of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government would have much more right to express indignation at the demand of the Polish Government as to the drawing into the protocol of Finland and Esthonia, which are territorially still further from the Polish frontiers. The difference is, however, that between the U.S.S.R., Finland and Esthonia there are no controversial questions giving grounds for the fear of the infringement of peace between them, which is more than can be said of the relations between Poland and Lithuania. It is but recently that Polish-Lithuanian relations gave rise to serious fears for the fate of European peace, and Poland itself endeavoured through the League of Nations to put an end to the state of war with Lithuania, so that the Soviet Government considered that Poland ought only to welcome the invitation of the Soviet Government to the Lithuanian Republic to take part in the Protocol.

7. The Polish Government itself declares in its Note that the Baltic States have declared in one form or another merely their readiness to adhere to the Kellogg Pact, proving that as yet this has not taken place. Both before sending the Note of December 29th to the Polish Government, and especially after it, the Soviet Government endeavoured through diplomatic channels to discover the attitude of the Baltic States to the Paris Pact, but these endeavours were unfortunately not crowned with success. The Soviet Government assumes that definite formal procedure is required for adherence to any treaty. When the Soviet Government was invited to adhere to the Paris treaty it received information, in answer to its enquiries, as to the form in which its adherence was to be made and the procedure to be observed. After its adherence the Soviet Government, through the courteous mediation of the French Government, was informed of the acceptance by the Government of the United States of America of the Soviet Union's act of adherence, in proof of which the Soviet Government was sent a copy of the Paris Treaty signed by Mr. Kellogg. If such procedure is obligatory for all States joining the Pact, it would appear to be an easy matter to establish which of the Baltic countries have subscribed to the Pact. Up to the

present the Soviet Government has only had official notification of adherence from the Lithuanian Government. The moment, however, that any one of the Baltic States officially notifies its adherence to the Pact the Soviet Government will immediately invite it to join the protocol for the speediest coming into force of the Pact. At the same time the Soviet Government is continuing its efforts to elucidate the position of the Baltic countries with regard to the Paris Treaty. It is aware that similar endeavours are being made by the Lithuanian Government. The Soviet Government would welcome analogous efforts on the part of the Polish Government.

8. Similarly if Rumania also, with which the Soviet Government is not in diplomatic relations, joins those States formulating their adherence to the Paris Treaty, the Soviet Government is ready to invite it to join in the protocol proposed by itself. It is perfectly obvious that, in adhering to the Paris Treaty the Soviet Government realised that it undertook, from the moment of that country's adherence to the Kellogg Pact, to exclude warlike methods of solving conflicts with Rumania, although this is far from liquidating existing controversies. The Soviet Government can therefore have no objection to the immediate coming into force of this obligation between itself and the Rumanian Government by means of the adherence of the latter to the Soviet-Polish protocol, as provided for in the fourth clause of the Protocol. The Soviet Government would feel grateful if the Polish Government would let it know as soon as possible if there has been any formal adherence on the part of Rumania to the Paris Pact, and if Rumania is inclined to take part in the proposed protocol. The reference to Rumania cannot, therefore, be considered a convincing explanation of the Polish Government's refusal to put into practice immediately the proposal of the Soviet Government.

9. Taking into consideration, however, that the aim of the Soviet Government's proposal is the speediest possible putting into force of the Paris Treaty for the Prohibition of War, if only between certain States, the Soviet Government cannot but wish to make sure that the evasive position or refusal of any given State to sign the protocol should not delay its coming into force, and hence the coming into force of the Paris Treaty, between States that sign the protocol in advance or adhere to it.

10. By way of another obstacle to the carrying out of the Soviet Government's proposal, reference is made in the Polish Government's Note to obligations supposed to arise out of the Paris Treaty of unanimous ratification procedure on the part of its original participants. The Soviet Government can find no such obligation in the Paris Treaty, which states nowhere that the ratifications of States signing it must be simultaneous or carried out after any definite manner. The Treaty also contains no sort of limitations for its participants in the sense of conclusion between themselves of any other treaties or agreements whatsoever, whose contents do not run counter to the Paris Treaty. In the given instance the Soviet Government proposes nothing but the putting into force between two or more States of this very Paris Treaty. Inasmuch as the initiators or participants of the Treaty aimed at the consolidation of existing peaceful relations and the elimination of war from international practice, they can scarcely object to any agreement whatsoever serving this very end. The Soviet Government considers that the interests both of the people of the U.S.S.R. and of Poland, and their aspirations towards peace, cannot permit of obstacles set up by any other States to the abstention from war as an instrument of their national policy. It is doubtful that any such State would be found that would only permit itself to set up such obstacles.

11. The Polish Government, while confirming the fact that not one of the fifteen States signing the Paris Treaty has as yet ratified it, expresses in its Note the hope that the attitude of these States to the Treaty will be elucidated in the near future. The Soviet Government does not consider that these hopes either should be allowed to impede the acceptance by Poland of its proposal. The fact of the signing of the Protocol preserves its great moral significance for Polish-Soviet relations, even should the hopes of the Polish Government not appear to have been unduly optimistic, and the protocol shortly be absorbed by the coming into force of the Paris Treaty between its participators. The signing of the Protocol will be only the more significant for the cause of peace, if for one reason or another the ratification of the Paris Treaty by all the fifteen States should take longer than expected by the Polish Government.

12. The Soviet Government, while respectfully recommending

the above considerations to the Polish Government, will await the earliest convenient final explanation of the attitude of the Government of the Polish Republic to the proposed Protocol, and a corresponding notification of the readiness of the Polish Government to put it into actual practice.

Accept, Mr. Chargé d'Affaires, etc.,

Litvinov, Acting-People's Commissar
for Foreign Affairs.

6. *Proposal by Soviet Government for Procedure for Signing Soviet Polish Protocol. January 21st, 1929.*

1. The Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the Polish Republic, declaring their consent to the signature of the Protocol, to carry out such immediately in Moscow, through the agency of their appointed representatives in this matter.

2. Immediately after the signature of the Protocol by the representatives of the U.S.S.R. and Poland, the Soviet Government to appeal direct to the Governments of Finland, Esthonia, and Latvia (such an appeal has already been sent to Lithuania, whose consent has been received), and also to Rumania, through the mediacy of the Polish Government, with a proposal to join the Protocol, inasmuch as these States have already adhered to the Paris Treaty.

3. The afore-named States to carry out their adherence to the Protocol in the same way as provided for in the Kellogg Pact itself, *i.e.*, by deposition to the States initiating the protocol of written acts of adherence, with an appended copy of the Protocol.

4. The Governments of States signing the Protocol, and also adhering to it, undertake the ratification in the shortest possible term, according to their respective procedure, both of the Kellogg Pact, and the Protocol itself, in case of previous ratification of the Pact not existing.

5. The Protocol to come into force between the U.S.S.R. and Poland from the moment of the exchange between themselves of ratification papers; and between the U.S.S.R., Poland and other States adhering to it, from the moment of official notification of ratification to the Soviet Government in Moscow.

7. *Speech by M. Litvinov, Acting-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, at signing of Protocol on February 9th, 1929. Moscow.*

I have great pleasure in welcoming, on behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the representatives of the Esthonian and Latvian Republics, the Polish Republic and the kingdom of Rumania, meeting here at the invitation of the Soviet Government for the signing of the Protocol for the immediate putting into action between our States of the obligations under the Treaty of Paris, 1928, for the renunciation of war as a weapon of national policy.

The Soviet Government, the moment the idea of the Protocol arose, which practically coincided with the adherence of the Soviet Union to the Kellogg Pact, suggested an appeal for simultaneous signing of the Protocol by all its Western neighbours. This would only have been possible if all the neighbours of the Soviet Union had formally become adherents of the Paris Pact. Awaiting this moment, the Soviet Government put aside its project for a few weeks. When, however, it appeared that the adherence to the Kellogg Pact on the part of the neighbours of the Soviet Union was likely to take some time, the Soviet Government considered itself bound to appeal in the first place to those neighbouring States which had already accepted the Kellogg Pact, with a proposal for the immediate signing of the Protocol, so that other neighbouring, or even not neighbouring States, desirous of so doing, might subsequently adhere to it. I venture to express, on my own and on your behalf, the hope that those neighbouring States which, for one reason or another, have not delegated their representative to to-day's signing of the Protocol, will become its participants in the shortest possible time. Later adherence to the Protocol will give the same rights and impose the same obligations as arise out of the protocol for its original participants.

The document signed by us to-day is an international deed of a special, even, it may be said, historically unprecedented nature. Its adherents do not, under the document itself, undertake any fresh obligations, merely pledging themselves to put into practice as speedily as possible obligations under another document. This circumstance, however, by no means minimises its importance as an international document.

The positive principles agreed to in the acceptance by our countries of the Kellogg Pact, acquire urgent importance and significance as a result of the signing of the protocol. The renunciation of war is realised by our countries earlier than by other states, but this is far from exhausting the significance of the Protocol. When states which have already undertaken to renounce war by a general international treaty, solemnly declare, and fix this declaration by a fresh international act, that, without waiting for these obligations to come into force for all the nations of the world, they had decided to introduce them immediately for a limited group of countries, they undertake in regard to these countries redoubled obligations of a peaceful character. Each of the participants in the Protocol individually undertakes in the face of the whole world to see to the preservation of peace, as far as this depends upon itself, in a definite geographical area, and the greater the danger formerly presented by this area, the greater the importance of our deed of to-day.

The proposal to sign the Protocol is but a link in the long chain of the Soviet Government's efforts towards universal peace and especially peace in Eastern Europe. It considers disarmament, which it has proposed and is proposing to all peoples, the most effective guarantee of peace. Disarmament alone could effectively guarantee moral and formal undertakings for the preservation of peace under international treaties. On the other hand any international treaty is of real importance inasmuch as it assists the speediest possible realisation of the idea of disarmament. Guided by these conceptions, the Soviet Government adhered to the Kellogg Pact, although fully alive to its defects. It was these same conceptions which caused it to undertake an act directed towards the reinforcement of the Kellogg Pact. It is, however, essential to regard the Soviet Government's proposal for a protocol first and foremost as a manifestation of the Soviet Union's will to peace. The fact that we have among us as a delegate, signing the Protocol, a representative of a State with which the Soviet Union has no normal diplomatic relations and with which serious unsolved dissensions, not solved by this Protocol, have long existed, is but fresh testimony of the Soviet Union's peaceful designs.

I venture to express the hope for the speediest possible ratification of the Protocol by all its participants since the sooner such

ratification takes place the greater will be the importance of the deed.

In inviting you to proceed to the signature of the Protocol, gentlemen, I venture to express the conviction that your Governments and countries have accepted the proposal of the Soviet Government and will carry it out in that true spirit of peace in which it has been made.

* * * *

The Protocol, signed in Moscow on February 9th, 1929, was ratified by the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. on February 13th.

On February 27th, Turkey informed Moscow of its adherence to the Protocol.

On March 5th the Protocol was ratified by Latvia, on the 16th by Esthonia, on the 30th by Poland and Rumania.

Persia announced its adherence to the Protocol on April 3rd, and Lithuania on the 5th.

PART V
THE U.S.S.R. AND PACTS OF NEUTRALITY
AND NON-AGGRESSION

PART V

NON-AGGRESSION

The U.S.S.R. and Pacts of Neutrality and Non-Aggression

1. FROM TREATY BETWEEN PERSIA AND THE RUSSIAN SOCIALIST FEDERAL SOVIET REPUBLIC, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, FEBRUARY 26TH, 1921.
2. FROM TREATY BETWEEN THE R.S.F.S.R. AND AFGHANISTAN, SIGNED AT MOSCOW ON FEBRUARY 18TH, 1921.
3. FROM TREATY BETWEEN THE R.S.F.S.R. AND TURKEY, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, MARCH 16TH, 1921.
4. FROM TREATY BETWEEN THE R.S.F.S.R. AND GERMANY, SIGNED AT RAPALLO, APRIL 16TH, 1922.
5. FROM TREATY FOR ESTABLISHING GENERAL PRINCIPLES FOR THE REGULATION OF QUESTIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, SIGNED IN PEKIN, MAY 31ST, 1924.
6. TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND TURKEY. CONCLUDED AT PARIS, ON DECEMBER 17TH, 1925.
7. TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND AFGHANISTAN FOR NEUTRALITY AND MUTUAL NON-AGGRESSION. CONCLUDED AT PAGMAN, ON AUGUST 31ST, 1926.
8. TREATY FOR NON-AGGRESSION AND NEUTRALITY BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. AND PERSIA. CONCLUDED AT MOSCOW, ON OCTOBER 1ST, 1927.
9. TREATY OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF LITHUANIA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS, SIGNED AT MOSCOW, SEPTEMBER 28TH, 1926.

1. *From Treaty between Persia and the Russian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic, signed at Moscow, February 26th, 1921.*

DESIROUS of seeing the Persian people independent, prosperous and freely disposing of their own property, the Russian Soviet Government declares all treaties, agreements and conventions concluded by the former Tsarist Government with Persia and leading to the diminution of the rights of the Persian people, null and void. . . .

The Russian Soviet Government declares its renunciation from participation in any measures whatever, tending to weaken or destroy the sovereignty of Persia, and declares all conventions and agreements concluded by the former Tsarist Government of Russia with any other powers, to the detriment of Persia, or in regard to her, null and void. . . .

Clause 6. If a third Party should attempt to carry out a policy of usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or if such Power should desire to use Persian territory as a base of operations against Russia, or if a Foreign Power should threaten the frontiers of Federal Russia or those of its Allies, and if the Persian Government should not be able to put a stop to such menace after having been once called upon to do so by Russia, Russia shall have the right to advance her troops into the Persian interior for the purpose of carrying out the military operations necessary for its defence. Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her troops from Persian territory as soon as the danger has been removed.

Clause 7. The considerations set forth in Article 6 have equal weight in the matter of the security of the Caspian Sea. The two High Contracting Parties therefore have agreed that Federal Russia shall have the right to require the Persian Government to send away foreign subjects, in the event of their taking advantage of their engagement in the Persian navy to undertake hostile action against Russia.

Clause 9. In view of the declaration by which it has repudiated the colonial and capitalist policy which occasioned so many misfortunes and was the cause of so much bloodshed, Federal Russia abandons the continuation of the economic undertaking of the Tsarist Government, the object of which was the economic subjugation of Persia, Federal Russia therefore cedes to the Persian Government the full ownership of all funds and of all real and other property, which the Russian Discount Bank possesses on Persian territory, and likewise transfers to it all the assets and liabilities of that Bank. The Persian Government nevertheless agrees that in the towns where it has been decided that the Russian Socialist Republic may establish Consulates and where buildings exist belonging to the Discount Bank, one of these buildings, to be chosen by the Russian Government, shall be placed at the disposal of the Russian Consulate, free of charge.

Clause 10. The Russian Federal Government, having abandoned the colonial policy, which consisted in the construction of roads and telegraph lines more in order to obtain military influence in other countries than for the purpose of developing their civilisations, and being desirous of providing the Persian people with those means of communication indispensable for the independence and development of any nation, and also in order to compensate the Persian people as far as possible for the losses incurred by the sojourn in its territory of the Tsarist armies, cedes free of charge to the Persian Government the following installations. . . .

Clause 13. The Government of Persia undertakes for its part not to give up any concessions and property returned to Persia under this Treaty, to the ownership, disposal, or for the use of, any other state or its citizens, but to preserve all the afore-mentioned rights to itself for the good of the Persian people. . . .

Clause 16. In accordance with the principle of the abolition of Russian consular jurisdiction, expressed in the Note of the Soviet Government of June 26th, 1919, Russian citizens residing in Persia, and likewise Persian citizens residing in Russia, will enjoy, from the moment of the signing of this Treaty, equal rights with local citizens and submit to the law of the country of their residence. All their juridical affairs will be investigated in local juridical bodies.

2. From Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Afghanistan, signed at Moscow on February 28th, 1921.

Clause 1. The High Contracting Parties, acknowledging the independence of each other and undertaking to respect it, are entering into correct diplomatic relations with each other.

Clause 2. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to enter into any military or political agreement with any other power which could cause detriment to either of the contracting parties.

Clause 3. In fulfilment of, and accordance with, the promises of the Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic, made by its head, Lenin, to the Plenipotentiary Minister of the sovereign state of Afghanistan, Russia agrees to give up to Afghanistan the border districts belonging to it during the last century, with the observation of the principles of justice and free expression of the wishes of the peoples inhabiting them. . .

Clause 10. The Government of the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic agrees, for the confirmation of friendly relations between the High Contracting Parties, to afford Afghanistan financial and other material aid.

3. *From Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Turkey, signed at Moscow, March 16th, 1921.*

1. Each of the contracting parties agrees not to recognise any peace treaty or other international agreement imposed upon the other against its will. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R. agrees not to recognise any international agreement relating to Turkey which is not recognised by the National Government of Turkey, at present represented by the Grand National Assembly.

The expression "Turkey" in the present treaty is understood to mean the territories included in the Turkish National Pact on January 28th, 1920, elaborated and proclaimed by the Ottoman Chamber of Deputies in Constantinople, and communicated to the press and to all foreign Governments.

4. The contracting parties, establishing contact between the national movement for the liberation of the Eastern peoples and the struggle of the workers of Russia for a new social order, solemnly recognise the right of these nations to freedom and independence, also their right to choose a form of Government according to their own wishes.

7. The Government of the R.S.F.S.R., holding that the Capitulations régime is incompatible with the full exercise of sovereign rights and the national development of any country, declares this régime and any rights connected therewith to be null and void.

4. *From Treaty between the R.S.F.S.R. and Germany, signed at Rapallo, April 16th, 1922.*

Clause 1. Both Governments agree that any dissensions between Germany and the Russian Soviet Republic with regard to questions arising during the state of war between these States, shall be settled on the following lines :

(a) The German State and the R.S.F.S.R. mutually renounce compensation for their war expenditure, and from military losses caused to them and their citizens in the districts of military

activities owing to military measures, including also requisitions taken on the territory of the other side. Both parties renounce also compensation for non-military losses, caused to the citizens of one side by so-called extraordinary military legislation and violent measures by state organs on the other side.

Clause 2. Germany renounces all claims arising out of the fact of the application up to the present time of laws and measures in the R.S.F.S.R. to German citizens and their private rights, or to the rights of Germany and German States in relation to Russia, and also claims arising generally out of measures in the R.S.F.S.R. or its organs in relation to German citizens or their private rights, on condition that the Government of the R.S.F.S.R. does not satisfy similar claims from other States.

Clause 3. Diplomatic and consular relations between Germany and the R.S.F.S.R. to be immediately revived. The admission of consuls on either side to be regulated by special agreements.

5. *From Treaty for Establishing General Principles for the Regulation of Questions between the U.S.S.R. and the Chinese Republic, signed in Peking, May 31st, 1924.*

Clause 1. Normal diplomatic and consular relations between the contracting parties to be established immediately after the signing of this Treaty.

Clause 4. The Government of the U.S.S.R., in accordance with its policy and its declarations of 1919 and 1920, declares all treaties, agreements, etc., touching the sovereign rights or interests of China, concluded between the former Tsarist Government and any third party or parties, to be null and void.

The Governments of the contracting parties declare that in the future neither of them will conclude any treaties or agreements whatsoever, capable of causing detriment to the sovereign rights or interests of the other.

1. The Governments of both contracting parties declare that the Chinese Eastern railway is a purely commercial enterprise. . .

Clause 10. The Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to renounce the special rights and privileges with regard to all concessions in any part of China whatsoever, acquired by the Tsarist Government under various conventions, treaties, agreements, etc.

Clause 11. The Government of the U.S.S.R. agrees to renounce all claims under the Boxer indemnification.

6. *Treaty of Friendship and Neutrality between the U.S.S.R. and Turkey. Concluded at Paris, on December 17th, 1925. Representatives : U.S.S.R., Chicherin ; Turkey, Tewfik Bey.*

Clause 1. In case of armed action against either of the contracting parties by one or more other powers the other contracting party undertakes to observe neutrality towards the first contracting party.

Note.—By the words “ armed action ” must not be understood military manœuvres, inasmuch as these cause no detriment to the other side.

Clause 2. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to abstain from any attack on the other ; equally they undertake not to take part in any alliance or agreement of a political nature with one or more other powers directed against the military or naval safety of either of the contracting parties. Moreover, each of the contracting parties undertakes not to take part in any hostile act whatsoever of one or more third parties (powers), directed against either of the contracting parties.

Clause 3. (Conclusion of treaty for a term of three years, with the option to prolong from year to year).

7. *Treaty between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan for Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression. (Concluded at Paghman, on August 31st, 1926.)*

With a view to the consolidation of friendly relations and the reinforcement of the neighbourly connections fortunately existing between the U.S.S.R. and Afghanistan, and based on the Treaty signed at Moscow, on February 28th, 1921, which remains in force in all its particulars, irrespective of the existence or annulment of this treaty, the representatives of both the High Contracting Parties have signed the following articles, with a view to the reinforcement of the friendly relations between both States and the guarantee of permanent peace.

Clause 1. In case of war or military action between one of the contracting parties and one or more other powers, the other

contracting party undertakes to observe neutrality in relation to the first.

Clause 2. Each of the contracting parties undertakes to abstain from any attack on the other, and not to take such steps on territory in its possession, which would cause the other contracting party political or military injury. Equally the contracting parties undertake to take no part in any alliances or agreements of a military or political nature with one or more other powers which might be directed against each other, nor in financial or economic boycott or blockade directed against either of the contracting parties. Moreover, should such a line of conduct by any other power or powers with regard to one of the contracting parties be of a hostile character, the other contracting party undertakes not only not to support such a line of conduct, but undertakes to oppose on its own territory any such conduct with all the hostile acts and principles that might arise therefrom.

Clause 3. The High Contracting Parties, taking their stand from mutual recognition of state sovereignty, undertake to abstain from any armed or unarmed interference in the internal affairs of the other contracting party, and will categorically abstain from co-operation and participation in any intervention whatsoever by one or more other powers taking any steps against the other contracting party. The contracting parties will forbid and impede on their respective territories the organisation and activities of groups or individuals which might be injurious to the other contracting party, or pave the way for the overthrow of the State structure of either of the contracting parties, or threaten the integrity of its territory or lead to the mobilisation or recruiting of armed forces against either of the contracting parties. Equally, both parties will forbid and prevent the passage or transportation through their respective territories of armed forces, arms, ammunition, war supplies and all sorts of military material, directed against either of the contracting parties.

Clause 4. The contracting parties agree to proceed to negotiations for the establishment of legal forms for regulating controversies which might arise between them, and which cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels.

Clause 5. Each of the contracting parties reserves to itself entire freedom of action for the taking of steps to establish any

kind of relations with other powers outside the limits of the obligations the conditions of which are established in this treaty.

Clause 6. This treaty will remain in force during three years. After this term it will be considered as automatically prolonged for the period of one year, unless either of the contracting parties give the other six months notice before the expiration of the term of the Treaty of its desire to bring it to an end.

8. *Treaty for Non-Aggression and Neutrality between the U.S.S.R. and Persia. Concluded at Moscow, on October 1st, 1927. Representatives : U.S.S.R., Chicherin and Karakhan ; Persia, Ali-Goli-Khan Ansari.*

Clause 1. The basic mutual relations between Persia and the U.S.S.R. to remain the treaty of February 26th, 1921, all the clauses and decisions of which to remain in force, and the power of which to be extended to the whole territory of the U.S.S.R.

Clause 2. Each of the contracting parties to undertake to refrain from all aggressive action against the other, or the transference of its armed forces beyond the frontiers of the other contracting party.

In the case of either of the contracting parties becoming the object of attack by one or more other powers, the other contracting party undertakes to observe neutrality during the whole course of the conflict, while the contracting party undergoing attack cannot, for its part, infringe this neutrality, whatever strategetical, tactical, or political considerations or advantages such infringement might represent.

Clause 3. Each of the contracting parties undertakes not to enter into any formal or actual political alliances or agreements directed against the safety on land or sea of the other contracting party, or against its integrity, inviolability or sovereignty.

Moreover, both contracting parties undertake to refrain from taking part in economic boycotts or blockades organised by other powers against either of the contracting parties.

Clause 4. In view of the obligations mentioned in Clauses 4 and 5 of the Treaty of February 26th, 1921, each of the contracting parties while having the intention not to interfere with the internal

affairs of the other party, and not to carry on propaganda or a struggle against the Government of the other party, will strictly prohibit its officials from taking such action on the territory of the other contracting party.

If the citizens of either contracting party concern themselves on the territory of the other contracting party with propaganda or a struggle prohibited by the authorities of such contracting party, the Government of this territory will have the right to put an end to the activities of such citizens and apply legal punishment to them.

Equally, in view of the above-mentioned clauses, both parties undertake not to support and not to allow on their respective territories, either the formation of, adherence to or activities of : (1) organisations or groups of any designation whatever, aiming at the struggle against the government of the other contracting party whether by means of violence, risings or acts of terrorism ; (2) organisations or groups, usurping the rôle of Government in the other contracting party or on any part of its territory, or aiming at a struggle by the above-mentioned means with the other contracting party, the infringement of its peace and safety or the attempt on its territorial integrity.

Maintaining their stand on the above principles, both contracting parties bind themselves equally to forbid the recruiting or transportation to their respective territories of armed forces, armaments, munitions or any sort of military material, intended for the above-mentioned organisations.

Clause 5. Both contracting parties undertake to regulate all kinds of controversies that might arise between them and cannot be settled through the usual diplomatic channels, by peaceful means, suitable to the situation.

Clause 6. Outside the limits of the obligations undertaken by both contracting parties, under this treaty, both parties reserve to themselves entire freedom of action in their international relations.

Clause 7. This treaty is concluded for a term of three years. At the expiration of the original term of the treaty it will be considered as automatically prolonged each time for one year, unless either of the contracting parties gives warning of its desire to bring it to an end.

9. *Treaty of Non-Aggression between the Republic of Lithuania and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed at Moscow, September 28th, 1926.*

Article 1. The relations between the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the Lithuanian Republic shall continue to be based on the Treaty of Peace between Lithuania and Russia, concluded at Moscow on July 12th, 1920, all the provisions of which shall retain their force and inviolability.

Article 2. The Lithuanian Republic and the Union of Socialist Republics undertake to respect in all circumstances each other's sovereignty and territorial integrity and inviolability.

Article 3. Each of the two contracting parties undertakes to refrain from any act of aggression whatsoever against the other party.

Should one of the contracting parties, despite its peaceful attitude, be attacked by one or several third Powers, the other contracting party undertakes not to support the said third Power or Powers against the contracting party attacked.

Article 4. If, on the occasion of a conflict of the type mentioned in Article 3, second paragraph, or at a time when neither of the contracting parties is engaged in warlike operations, a political agreement directed against one of the contracting parties is concluded between third Powers, or a coalition is formed between third Powers with a view to the economic or financial boycott of either of the contracting parties, the other contracting party undertakes not to adhere to such agreement or coalition.

Article 5. Should a dispute arise between them, the contracting parties undertake to appoint conciliation commissions, if it should not prove possible to settle the dispute by diplomatic means.

The composition of the said commissions, their rights and the procedure they shall observe shall be settled in virtue of a separate agreement to be concluded between the two Parties.

(L.S.) *(Signed)* Mykolas Slezevicius.

(Signed) Jurjis Baltrusaitis.

(L.S.) *(Signed)* G. V. Chicherin.

(Signed) Serge Alexandrovsky.

